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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a poststructuralist analysis of Nuns Barnes's
NAThtwood as a "carnivalesque" text marked by an engendered difference.
The first chapter is composed of selected biographical material,
considerations of previous critical analyses of Barnes's work, and the
primary establishment of my approach to Nightwood It culminates in an
analysis of a passage from Nightwood which illustrates the
"carnivalesque" nature of Barnes's discourse and introduces the following
discussion of the "carnivalesque" in theory.
The second chapter is a description, analysis, and distillation--via
the commentary of Julia Kristeva and Jacques Derrida's concept of
"differance"--of Bakhtin's concept of the "carnivalesque" as presented in
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics and The Dialogic Imagination. This
process yields a functional concept of the "carnivalesque" that will be
used as the rudiment of my particular reading of the text. I also,
briefly, consider Barnes's text as an arguably "carnivalesque" writing.
In the third chapter, I examine Night wood as a self reflective text
engaged in a carnivalizing of the subjective critical paradigms
determining and delineating our reading of both historical and fictional
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discourses at least since the nineteenth century. For example, I examine
how Nightwood's aphoristic practice confounds a conventional development
of Character, how Night wood inverts the hierarchical relationship of
"plot" over "image", and how it overturns the traditional priority of
"speech" over "writing".
Chapter Four is a reading between Nightwood and The Confessions of
St. Augustine and between Night wood and The Spiritual Exercises of 51.
Ignatius of Loyola. It examines NAghtwoods carnivalesque relationship
to certain predominant Pauline paradigms and Night wood's perverse
adoption of certain Ignatian methods of "composition".
In the fifth chapter, I examine AUghtwoods engagement with
Freudian psychoanalytic theory and consider Barnes as what Kristeva
would call a "writer of abjection". In the course of doing so, I also
consider the possible effects of the gender of the author on the writing
of the text.
ABBREVIATIONS
Lewis and Short 	 Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary. Eds. C.T.
Lewis and C. Short. Oxford: Claredon Press,
1889.
Liddell and Scott	 Greek-English Lexicon. Compiled by H.G.
Liddell and R. Scott. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1871.
OED	 The Oxford English Dictionary.
INTRODUCTION
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DJuna Barnes's novel Night wood has been admired for its poetic and
modernist qualities by readers like T.S. Eliot, Kathleen Raise, and Dylan
Thomas. At the same time, it has been criticized as a narcissistic and
too-private or perverse--even "sick"--work by Graham Greene, and it has
been dismissed as mere rhetoric or "blubbery prose" by Ezra Pound.'
Critical consensus on its value as "art" has not been Nightwoods lot.
However, there has been general agreement on the text's difficulty:
most critics agree that Nigh twood offers intricately complex writing, no
matter if this complexity is assumed to arise from modernist
experimentalism, some form of psychological verisimilitude, excessive
rhetoricity, or Just plain bad writing. The first part of my argument
Is that the complexity of Nightwood's language, rather than being a
rhetorical adjunct to the plot, is the primary generative feature of the
text and should be the focus of any analytical consideration of
Night wood Traditionally, the language which conveys or presents a
novel's plot or theme has been held to be secondary to the plot or
story which it purportedly tells and valued in relation to its non-
obstructive or transparent qualities. In the terms of this desire for a
clear or transparent medium of linguistic presentation, complex
language like that of Nightwood could be considered as an example of
unnecessary obfuscation or excessive rhetoricity. However, in
Night wood what appears to be obfuscation is part of a complex rhetoric
that is an essential part of this novel's creative attempts at
subverting the traditional preference for plot over language and some
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of the related conventions of epistemological, theological, and
psychoanalytic discourses.
Night wood dialectically engages the discourse-rendered world by
turning it upsidedown and targeting that which it represses, its
underworld--night, the unconscious, the untermenschen. Mikhail Balchtin,
the Russian "dialogist", has identified this type of novelistic
enterprise as the "carnivalesque"--the necessary generative, revelling
and revelatory, inversion and subversion of established order. The
thesis of this dissertation is that Djuna Barnes's Night wood is,
fundamentally, a carnivalization of traditional (hegemonic) literary and
non-literary (philosophical, theological, psychoanalytic) discourses.
Mighturoods carnivalization of these orthodoxies is of particular
interest because it is one of the very few "carnivalesque" texts
written by a woman and because Barnes wrote it, not within the
(domestic, social, subjective) sphere of women's writing delineated by
Austen, G. Eliot, the Brontës, Woolf, Colette, Rhys, etc, but within the
(intellectual) sphere of writing by men, the very sphere of the
orthodox itself.2
I should qualify my use of Bakhtin's "carnivalesque", however, as I
have not simply adopted a modus operandi, or an ideology, from Problems
of Dostoevsky's Poetics or The Dialogic imagidatiom My use of the
"carnivalesque" is, first of all, always informed by Roland Barthes's and
Julia Kristeva's concepts of "intertextuality" and by a recognition of
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Nightkroaa's insistence on structurality. It seems that the "reality"
behind Nightwoods writing is always a reality of structures--
hierarchical relationships, binary oppositions, etc.---, and it is this
reality that is always being questioned, or exposed, by the novel.
Where traditional philosophy and religious and literary interpretation
ascend to a meta-position from which to account for all the variables
of life and/or text, NAThtwood descends to "structure" and thus,
honestly, offers no resolution. This is, perhaps, why so many texts
cross through Nightwooct because the text itself is not a resolved
thing. Its references are not centripetally directed to its own
internal, fictional, ideal world, nor do they signify centrifugally
toward some external non-textual reality: they are always of a text-
to-text nature--from Arightwood to the texts of Montaigne, Donne, Eugene
Sue, Shakespeare, Loyola, the Bible, the 'Book of Concealment",
newspapers, maps, children's drawings, tattoos, etc, etc. In short,
NiEhtwood's references are always to other scripts in a general system
of language.
The myriad explicit references in the text give us but the clue to
the intertextuality of Arightwool4 which goes beyond citation and
reference itself. In a sense, citation and reference are the symptoms
of Nightwoocfs intertextuality. Beyond the proper names and inverted
commas, Night wood seems preoccupied with certain paradigmatic
discursive structures that inform the meanings of Western writing ("in
a preoccupation that was its own predicament" (p. 47D. Thus, I do not,
as a general rule, but with one notable exception, argue for specific
texts or sources that Barnes may have been carnivalizing, nor do I
attempt to prove that Barnes actually read any of the texts that I read
Nrightwoodthrough—wdth the exception of the Freudian text. The texts
that I have chosen to "face up to" Night wood, including the Bakhtinian
text, offer operative paradigms of the conventional structures that
Night wood seems to be engaging with or to be composed by: whether or
not Barnes was familiar with these texts is almost entirely beside the
point.
My use of the "carnivalesque" is also informed by Jacques
Derrides (non)Concepts of "writing" and "differance and by a
recognition of Arighturcxxfs insistence on the written (everything from
tattoos to hieroglyphs and letters) and on "difference" and deferral.
Chapter Two of this thesis is in part a reading of Bakhtin between
Plato and Derrida, and it develops a poststructuralist concept of the
carnivalesqueli as one of those "nonsynonymous" terms that "inscribe
différance within themselves", (as Alan Bass puts it in a footnote to
Derrida's Margins of Philosophy). Thus, my use of the "carnivalesque"
is always marked by deconstructive or Derridean concerns with the
undecideabilities of signification that do not mark the Bakhtinian text.
Night wood, with its ambiguities and evasions or subversions of meaning,
practically demands a poststructuralist reading informed by
deconstruction. In a sense, its carnivalesque inversion and solicitation
of "phallogocentric" structural paradigms is a deconstructive practice
in itself. This is why I have employed certain Derridean concepts to
solicit and "open up" Bakhtin's (very Platonic) "carnivalescple".
The fifth chapter of this thesis makes explicit what is always at
work in the preceding chapters: Freud is "always coming on board", to
use a phrase of Derrida's. A It is almost impossible, now, to discuss
the "carnivalesque"--with its dream logics, fantasies, perversions, etc.-
-without at least assuming the Freudian text. I have also found it
impossible to avoid Freudian psychoanalytic theory in reading Night wood,
with its dreams, unconsciousnesses, undecideable identities, desires, and
somnambulistic states. Again, my reading of Freud is often
poststructuralist and is informed by various writings of Jacques Lacan,
Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, Catherine Clement, and
Jacques Derrida.
I have tried as much as possible to avoid categorizing Night wood
mostly because the text itself seems to resist the formalizing impetus
of categorization per se. Thus, I do not, for the most part, treat of
the text as modernist, American, English or as a specifically lesbian
novel, preferring to read it in the terms of the intertextuality stated
above. I suggest that it is a "carnivalesque" text not so much to
identify it (although, in effect, I do identify it as "carnivalesqueu) as
to identify some of its strategies of signification.
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I have also tried to avoid imposing a specific critical
methodology on my reading of the text. Undoubtedly, my approach to the
text is poststructuralist in the sense that it proceeds from
poststructuralist considerations of the instability of signification and
subjectivity and that many of its strategies are adopted from the so-
called poststructuralist theorists. However, poststructuralism is
almost impossible to define conclusively--the differences between the
various poststructuralist theories and/or practices also resist
definitive categorization. My approach to the text might be better
described as a "reading between" which attempts to heed Derrida's
advice that "above all it is necessary to read and reread those L.J in
whose margins and between whose lines I mark out and read a text
simultaneously almost identical and entirely other L.J us My research
began with a reading of Nightwoo4 then proceeded to a reading of texts
(Bakhtin, Kristeva, Derrida, Freud) that I thought might help in solving
some of the interpretative problems posed by NAghtwood and texts that
I thought might work as illuminating intertexts (Augustine, Loyola, for
example). But I soon found that my analyses were not proceeding in a
linear and progressive fashion: for example, I would begin reading
Night wood from a "Freudian" perspective only to find that at a certain
point, the perspective would turn around and I would be reading Freud
from Nigh twoods perspective. Thus, the reading presented here is often
a "reading between" a subject text and an object text that sometimes
change their positions, which is a rather "carnivalesque" manoeuvre.
Although I have tried, as I've already noted, to avoid
contextualizing Nigh twood, during the course of my acquaintance with
this text, I was led, inexorably and almost despite myself, to a
consideration of the relevance of the gender of the author. I had
hoped (rather naively) that adopting a poststructuralist stance would
make such a consideration unnecessary: I was particularly anxious to
avoid marginalizing Nightwood, to avoid seeing it as a marginal
production "mimicking", perhaps perversely, seminal works like Ulysses
or, say, "The Wasteland". (After all, it does appear that, by the end of
the 'thirties, Night wood was as well known as Joyce's "Work in
Progress", although it rather quickly dropped from sight after that.)
However, my avoidance of the gender question did not solve this problem
of marginalization, and it left too many questions unanswered. Why has
NAghtwood receded from public view, despite the attention that other
writers have paid to it and despite its similarities to other
revolutionary projects, of the period, written by men? Why has the
intellectual impetus of Barnes's work been so frequently ignored or
denied by the critics? (Notable among the few critics who recognize
Barnes's intellectualism is Jane Marcus, who nonetheless states that "we
are not accustomed to thinking of Nuns Barnes as a learned woman, a
scholar as well as a writer". I was startled when I first came across
this statement, for, in my perhaps isolated reading of Nightwoo4 I had
never considered her as anything but a "learned woman".) Why has her
project been so often identified as following or responding to Joyce's
or T.S. Eliot's, for example? Why has she been called the female
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Rabelais?' And why, paradoxically, does her work not fit easily into
the general context of "women's writhlier? Why has her work been
castigated by some critics for being too morbid, too difficult, too
metaphysical or too Proustian to be included in the canon of women's
writing?e Barnes's works, and Nghtwood in particular, seem to have
fallen into some sort of no—(wo)man's ground between the (arguably)
unorthodox writings by men and women's writing.
This is ArAghtwoods difference: largely excluded from the
dominant canon because its intellectualism has been denied and largely
held at bay in the minority canon of women's writing because of its
suspiciously intellectual and difficult bent, NOtwood is not properly
aligned with either camp. This difference, which is irreducible, is
sustained by the unresolved questions about the relevance and
specifications of the gender of the being that writes. If there is one
thing that a study of Nghtwood can teach us, it is that the writer's
gender, however that gender may be constructed, does make a difference,
but the difference that the writer's gender makes may not be quite
what we expect it to be.
CHAPTER ONE
FROM CONFIDENCE TO DOUBT: A HISTORY OF READING NIGHTWOOD
Who was Nuns Barnes? This is a surprisingly difficult question
to answer given that she was of the twentieth century, the century of
documentation and data, and lived among much-recorded and often-
analyzed characters in one of the most notorious settings of recent
history. If we were to attempt an answer, to say "this was Nuna
Barnes", we would somehow have to overcome the fact that the first
part of her life was virtually unrecorded, that her birth was
unregistered, her parents' marriage uncertified, that she never attended
school or any other institution that might document her existence. We
would also have to accommodate our concern to the fact that most
contemporary reports and portraits of the adult Barnes are the products
of passing acquaintanceships with her or with myths and rumours of her.
Those closest to Barnes, as Shari Benstock has noted, "protected her
need for privacy by not commenting on her at length in their memoirs".'
Between rumour and the protections of privacy, where do we find the
Nuna Barnes?
Of course, the most obvious place to find this writer, or any
disembodied writer for that matter, is between the covers of those
texts bearing her name as a signature of author-ity. "By their works
shall ye know them." There are a number of Barnes critics who suscribe
literally to this view and read all of Barnes's poems, stories, plays
and novels as one large autobiographical raman A clef. Her "recognized"
biographer, Andrew Field, has given the virtuoso performance of this
manner of reading and actually grounded many of his psycho-biographical
suppositions (and statements-of-fact) on the "evidence" of her texts.
This is a dubious course for a literary biographer to follow and Field's
practice (which also excludes documentation of quotations and the
identification of many of his informants) often renders his work
useless to any sort of scholarly study of Barnes. A classic example of
Fieldean analysis is his predication of Barnes's entire oeuvre on her
experience--although an experience never mentioned by Barnes herself--
of the violence of an incestuous father:
Wald Barnes, Henry Budington, Basil, Titus,
Wendell, which is, by the way, a traditional
Barnes family name. It does not take much to
understand why this tale of cold and stupid
horror has always remained the story behind
the story in Barnes's writing, either removed
or disguised or only obliquely told (...J
Such a life. Dostoevsky and Faulkner even
working together probably couldn't have in-
vented it:2
The realization seems to have escaped Field that this "life", which he
has divined from her fictions, might well be an invention itself.
Shari Benstock notices that there seems to be a problem with the
application of biographical criticism itself to Barnes's texts. When
"the mysterious unreality of hrthtwood has translated itself into
accounts of Barnes's life (...J Diuna Barnes becomes a pathetic victim of
the Parisian nightworld, her 'basic heterosexuality' undermined by the
evils of a lesbian community, her beauty lost in drunken brawls, her
wit turned acid [...J she is Nora L.J a victim of the drugged, alcoholic,
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sexually ambiguous Paris nightworld". This "myth" perpetrated by the
"cultists" of biocriticism is so predominant that Benstock finds it
difficult to "offer alternatives to the crass efforts at psychoanalysis
indulged in by most commentators on her life and work". 3 Benstock does
manage to redistribute the critical emphasis, however, by considering
Barnes within a particular context--that of the "Women of the Left
Bank", the group of predominantly lesbian expatriates settled in the
rive gauche/Montparnasse area of Paris through the first third of the
century. I will return to Berxstock's study of Barnes and analysis of
her work when I discuss the history of Barnes criticism: what I wish
to stress here is Benstock's dissatisfaction with the sort of analysis
that necessarily presupposes an unassailable relationship between life
and text. As Benstock has demonstrated, not only does such an approach
provoke a disagreeable image of Barnes herself, it also leads to very
limited readings of her texts.
In an interesting essay on Virginia Woolf's TO The Lighthouse,
Gayatri C. Spivak prefaces part of her analysis with the following:
I do not know how to read a roman A clef;
especially an autobiographical one. I do not
know how to insert Woolf's life into the text
of her book. Yet there is a case to be made
here. I will present the material of a pos-
sible biographical speculation, adumbrate a
relationship between life and book that I can-
not theoretically present, consider the case
made, and give a certain reading.4
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There is a case to be made for "biographical speculation" as part of a
theoretical approach or "practical enterprise that produces a reading".s
I cannot resurrect Barnes or make of her a human subject/object for
analysis, but I can incorporate or present the "material" (materia,
matter, apparatus, fabric, text [OED]) of a "possible" "speculation"
(exercize of the faculty of sight, contemplation, conjectural
consideration COED]) in order to "adumbrate" (sketch in, overshadow
[OED]) "a relationship between [Barnes's] life and (her] book[s]".
Obviously, I am not concerned with verifiable Truth: I am interested
only in the possibility of employing texts of views, conjectures and
opinions (biography) as I fill-in-by-casting-a-shadow-over (read) the
texts signed "Djuna Barnes" in order to "produce a reading" of those
texts. This is not to deny Barnes's existence--certainly she lived,
breathed, and had her being—but to acknowledge that I "do not know
how to insert [Barnes's] life into the text of her book[s]". (It may
well be the case, as Barnes asserts, that "[e]very writer writes out of
his life", but it is not necessarily so that we can simply reverse the
procedure and arrive at the writer's life again). 6 I do not even know
how to begin answering the question posed at the beginning of this
chapter: I can, however, present the following materials gleaned from
the small number of texts that do attempt to answer the question and
chosen for their possible usefulness in a reading (the lineaments of
which will be discussed later) of the Barnesian text.
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Djuna Barnes was born on June 12 1892 on a farm near Cornwall-
on-Hudson in New York State.7 She was the second of five children and
only daughter of Elizabeth Chappell, a violinist and a furniture-maker's
daughter from Leicestershire. Barnes's father, Wald, was a spoiled
"bohemian" cum subsistence farmer with a predilection for exotic
experiments in marital arrangements and child-rearing: he was a
practising bigamist, adulterer, and pre-potent sire, a fundamentalist of
American individualism--with a streak of early Hebraic patriarchism--
and an utter failure at generating fiscal wealth of any sort. This
last "attribute", and Wald Barnes's whimsical indifference to its
significations, seemed to have marginalized the Barnes family in their
relationship to both the indigenous rural society and the summering
Greenwich Villagers.
Wald Barnes apparently never felt constrained by social
proprieties, or even "legitimacies". Indifferent to, or disdainful of,
one of the most conventional forms of patriarchism, the assumption of
the surname (or sire's name) by legitimate offspring, he had dropped
his given name, Henry Budington (II), in favour of his mother's maiden
name, Barnes, and a variable series of Christian names the was "Harold"
around the time of his daughter's arrival). If nomination is indeed
intimate with identity (as identification), then we can see that Diuna
Barnes's social legitimacy was already at risk--at least linguistically-
-before her birth. Her naming is even more problematic: "Djuna" is
either an agreed upon change from the given name "Djalma"--after the
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prince in Sue's The Wandering Teri—following a younger brother's
insistent mispronunciation of that name; or it is the collapsing of
"Dialma" and "ma", her older brother's infantile logism for the moon,
and thus the name given her at birth. (Her father seemed to have a
fondness for the rare or self-composed name: his sons were called
Thurn, Zendon, Saxon and Shangar. Thurn later changed his name to
Thurn Budington, while Shangar changed his to Charles [931.09 Barnes.)
"Barnes", as we have seen, could not have been her proper surname.
"Budington" may not have been the right name either: Barnes herself
acknowledged that she may well have been illegitimate and neither
marriage license nor birth certificate exist to prove or disprove that
supposition. Given the admixture of familial, nominal, and legal
irregularities or uncertainties comprising Barnes's "bohemian origins",
one might be forgiven for suggesting that Barnes was almost "born" to
be a "modernist".
It is interesting that Barnes chose to retain this pseudo-
patronymic, especially as name-changing seems to have been a family
trait, for the name places her, at once, in two camps. On the one hand,
as the name of the father, "Barnes" aligns her, although questionably,
with the patriarchal system of descent and propriety. On the other
hand, as the maiden name of the grandmother, "Barnes" also signals an
elision or refusal of patriarchal imposition. As both her father and
grandmother were writers of sorts, the name offers an additional
significance. Like 'Tdune, which is either the mispronunciation of the
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proper masculine name of a character in a novel or the mingling of that
proper masculine name with a feminine neo-logism, "Barnes" can function
as a signature to two apparently opposing discourses--the proper,
meaningful and rational, "masculine" discourse that constitutes literary
and philosophical tradition and the improper, nonsensical or "prattling",
"feminine" discourse against which reason defines itself. In this
sense, her name itself signals the different, alembicated discourse that
constitutes her writing.e
Like Virginia Woolf, Barnes was educated only informally: unlike
Woolf, she did not seem to find this education ignominious. Of course,
Woolf's quite just complaint was that she was denied a formal "higher"
education simply because she was of the gender considered unable to
benefit from such learning. Barnes, on the other hand, escaped any
formal schooling because, first of all, her father considered state-
controlled education an unnatural check on a child's innate
individualism and, secondly, he was unable to afford a tutor. Woolf, who
was certainly the more "advantaged", tended to view her education in
terms of deprivation: Barnes, whose studies were often occluded by the
necessities of minding younger siblings and doing farm chores, seems,
like Blake, to have treated hers as an early license to study and write
as she pleased. We should remember, though, that Woolf's education,
under the direction of her father, was placed in the hands of
governesses and her mother, members of a distinct educational "under"
class.9
 Barnes had the peculiar advantage of being taught by her
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paternal grandmother, Zadel Barnes Gustafson, who had been, in her
earlier days, a journalist, poet, biographer and novelist, an
acquaintance of Harriet Beecher Stowe, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
Eleanor Marx (daughter of Karl), and, interestingly, an attendee at the
Wilde salon in London. Zadel does not seem to have been a particularly
"good" writer, or even a noteworthy feminist <although she was one of
the less than 1% of American women divorced in 1877), but she was
certainly well-read, of a revolutionary bent, and appears to have been a
stimulating teacher if we are to Judge by her granddaughter's career.
The construction of a taxonomy of Barnes's early readings has not
yet been attempted--at least, as far as I know--and is quite beyond
the scope of the present study, but it seems reasonable to argue that
by the time Barnes began her Journalistic career (at 18) she had more
than a passing familiarity with a considerable portion of Great, and not
so great, Literature. Certainly, her early interviews, poems, short
stories and plays--as well as her later comments--suggest
acquaintanceship with the Authorized Version of the Bible, with Chaucer,
Dante and Shakespeare, and Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, as well as
the works of Rabelais, Montaigne, Fielding, Sterne, Thackeray, Dickens,
Wilde, Kipling, Chekhov, Dostoevsky, Proust, Strindberg, Ibsen, Synge,
Yeats, Thoreau, Emerson, Poe, and Holmes. I don't think it would be
irrational to assume that she was first introduced to at least some of
these texts by her grandmother. 1 ° She was also likely exposed to her
own family's literary productions: her grandmother's work, including
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the "quasi-spdritualistic" The Foundation of Death, a successful book
(five printings) written by Zadel and her second husband during their
years in London; her Theosophical grandfather Budington's Man Makes his
Body, or the Ascent of Ego Through Matter; and her greatgrandfather
(renowned spiritualist and medium to the "great" on the "other side")
Thomas Buddington's Dissolution or Physical Death, and How Spirit
Chemists Produce Materialization, by Pt Faraday and historical
Revelations of the Relation Existing Between Christianity and Paganism
Since the Disintegration of the Roman Empire, By the Roman Emporer
Julian (Called the Apostate)" The writings of her grandmother's
peers, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Harriet Beecher Stowe, were probably
made available to her as well. Whatever its actual lineaments, her
grandmother's curriculum, with its apparent indifference to or avoidance
of an exclusive and categorical organization of readings, can scarcely
be considered an incidental force in the cognitive development of her
granddaughter. In fact, it may well have engendered the host of
artistic and metaphysical problems, as well as the exotic vocabulary
and catalogue of styles, that absorbed and characterized Barnes's
writing throughout her working life.
Considering the nature of Barnes's education, it may seem odd that
she has been criticized (or congratulated) for her inconsistent attitude
toward feminist organization. Shari Benstock notes that "the tone of
some of [her] early articles on suffrage might suggest that Barnes was
not sympathetic to the movement" and Andrew Field quotes (happily, one
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suspects) her opinion of "the exaggerated posturing of the contemporary
feminist movement" (Field's words): m.--These women!! Why don't they do
something? Or knit socks for their husbandsr' 2 I do not think it
necessary to examine Field's unsubstantiated implications--his
antipathies to feminism are self-evident. However, Benstock's
suggestion that Barnes "eschewed group causes and refused to become
part of a 'sisterhood,' probably from fear of jeopardizing her
Individuality" is interesting and could bear some elaboration, or at
least a bit more speculation.13
Andrew Field states that "[t]he family in which Nuns Barnes grew
up was a matriarchy over which 'Mother' Zadel presided with benign but
very considerable power behind her odd son". 14- At the risk of
supporting Field in his confusion of figures from Barnes's history and
characters from her texts--he has apparently drawn this conclusion from
his reading of Ryder--I must confess that I find it easy to read into
these texts, with their figurations of the female as large and
indomitable and of the male as small or insufficient, an underlying
experience of matriarchal hegemony. But this is a matriarchy "behind
Ethel son", for the benefit of the son in the absence of the father, and
a substantial propping up of the facade of patriarchy. This particular
structure has, of course, a sterling pedigree within the history of
patriarchal systems, and it is scarcely the argument for the early
feminist influence in Barnes's life that Field supposes. Barnes's
grandmother may have been a considerably powerful matriarchal figure,
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but the system which ensured her "benign" power made virtual slaves of
Barnes's mother and Weld's other wife. Still, I may be able to extract
something useful from Field's assertion by altering the focus and
suggesting that the roots of Barnes's "attitude" towards "sisterhood"
are posited in a reactive suspicion that any organization of female
power is merely the black backside of patriarchism. In other words, I
would like to suggest that Barnes may have been less influenced by
examples of matriarchy than suspicious of the unanswerable power
(which can never be "benign") inherent in any sort of -archy.
Barnes's eclectic education ended when, according to Field, she
"was 'given' to Percy Faulkner, 52, the brother of her father's mistress,
in 1910 by Wald and Zadel". 1s
 This is such an enticing little story,
and such a complement to my previous suggestion, that I include it
among the biographical "materials" presented even though Field has done
nothing to substantiate it. ("Now it has been confirmed", he announces
and leaves the "by what" and "by whom" to his reader's imagination.)
Apparently this marriage didn't last long: by 1911 Barnes was living in
New York with her newly-divorced mother and younger brothers and
attending, very casually, art classes at the Pratt Institute and The Art
Students League. Her encounter with formal education was doomed to be
brief, however, for she soon found herself the sole financial support of
her mother and brothers. Like her grandmother before her, she took to
Journalism and was soon contributing regularly, as a freelance
illustrator and columnist, to The Brooklyn Daily Eagle. By 1914, she
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was also writing "local-colour storiea", "a few murder and suicide
stories", and a good many interviews for The Press, The Wor14 and The
Morning Telegraph Barnes apparently told Field that by the time she
was 25 "she was earning $5000.00 a year, a most handsome salary for
the time". Her "greatest reportorial feat" was her submission to
forcefeeding so that she might be able to comment more accurately on
the "violations" suffered by the hunger-striking English suffragettes.16
Despite the distinction of her early success, however, Barnes
seems to have been inclined to view her journalism as something she
did to pay the bills. As her reputation increased, and with it her
earning power, she began to spend less time on journalistic projects
and more on her paintings, sketches, poems, and short stories. In 1916,
Guido Bruno published The Book of Pepulsive Women, a collection of
eight poems and five sketches of a decidedly decadent nature depicting
the progress of a "fallen" woman (or women) through urban depravity to
suicide." The irony, the influence of European Decadence, and the
postlapserian urban themes that were to distinguish, for so many
critics, her later work as definitively modernist were already in
evidence prior to the entry of the United States into the First World
War. In 1918, one of her short stories, "A Night Among the Horses", won
an 0. Henry prize, and, in 1919, the Provincetown Players opened their
season with her first play, Three From the Earth (As she retreated
from full-time journalism, Barnes was also doing a considerable amount
of reading: she studied, among others, Chekhov, Synge, Strindberg,
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Ibsen, Joyce, and O'Neill, who was in turn to become an admirer of
Barnes. The influences of these readings on her early works have been
frequently commented on, and I do not have anything new to add; but I
should note, at this point, that Barnes was an avid reader throughout
her life and served numerous literary apprenticeships.) After the war,
her work began to appear in The Little Review, Smart Set and Vanity
Fair.
Around 1919 or 1920, the date is uncertain, Barnes followed the
general artistes' migration to Europe. She travelled on a commission
from Arc-Calls and money borrowed from Peggy Guggenheim and landed in
Paris with two letters of introduction, one to Pound and the other to
Joyce. (rhe former was to lead to a fond, if guarded, relationship--
Pound was later to say of Barnes that "she sure weren't too cuddly"--
while the latter was to prove the threshold of a lifelong friendship.)
Between the ArcCalls money and earnings from submissions to magazines
"back home", Barnes was able to secure a fairly comfortable life for
herself. After a brief spell in Berlin in the early twenties (with
Thelma Wood, Marsden Hartley, Berenice Abbott, Isadora Duncan, and a
considerable amount of cocaine, according to Robert McAlmon), 1e she
bought a flat on the rue St. Romain and set up housekeeping with her
lover, Wood, an American silverpoint artist. Barnes's sexual orientation
was always ambiguous--she variously admitted and denied lesbianism as
she admitted and denied feminism--and she was rumoured to have had a
variety of lovers of either sex (among them Marsden Hartley, Robert
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McAlmon, Laurence Vail, Jane Heap, and Natalie Barney), but the ten year
affair with Wood was her one serious attempt at a sustained
relationship and, thus, perhaps bears its own pointed significance.
Certainly, her three best-known works belong, in one way or another, to
this period in her life. Her first novel, Ryder, and her infamous
oblique account of the expatriate "lesbian ladies" in Paris, Ladies
Almanack were both published in 1928; and Nightwood, considered by
many the "best" of her works, was begun in 1931 upon the dissolution
of the affair. For ten years after Nightwood's publication, Barnes
remained "silent": her only other major work, The Antiphon, was begun
in 1947 following another significant separatism, the death of her
mother.''
Ryder, the text which Barnes declared "the female Tom Imes",
quickly became a best-seller. 2° It was critically acclaimed as "the
most amazing book ever written by a woman", "the most amazing thing to
have come from a woman's hand", "a modern embodiment of the robust
humour of Rabelais and the whimsical raciness of Laurence Sterne", "a
thing of abundant high spirits and of a robust and salty humour".2'
Eugene Jolas, himself, sung Barnes's praises in transition: 'She has
caught life prismatically in a humour that, I dare say, no women, and
few men, have succeeded in giving us. 12 Of course, there were a few
pejorative reviews as well--a certain G.S.M. complained that "these
conceptions of the essence of salty old Adam in human nature are not
for 'lady writers' to paint"--but it is apparent even from these that
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Barnes had certainly created a stir. 2 Ryder's reception, and the
clandestine success of anonymously and informally published Ladies
Almanack marked perhaps the highest point of Barnes's public career.24
Nghtwood comes of a darker era. Conceived in a personal
bereavement, its development punctuated by periodic drunkenness and
bouts of incapacitating depression, and its maturation always
threatened by penury and the increasing likelihood of war, Nghtwood
marks Barnes's commitment to a new sort of writing--a much more
opaque, more difficult, more "poetic", sort of writing. She no longer
cared to produce saleable material and the influential literati
responded accordingly: despite her lingering reputation as a reporter
and the author of Ryder; no-one in the United States would touch the
new book. It suffered three years of unrepentent rejection before the
American novelist Emily Coleman and Edwin Muir took it upon themselves
to forcefully introduce the text (titled Bow Down) to T.S. Eliot, now
editor at Faber. Eliot succumbed, but not before engineering the
reduction of the book by more than half (from over 190,000 words to
some 65,000) and suggesting a new title. Faber & Faber published
Nightwooc4 with a foreword by Eliot, in 1936 in England. Despite
backing--and Dylan Thomas's assurances that it was "one of the
three great prose books ever written by a womanu2s--Nghtwood never
attracted the loud acclamations and declamations that followed Ryder-1s
appearance. Rather, its reviewers seemed smitten by a great






sick spiritual condition may have gone into this book, but it is rare in
contemporary fiction to be able to trace any spiritual experience
whatever, and the accent, I think, is sometimes of a major poet".26
Desmond Hawkins, in his recommendation-with-reservation, adds that "its
effect may be described as 'Hamlet' without everyone but the Prince.27
Peter Quennell, writing for the New Statesman and Nation, finds it "an
extremely moral work", then asks the reader to "LiImagine the worst of
hangovers, complicated by acute remorse--and extreme retrospective
jealousy--all thickened into a view of modern civilization and
contemporary social life that, for bitterness and crazy violence, leaves
the darkest chapters of Ulysses far behind". 	 The book did not sell
particularly well: Eliot had been a wise editor to insist that Barnes
"be paid no advance".
Nightwood was published in the United States in 1937, reprinted in
1946 and 1961, and translated into Swedish, French and German, but it
never produced enough revenue to support Barnes. Ryder, after demand
waned following the second printing in 1928, went out of print for over
fifty years (until 1979, when Barnes finally stopped quarreling with
the publishers). Only the generosity of friends like Peggy Guggenheim
and Samuel Beckett kept her from starvation during this period.
Barnes's financial decline, however, was merely symptomatic of her
growing resignation before the horrors of quotidian existence. When
the Occupation began in France, Barnes was suffering her second nervous
breakdown. Emily Coleman found her in a mental hospital and convinced
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Guggenheim, who was displaying some exasperation at Barnes's continued
dependency, to pay at least her fare back to the United States. It was
a rescue with some irony: Barnes detested her native country and, over
the next forty years, frequently lamented her inability to ship herself
back to Paris or London. Perhaps consigning herself to an inevitable
devolution, Barnes now chose hermitage in a room-and-a-half walk-up
flat in Greenwich Village over the restitution of her Journalistic
career. This was to be her last home and the workshop of her final
production, The Antiphon.
This play was published, in 1958, only through the persistence of
Muir and Eliot and the support of Dag Hammarskjold, who had been
introduced to Barnes's work by his friend Muir. Aside from a "concert
reading performance" of it at Harvard in 1956, a reading arranged by
Muir, the play was only ever staged in Swedish (translated by
Hammarskjold and Karl Ragnor Gierow) at the Royal Dramaten Theatre in
Stolkholm, February 1961. A reviewer dubbed it "one of Dramaten's
great performances".0
In the English-speaking world, The Antiphon was assumed to be
"unplayable", a work of "literature" rather than of the theatre. Many
of its reviews displayed the same sort of ambivalence that greeted
Arightwnod in 1936 which suggests that we cannot simply assign that
earlier ambivalence to a general mood of impending catastrophe. The
reviewer for the TLS remarked that:
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The Antiphon, because of its uncompromising
bitterness and its equally uncompromising
language, is even less likely than Night wood
to prove popular, but it is probable that
there will always be one or two eccentrics
who think that it gives its author the first
place among women who have written verse in
the English language.
And Norman Dorn, in an article for the San Francisco Chronicle wrote:
One supposes that 'The Antiphon" can be meant
as a hymn of hates, another allegoric elegy
to the England past and passing, or one more
Samuel Beckett-like glimpse of futility.
Yet, with its dissonance of "dear estrangement"
--people merely impinging upon each other
rather than communicating--this verse play
may well have depth of vision comparable
only to James Joyce.31
There is, however, one noticeable difference between the reviews of The
Antiphon and those of Night wood: the former tend to consider Barnes in
an historical context, specifically that context generally labelled
"modernism" and assumed, by the late 1950s, to be part of the pre-war
"past". As Kathleen Raise noted in her review for New Statesmarz
One may say that Nuns Barnes is to early
Eliot what Samuel Beckett is to Joyce. The
emergence of two such remarkable writers,
whose flowering is so late as to bloom in
another world, ought at least to remind us
of the astonishing transformation of language
that was undertaken and achieved in the
Twenties
And it is here, with Barnes's translation into a "flower" of
"modernism", that I will temporarily close this presentation of
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"material" of "possible biographical speculation[s]", adding only that
Barnes continued to write poetry, publishing odd bits and pieces, until
her death at the age of 90. She apparently left her last large piece--
a verse narrative intended to rival The Divine Comedy—uncompleted. I
will, of course, be returning to this material periodically as my
analysis of Barnes's text proceeds, and I will be examining the
conjunction of Barnes and "modernism" in Chapter Two. The task which
immediately presents itself, however, is the articulation of strategies
of examination and analysis that will suggest the angles of my critical
speculations. To this end, I offer the following history of, and
critical commentary on, the phenomenon of "Barnes Criticism". By
focussing on what I perceive to be the insufficiencies of the
established critical apparatus to the texts upon which it has been
afixed (or upon which it has been forced), I will be laying out, and
justifying, the margins of my own reading of the Barnesian text.
I. CRITIQUES AND CRITICISMS
And what is the perverse mechanism of fame
that can have an artist be honoured as she
has been by her greatest fellow artists and
then be put on display in a dim hallway of
contemporaneity like an heirloom that is too
good to put away but does not merit frequent
contemplation.
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One academic anxiety becomes poignantly clear as one reads
through that small, select, collection of material comprising "Barnes
Criticism": the writers, at some point, usually feel it incumbent upon
them to address Barnes's lack of popularity with the reading public. By
way of explanation, they offer Barnes's recalcitrance, or indifference to
her own "marketability"; her literary and historical position, half-
hidden in the shadows cast by Joyce and Eliot; the difficulty in
assigning particularly her later works to a genre; the alienating
obfuscations of her language, and of her "metaphysics"; and the general
institutional neglect of works written by women. Of course, all these
explanations may well apply to the case. But, I am not concerned, at
the moment, with their validity: my interest is more with the need
that gave rise to these explanations and the attendent effect of this
need on the texts in which it transpires.
James B. Scott, in Diuna Barnes, and Louis Kannenstiw., in The Art
of Djuna Barnes: Duality and Damnation, both state that, for the reasons
mentioned above, Barnes has been virtually ignored by the critical
fraternity Cs significantly male contingent) and the reading public in
general.	 These two critics intend to set the record straight: "it
is indeed time to give DJuna Barnes her due".3s Andrew Field, if we
note the epigraph to Dims: The Formidable Miss Barnes, feels the same
compulsion.36 "bliss Barnes", as all three significantly insist on
calling her, must now be rendered accessible to the public. Why?
Because she was "one of the most talented and fascinating literary
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figures of the twenties"; because Night Wood "has come to appear as a
pivotal book, a precusor of the time-liberated interior novel"; because
Faulkner, Lowry, AnaYs Nin, and John Hawkes have all admitted her
ponderable influence on their work; because "she is a stylist, an
innovator and even an inventor of literary language"; and because she
is the "last survivor of the great generation of early twentieth-
century modernists in English literature". 37 (It should be noted that
all three texts were written during Barnes's lifetime.) Of course, most
of these justifications are valid enough, but one begins to feel that,
having identified and priced their found "heirloom" and having
apparently Justified her expense, Field, Scott and Kannenstine now
produce her for our contemplation and edification.
Herein lies a problem: the pedestal is erected, Barnes and her
work fixed upon it, and not one of the three erectors is able to evade
this manufactured quintessence of 'The Formidable Miss Barnes". This
image may be too forced, relying blatantly on the conventions of the
politics of gender and of the artist-critic relationship, but I think it
is a useful analogue for a large part of Barnes Criticism and will
provide an object over and against which to set a proposal for another,
different, reading of the Barnesian text.
Before going on with that, however, I would first like to be a bit
more specific in my criticism of these three seminal texts (the only
book-length studies to date, excepting doctoral theses) of Barnes
- 31 -
Criticism.	 I begin with the first published, James B. Scott's Nuns
Barnes, a text bearing the tell-tale dedication: "This book is for all
my women friends, and my wife." One can only assume that he intends
to educate these women, because he goes on to say, in the "Preface",
that his study is "partially anachronistic; it is addressed to readers
who for the main part have yet to read the works herein discussed", and
that Barnes's "works can be understood--with effort"--presumably also
with Scott's aid to reading. 9
 However, as a general guide to Barnes's
writings, Djuna Barnes is both comprehensive and fair. Scott covers the
bulk of the canon, giving each part its synoptic due and refusing to
qualitatively valorize Night wood over the other works. It is to Scott's
credit that, unlike Kannenstine, he does not see the writings preceding
Night wood as, for the most part, series of developmental stages, ridden
with experimental failures, but as works worthy of attention in their
own right.
Yet, the problem, if I may designate it as such, with Scott's text
arises precisely from the kind of attention he devotes to Barnes's
works. In order to deal with texts that make "unaccustomed use" of
"standard words", that confound "our expectations of a linear and
chronological presentation", that reverse "the usual associations
between life and hope versus death and despair"--making "the ruined
state the positive one"--and that find that "the meaninglessness of
life lies precisely in its meaning", Scott pulls out of his sleeve a
fundamental concept of his owl, "inverted naturalism".‘10 Thus, Scott
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rationalizes, or renders understandable, the apparently irrational,
undecidable, or obscure, practices of Barnes's writing. "Inverted
naturalise, according to Scott, is simply a meliorization of the "hard
realism of naturalise. If "naturalism" is deterministic and pessimistic
"about man's ability to shape the world to his will", then "inverted
naturalism" is writing that treats positively of this dilemma: life is
tragically "meaningless", but death is "an affirmation and a triumph".41
What is more, "inverted naturalise, like "naturalise before it, holds
that life may be nonetheless "understood". Barnes, as an inverted
naturalist, "sees life as meaningless but as quite understandable. In
the deepest sense, her stories can be said to show how and why death
can be the only real affirmation in a meaningless universe."
An entire series of questions go begging about this concept, and I
will come back to them in a moment; but first I offer Scott's how and
why of "inverted naturalism". Scott contends that the "best writers" of
the 1920's, "typified by Joyce, Eliot, and Miss Barnes", disillusioned
with a world marked by war, violence, crass materialism, and the erosion
of idealism, found themselves deprived of any "hopeful real-life
models".
They were faced with essentially three choices:
they could write naturalistically about the
actualities of this violent century; they
could begin looking backward for their models;
or they could try to do both.4
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Of course, Eliot, Joyce and Miss Barnes followed the latter course.
Barnes's efforts resulted in an "inverted naturalism" informed by a
nostalgia for the "longed-for certainties of the past", hence her
recourse to past or archaic forms, her "unaccustomed use" of "standard
words", and the meldings of past and present that confound "our
expectations of a linear and chronological presentation"." Thus, Scott
wraps up and annuls the problematics of Barnesian discourse.
Scott's discourse, however, provokes another series of problems.
Can the "meaningless" be "understood"? What is the relationship of
"understanding" to "meaning", then? If life is "meaningless", what does
death "affirm"? And, what is death a "triumph" over? Can there be
"affirmation" and "triumph" in a meaninglessness that necessarily (one
assumes) precludes the structural polemics of right and wrong? And
what, then, does Scott "mean" by "meaningless"? I bring up these
unaddressed questions primarily to illustrate the tension within Scott's
discourse, and his analytic attitude, away from a reading that admits of
problems, dissociations, fragments, ambiguities, and toward a
centripetal, unifying, reading of texts. Nothing, supposedly, escapes
the whirlpool of understanding: "meaninglessness" functions
meaningfully within this system of signification and, therefore, may be
apprehended rationally. Barnes's works are organized, according to
Scott, around "center(s) of focus", or "center-of-consciousness"
characters, or narrators, informed by a central teleology (the solace,
affirmation, of death), and orchestrated, in the "deepest sense", by an
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omniscient understanding of "life" in all its "meaninglessness". Such a
reading renders Barnes's works peculiarly conventional, unitary,
rational, usafenAs
 You see, "her works can be understood—with
[ameliorating, rationalizing] effort". This effort can only be sustained
at the expense of a recognition of the Barnesian texts's own strategies
over and against centrality, safety, and rationality (strategies which
Scott admits, but evades) and even, ironically, at the expense of
sensible, conventional, reading itself. (For example, in his struggle
for a central theme in Ryder, Scott concludes that the book is actually
about Wendell Ryder's confrontation with society, which is a most
pecular reduction of the text's various themes.) 4-6 Despite his
disquisitions on the "fragmentary" nature of Barnes's later works, Scott
presents us with a circumnavigable, knowable, "heirloom", amenable to a
rationalist sensibility.
Louis F. Kannenstine, in The Art of Diuna Barnes: Duality and
Damnation, takes fewer pains than Scott to reconcile us with Barnes's
entire canon. For Kannenstine, "the uneven and sometimes flawed work"
that precedes Night wood presents the artist's own struggle to develop a
coherent thematic and stylistic practice. A7 Nightwood "towers over all
of Diuna Barnes's previous work, excelling it in organizational
perfection, intensity of conception, and power of phrasing". 4e A work
of near perfection, it "takes a prominent place in the 'subjective-
feminine' tradition in modern fiction 	 in the broad tradition of the
novel of sensibility L..] forming a kind of bridge between the stream-
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of-consciousness novels of Virginia Woolf and the 'interior' novels of
Anais	 Moreover--and this is of special concern to Kannenstine-
-"hrightwood brings the aims of the novel perhaps as close as possible
to those of poetry, particularly with respect to the poetic image." The
Antiphon is primarily "a continuation of formal experimentation with an
accompanying increase in complexity and obscurity", a natural
development out of NAghtwood and away from accessibility. s° Yet, it
cannot eclipse Nightwoo4 a text that more readily places itself in the
larger (and more important?) context of a "tradition".
Unlike Scott, as well, Kannenstine approaches Barnes's texts with a
specific, identifiable, methodology, from a formal critical stance rather
than from a "common sense". His pragmatic analyses of passages are the
"close readings" of Practical Criticism, and his focus on the poetic
image (as defined by Pound) and his conclusion that Barnes's images
have "[a]n ineffable quality 	 that analysis not only cannot diminish,
but cannot even touch" indicate a theoretical alliance with American
New Crit1cisms1 Kannenstine projects this attitude onto the
functioning of Nightwood and The Antiphon themselves:
Their lines are intensely worked and tightly
constructed into complex units that stand firm-
ly on their own ground, independent and resis-
tant to ultimate breakdown or exhaustion by
analysis. These highly formal late writings
are evidence of their author's self-effacement,
of a willful depersonalization of voice through
which the work stands independent of its
creator.s
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Thus a fundament of Barnes's genius accomodates the New Critical, and,
indeed, imagist, apprehension of poetic functioning.
Kannenstine's entire project (to delineate the "Duality and
Damnation" informing all aspects of Barnes's work) rests on his
conception of the Barnesian image. Noting that, in Night wood, the image
is defined as "a stop the mind makes between uncertainties", and taking
sustenance from Pound's definition--"that which presents an intellectual
and emotional complex in an instant of time"--Kannenstine argues that
much of "'Miss Barnes's art" can be viewed as an "architectonic"
arrangement of poetic images intertwining "in a complex pattern to
render a higher reality". s This "higher reality" consists of a
recognition of the essential "duality of being*: to live is to be
"divided", caught in the flux of an ineluctable duality. s4- To "stop L.J
between uncertainties", to stand on the middle plane between contraries,
is to assume the static "halt position" of the image, realizing,
paradoxically, "both total coherence and dissolution". It is also,
contradictorily in view of the proffered paradox, to "abolishEl duality*,
to lose one's identity in union with another, to be "damned" without
capitulation.ss
Kannenstine's problematic view of the structure of the image is
posited as the single, informing, structure of Barnes's life and work:
the character's "lives are struggles to become one unqualified whole,
either one thing or the other, but they are blocked by the recognition
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of their duality"; "EmJystery, in essence, is the subject of Ryder, the
ambiguity of suspension between nature and humanity, life and death,
man and woman L.-) there is no state that does not partake of its
opposite"; beneath Barnes's "apparent split between introverted and
extroverted states of mind, she had been working toward a new thematic
consistency"; Barnes's "central vision" is that "Being is a terrible
state of tentativeness or suspension, never resolved but certainly
terminating in death, ending in the mystery that initiated it"; "[E011 in
Hightwoods imagery, narrative structure, and generic mutability are
determined by Diuna Barnes's urge toward centrality" or "syntheses of
dualities".
Certainly, there are multiple difficulties with Kannenstine's image
of Barnes's informing image. On the one hand, he posits a
"consistency", a totality of "coherence and dissolution", an "urge toward
centrality", a consuming "higher reality"--a sort of dialectical,
transcendental, synthesis of duality—and the image itself as static
middle grounds (or principal foundations) of Barnes's system. On the
other hand, and much to the disruption of his argument, his own reading
of Barnes brings him to the realization that to "stop" on the middle
ground is to lose identity, to die, to end in the initiating "mystery"
(the "ineffable quality" that speaks disaster for the literate), to
dissolve into nothingness. Ode should remember that Pound, himself,
could not finally continue to presume the stasis of his image, hence
the development of nvorticism".) There is a gap between the imposition
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of his theory and the effect of his practice into which his "heirloom"
appears to have escaped, having slipped his grasp. (It is interesting
that Kannenstine places Barnes between Woolf and Nin, between "the
early innovators of this century and the later generations of
experimental writers". s7 Perhaps it is also significant that, under a
chronological ordering of texts, Kannenstine's should occupy the middle
position.) My argument with Kannenstine is that his own productive
reading of her text is confounded by his conception of "Miss Barnes" as
an imagist poet. His insistence on a transcendental and centralist
teleology seriously inhibits his very suggestive reading of the
simultaneous "total coherence and dissolution" of Nightwoods images.
Andrew Field's dual biography/biocritical analysis, Nuna: The
Formidable Miss Barnes, is another story altogether. As the only
biography of Nuns Barnes, it stands on enviable ground, and Field takes
a roguish--or slovenly?--advantage of this position. As I have already
noted, he documents neither reference nor quotation, providing readers,
instead, with a lengthy, unannotated, bibliography through which to wade
at their leisures, and he happily indulges in his own particular brand
of neo-pseudo-Freudian (I can find no more descriptive term) analysis
at every significant turn. He also, as we have seen, quite unabashedly
confounds Barnes's characters with her family, her friends, and herself.
I offer another exemplary passage, this time on The Antiphon,
illustrating all of the above.
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The name Miranda is another important and
clear transference--Miranda is the daughter
of Prospero, of course, but there may be a
Miranda closer to hand. The only death
certificate that could be located for the
period in which DJuna's friend Mary Pyne
died belongs to Miranda Pyne. It could
be a close relative and another Barnes name
transference. However that may be, as one
critic observed, Miranda is Nuns, as were
Julie of Ryder and Nora of hrightwood before.
The hostility towards the father by Djuna-
Julie-Miranda is a simple continuation of
a well-articulated basic Barnes theme, but
It is only in the discarded drafts of The
Antiphon that there is shown at last the
precise basis of the hostility between mother
and daughter.
One wonders why "Miranda" should be an "important and clear
transference". Unlike The Tempest's Miranda, The Antiphon's Miranda is
fatherless, not motherless, and her hatred of her dead father certainly
exceeds Prospero's daughter's defiance of a father that she loves. The
reference to a Miranda Pyne is almost entirely beside the point, even
if Mary Pyne was indeed a Miranda. Mary Pyne is a rather shadowy
figure about whom we know very little--certainly not enough to
construe her as the "original" of Miranda. One also wonders about this
anonymous "one critic", for doubtlessly it would be interesting to read
this critic's argument for such a certain and total identification of
author and characters.
I would suggest that, rather than actually being a work of
biographical criticism, Djuna: The Formidable Miss Barnes is itself a
"novel", perhaps taking some direction from Truman Capote ts
 In Gold
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Blood (it is as painstakingly researched) or from Barnes's own early
interviews. With a Capote-like disregard for the "establishment", a
regard that is perhaps more arrogant than critical, Field has attempted
to demolish the conventionally contrived barriers between fiction,
history, and criticism. Unfortunately, he has none of Capote's tools,
neither the wit nor knowledge of his "field", to deliver purposive,
telling, blows. His is not an avant-garde work of literary scholarship;
it is a derivative story about an eccentric vagrant making her way
along the twisted paths of the artistic life, a story that commences by
proclaiming itself: "'This is the story of Djuna Barnes. It is a tale of
two cultures, three generations, and a major writer of our time."
His "criticisms" all function relative to the legend that he is creating,
and Barnes does emerge from this study a "legend", albeit subject to
human foibles. For Field, Djuna is "The Formidable Miss Barnes" whose
texts amount to no more than exposes on her remarkable character.
Unfortunately, his is the only extensive biography that we have to date.
I am treating these three very different texts as paradigmatic of
one of the general trends that I have noted in my reading of Barnes
Criticism to date. In response to the fragmented, trans-generic (or
antigeneric), poetically obscure, metaphysically oblique, nature of
Barnes's writing, these critics have, in general, felt compelled to
introduce or impose mediating themes ("inverted naturalism"), formal
structures (Kannenstine's "image"), or laudatory legends in their
analytic, or biographic, attempts. Symptomatic of all these endeavours
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is a general repression of that which in Barnes's texts eludes their
restrictive schemes or structures: there are evidences of repression
in Kannenstine's refusal to deal with the anomalies produced by his own
analysis and in Scott's refusal to note the very fundamental problems
in his genially composed "inverted naturalism" as an explication of
Barnes's "metaphysics". Field's predetermined exposition of Barnes's
"personality" is so repressive that Barnes's texts often seem little
more than stigmata. Barnes's works are "difficult", but I have sincere
doubts about the ability of the strategies of imposition and repression
to reduce this difficulty.
Obviously, the past several pages of this chapter have been
leading up to, composing, a contest of theoretical perspectives. I have
tried to show, very briefly, why the texts by Scott, Kannenstine, and
Field are inadequate to the task of analyzing Barnes's works, and that
this inadequacy is a result of these critics's "blindness" to their own
discourse, of an unwitting repression of that which contradicts or
evades their ostensible arguments--or stories. It is as though each
critic has approached the text with an entire armoury of critical and
theoretical presuppositions in his hands and has summarily dismissed or
redesignated anything in the texts that did not yield meaning under the
application of his tools.
The types of analysis that might be proposed in their stead are
not necessarily "better" or more "pure", but they are perhaps more
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attuned to the difficulties presented by Barnes's texts. One way to
approach the texts is to reverse the impulse to make Barnes's works
acceptable to a conventional apprehension of the tradition of Great
Literature and to see them as functioning against that apprehension and
its related expectations. This type of analysis assumes a subversive
political position and attempts to demonstrate that the texts occupy a
similar, if not the same, position. If we acknowledge that Great
Literature is a predominantly masculine field, sustained by a society
organized around the Phallus (or God, authority, law), then we can
undoubtedly say that most of Barnes's works, with their distinctively
feminine and often lesbian content, function subversively within or
against this tradition.6°
Certainly, this is the line of argument taken by feminist critics
like Shari Benstock, Sandra Gilbert, and Annette Kolodny, who find in
Barnes's writings a valuable "critique of woman's place in Western
society" and literature and a striking inversion or subversion of
expected literary values.G1 Gilbert suggests that we read Nightwood
"as a revisionary response to male modernist touchstones like Nighttown
and The Waste Lana" and Kolodny comments that the same text "places
Its readers in precisely that situation in which the main characters of
more recent women's fiction find themselves: that is embroiled in the
hopeless task of trying to decode or decipher a strange and
incompreprehensible reality". 	 In other words, the Barnesian text is
both a response to significantly masculine constructions and an exposé
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of the crippling chaos underlying and escaping these constructions.
Shari Benstock claims that "ftlhe nightwood serves as a frightening
symbol of the irrational and bestial in which civilization's corruption
works its effects" and that, to a certain extent, the "purpose" of the
novel is the revelatory dissection of the masculinist myth of 'genuine
values".6
This is also the angle which Jane Marcus takes in her
comprehensive essay "Laughing at Leviticus: Night wood as Woman's Circus
Epic". Marcus initially discribes her essay as "a feminist
interpretation which argues, among other readings, that Night wood is a
brilliant and hilarious feminist critique of Freudian psychoanalysis"."
She also describes her essay as part of "an effort to read race, class,
and gender back into the discussion" on modernism. G5 For Marcus,
"Barnes is the female Rabelais, the articulator of the woman's
body/bawdy", and Night wood is a woman's carnivalesque exposé of
"fascism" in all its ideological, political, psychoanalytical and
"masculine" forms.G'=•
It is interesting that Gilbert, Benstock, and Marcus, in particular,
focus on Nightwoo4 a text which causes many lesbian feminist critics
apparent discomfort. The latter seem more inclined to proffer Ladies
Almanack as the exemplary text and castigate Nightwood for its bowing
down to a conventional portrait of lesbian angst. While Blanche Wiesen
Cook celebrates Ladies Almanack as "DJuna Barnes's frolicsome romp"
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(perceiving it as an ameliorizat ion of the pervasive melancholia of
Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness) and Bertha Harris commends it
as "a document of lesbian revolution", Lillian Faderman finds that
hrightwood is primarily a reiteration of Proust's "Gomorrhe", Lours
Chansons de Bilitfs, and the group of texts constituting the nineteenth-
century French decadent writings on lesbianism, writings by men for the
titillation of men.G• "Barnes", suggests Faderman, "called on her
knowledge of lesbians in literature rather than in life in order to
write her own novel", and thus catered to conventional morality by
portraying lesbians as tortured, displaced, and doomed. Faderman,
however, is disinclined to be too harsh on such an admirable historical
figure as Barnes and so she attempts to equivocate by suggesting that
"[p]erhaps the difference in [Barnes's] perspective in these two works
is because Ladies Almanack was intended for her friends and printed
privately, while Night wood was written for the public, who demanded
that their expectations regarding lesbian suffering be fulfilled".
(This criticism does not sit well with Benstock's informed comment that
Barnes "never thought it possible that (hrightwood could have
commercial success".Ya
Between these two camps of feminist readers, between those who
extol Night wood as "a revisionary response to male modernist
touchstones" and those who hail Ladies Almanack as "a document of
lesbian revolution", we can locate the fundamental--and already
familiar—problem with this type of approach to Barnes's writings. (The
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two camps seem to have become more and more polarized in the last few
years, and one sometimes gets the feeling that each side is more
interested in declaring any text--or, more properly in this case, any
writer--under analysis "theirs" [as opposed to the "other women's(?)" or
"men's"] than in achieving any sort of "reading" of the text "in its own
right".) The attempt to force Barnes's work, as subversive agent, into
specific artistic, literary, historical, or sociological contexts, whether
performed by critical conservatives like Scott and Kannenstine or
critical radicals like Gilbert and Faderman, will always be confounded
by the ambivalent, ambiguous, and enigmatic nature of Barnes's language
Itself. Monique Wittig recognizes this and points out, in "The Point of
View: Universal or Particular", that such forcing does "no favor to
[Barnes], but also no favour to" her "lesbian" readers. "For it is
within literature [in genera]] that the work of Barnes can better act
both for her and for us", as an unconventional writing which does not
preserve the status quo, 6 And, Marilyn Reizbaum, in "A 'Modernism of
Marginality': The Link Between James Joyce and DJuna Barnes", suggests
that Arightwood, in its resistance to "typing and definition", actually
teaches us to read more difficult, "modernist", texts in an other way,
beyond or without the conventional critical contexts: "In our present
ability to read marginality, to read Nightwoo4 perhaps we can reread
11.4,7sses in a way which discovers the other."70
Certainly, it can be most useful to enlist the support of Barnes's
texts in arguments against the phaLlocentrism and homophobia of the
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Great Tradition, but any analysis of her texts as specifically
"feminist" or "lesbian" on the bases of characters, themes, or "what
these books are about" will always prove insufficient to the
doubletalking Barnesian discourse7" We must not forget that, in the
Barnesian text, Woman is both a "Saint" and a "cow sitting on a
crumpled grin".7 The problem is neither the theme nor the character:
the problem is the "language".
I am not about to abandon what is essentially a feminist position
on the strength of these d;:ssensions from certain types of feminist
criticism: I merely wish to demonstrate that any critical position
which valorizes texts on the basis of their usefulness to that position
is bound to be inadequate to any analytic enterprise foregrounding
those texts themselves. It seems that the general and the particular
are, here at least, insufficient to each other.
Shari Benstock sets us off in a potentially more productive
direction when she notes that "the problem of style" in the texts of
Barnes (and Stein) has attracted more than its share of critical
attention. Here again there appear to be at least two critical camps:
those, like Scott, who focus on "style" either because they do not
understand the "subject matter" or they wish to "sidestep" the
"ideological questions that discussions of subject matter might have
entailed"; and those, like Edmund Wilson, for whom "style" is "code", a
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way of obscuring improper subject matter. 7s According to Benstock,
however:
Recent feminist criticism has made the works
of both [Barnes and Stein) more accessible,
providing corrective readings to the earlier
ones. Specifically, the "problem of style"
has been shown to be the effect of an inter-
pretive strategy that disguises misogyny in
the distinctions between style and substance
and in the operation of criticism itself.
The text has been likened to a woman's body
whose envelope (style or code) must be broken
in order for the substance to be recovered
and explained7 4.
Despite her unassailed presuppostion that there is such a thing as
a "corrective" (correct?) reading, Benstock delivers the germinal seed
of what I would more willingly call a "productive" reading of the
Barnesian text. In the distinctions between "style" and "substance",
between the means of expression and the expressed meaning, is a
disguised repression of all that would offend or evade orthodox
conceptions of the propriety of meaning of language as Truth. With
Barnes's texts, I argue, there is indeed a "problem of style": the
problem of a "style" that will neither submit to nor disengage
"substance"; of a means of expression that remains indistinct from
expressed meaning; of a discourse that holds, like Blake's, that there is
"no Body distinct from Ethel Soul".7s
 Benstock notes that "Barnes's
early critics thought her style 'perverse', only to realize that her
subject matter was perversion itself", and this realization greatly
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exceeds simple recognition of a harmony of diction and theme76 In the
night wood it becomes very easy to lose sight of meaning.
The critical approach that I am advocating incorporates, to a
certain extent, the attitude and many of the strategies of the
feminist approach, especially some of those of Benstock and Marcus.
This type of analysis, however, is essentially "deconstructive", an
approach to the text that focuses on the "problems" (the contradictions,
paradoxes, aporias, ungrammaticalities, and illogicalities which threaten
or disrupt totalizing apprehension) that the text presents rather than
bypassing them or attempting to stuff them, unw;eddy as they are, into
a determinable meaning or motivation. The intent of such an analysis is
to recognize and demonstrate how the discourse of the text can actually
work against the determination of meaning, how it can subvert a
conventional (or "phallogocentric") interpretation by functioning
indeterminately, undecideably7 .7 The "deconstructive" approach does not,
like much of feminist criticism, operate as a method derived from a
system or predetermined set of ideas. "Deconstruction" is, rather, a
flexible critical practice of reading/writing aimed at and reactive to
the assumed correspondences between method, system and meaning. In
other words, "deconstruction" can be seen as a variable set of
strategies for dismantling (literary, philosophical, critical, etc.)
texts's claims of authority and of determinable meaning by a practice
of incessant rhetorical questioning. This approach has nothing to do
with establishing the "truth" of texts, and everything to do with
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discovering how texts establish and disestablish their own "truths".
Obviously, this type of approach is much more "rhetorical" than the
first, concentrating on the text at the level of discourse rather than
considering comparative abstractions like character and content;
however, in its implications, it sustains the same capacity for
politicization. It also, and this is its greatest commendation in this
instance, gives us a chance to address the radical and unruly elements
In the Barnesian discourse that have caused such exquisite problems for
the Barnes Critics.
Before launching into a more expansive articulation of this
approach, however, I think it would be useful to establish a little
history of considerations of Barnes's 'style". This will be essentially
a history of "stylistic" readings of Nghtwood for that is the most
studied and written about text, as well as being the focus of my own
analysis. Obviously, there is going to be some fluctuation in the
"meaning" of this word "style": for some critics it will be a matter of
genre (novel or prose-poem?) or of structure (spatial form, temporal
arrangement); for others it is more a matter of diction, of tropes or
more specific verbal units, of the words themselves. I will try,
throughout this history, to accommodate all of these different "styles"
as functionings at the level of discourse.7E'
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IL FROM CONCERNS WITH STRUCTURE TO POSTSTRUCTURALIST CONCERNS
As Benstock has suggested, the stylistic peculiarities of Barnes's
discourse have certainly been noticed and fretted over by the critics:
Scott notes that there has been a "certain amount of 'critical
infighting", particularly over the "structure" of Nghtwood which is
seen as a non-linear, non-chronological, arrangement of thematically,
imagistically, or symbolically related terms, phrases, or, as Scott would
have it, "tableaux". 7 Scott goes on to elaborate his thesis that the
text is composed of a collection of tableaux reflecting back and forth
to each other, providing each other with details that will complete the
single, unitary meaning of each (individually incomplete thus
necessarily only "apprehended" in isolation by the reader). Field,
without discussing it much, aligns himself with Scott.e° Kannenstine
advocates a greater complexity of structure: the patterns of rococo
art, the "arabesque pattern with its intricate interlace E -.I a figure
for the novel's interlaced and recurring images, terms, and symbols".al
His offer of a figure, or trope, for the novel's structure is in keeping
with his view of a bifurcated construction, ostensibly "an art of
ornamentation" but actually informed by a "substructural symmetry", " a
central vision", a "sense of intuitive order", or meaning beyond the
scope of mere ornamentation. Thus, "the images intertwine in a complex
pattern to render a higher reality". The repetition of terms and
phrases actuates the cohesion of the "main themes", ensuring the
structural (which is always thematic) unity of the text.62
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Both Scott and Kannenstine cite, with relative correctives, the
opposing theories of Joseph Frank and Walter Sutton on the structural
principles of Night wood. For Frank, the "father" of stylistic analyses
of Nightwood the central principle is spatial form, an attempt to
chart, following Lessing's aesthetics and Pound's poetics, the changing
relationship between plastic art (space) and poetry (time). Literary
form, Frank argues in 1945, is challenging its designation as the art of
time and is moving in the direction (via the work of Proust, Pound,
Eliot, Joyce, and Barnes) of the spatial. ''Spatial form" is an aesthetic
arrangement of imagistically or symbolically significant details
independent of "any time-sequence of narrative action", finding, rather,
textual cohesion in "the continual reference and cross-reference of
Images and symbols that must be referred to each other spatially
through the time-act of readire. 9
 Sutton, on the other hand, argues
in 1957 for a pragmatic reading aware of the historical position of
both novel and tale. It is indisputable that the story takes place in
"the cosmopolitan world of displaced Europeans and expatriated
Americans in the post-World-War I years", and that there is a
chronological progression, in fact, throughout the novel.'34- It is
significant that Sutton, the only one whose structural theory--although
it is an elegant argument against the excesses of imagism—does not
deal with the repetitive or reflective nature of the discourse but
relies on analyses of characters as representing literary themes
developed temporally, is dismissed almost out of hand by the others.
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They all seem to agree that a conventional, progressive-narrative,
apprehension of the text's structure is an impossibility.
Obviously, Barnes's particular use of words, terms, images, phrases,
tableaux, is causing some problems in the critical fraternity. The
majority of those who have addressed the question of the novel's
"structure" have found themselves, in some way, having to answer in
terms of repetition, reflection, patterning, and yet they cannot agree
on either the nature or effect of these functions. Kenneth Burke,
whose important essay '4Version, Con-, Per-, and In-: Thoughts on Diuna
Barnes's Mghtwoocr first appeared in 1966, offers no conciliation.
He does, however, offer the first movement away from concentration on
the novel's formal "structure" and toward an analysis of its verbal
"stylistics". What is more, Burke demonstrates that a "rhetorical
situation L.J underlies the poetics of the book", that the text's
"stylistic tactics" are at once "poetic" and "rhetoricar.66 Of course,
Burke is a rhetorician (current head of the American neo-Aristotelian
family) and his concerns are rhetorical in the best classical tradition,
a fact which distinguishes him from Frank and Sutton and renders his
essay more pertinent to my own endeavour. Aside from this, however,
Burke's recognition of the rhetorical/poetical nature of Barnes's
discourse undoubtedly marks a new twist in approaching the "problem of
style".
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Reading Night wood through his reading of Augustine's Con/ea-ma/one,
Burke finds that "vert-family of terms"--around which, he claims,
Augustine built his "theology of motives" (perversion to conversion,
"(elven the word 'universe' belongs here")--is alive and functioning in
Barnes's text.97 He indicates Ole can do no more in the circumstances,
for Barnes had refused him permission to quote from the text) that the
word "turn" appears five times in the passage in which Nora meets
Robin, the initial scene of Nores conversion to perversion through the
bisexual Robin. This activity he calls a nova, "the sudden flaring
forth of a term" which gives it an uncharacteristic or added
significance.ea In this particular case, Burke finds the nova
emphasizing a "transcendence downwards", Nora's conversion being the
(blasphemous) opposite of Augustine's. Certainly, the text presents
many such novae there are, for example, seven occurences of "now" in
the first paragraph of the section "Go down, Matthew", a section in
which Matthew does indeed "go down", uttering the words "Maw [...) the
end--mark my words--now nothing, but wrath and weeping"; there are
seven "doll"s in one paragraph elaborating on the "third sex" or
"uninhabited anger; and we find four "shadow"s in a paragraph on the
ontological "calamity" "that we are all seekingm.e9 Burke finds these
novae working rhetorically (persuasively, in the Ciceronian sense),
building up "the sense of a Puritan morale even while running counter
to the Puritanical", so that the theme of unrequited love, even though
between "inverts", may seem properly--and in the best tradition--
lamentable.s°
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There is much of interest in Burke's essay and I will be returning
to it frequently throughout this thesis. What I want to stress at this
point, however, is its forging of a new line of approach to the
difficulties of Barnes's writing. Of course, I recognize the
appropriateness of Benstock's complaint in this case: neo-Aristotelian
rhetoric, in its insistent distinction between "style" and "substance",
Is no less misogynist in its implications than Burke himself in his
devotion to hierarchical, entelechial, arrangements of reality. Yet, his
initial solicitation of the barriers between poetics and rhetoric, and
between the novel and rhetoric, opened up a whole new field of
potential analyses.91 After Burke, it becomes increasingly difficult to
dismiss the more enigmatic or ambiguous passages of Barnes's work as
"mere rhetoric".
In the mid-1970s, as both Modernism and Freudianism became more
distant and monolithic, this interest in Barnes's "style" transformed
itself into a focus on the subjective, or psychoanalytic, nature of
Barnes's language. Critics began to pay more attention to the
phenomena of the "alienation" and "autotelia" of the artist, of the
crisis of signification (language) brought about by the recognition of
the unconscious, of the fragmentation of the speaking (writing) subject.
We have already seen Scott (1976) and Kannenstine (1977) embroiled in
questions of the meaningful "meaninglessness" or paradoxical duality of
life. Charles Baxter in "A Self-Consuming Light: ArAghtwood and the
Crisis of Modernism" (1974) finds that "Matthew O'Connor's drunken
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collapse in the bar, in a bonfire of rhetoric, also signals the
rhetorical collapse--or deflation--of PAghtwood itself", and that
"Pight plotiod...] is an artistic dead-end, teetering on the edge of
Incomprehensibility or silence". "[In] Nghtwood the aesthetics of words
become the anesthetics of verbal rituals whose efficacy has
vanished."9=2 Elizabeth Podhoda, in "Style's Hoax: A Reading of Nuns
Barnes's Nghtmgoe (1976), suggests that it is about the end of
writing, that Rightwood "bows down before its own impotence to express
truth", and that it is this paradox of the end of writing sustained in
writing that holds this text together--while tearing it apart. By the
penultimate chapter, "the novel has already jettisoned language".
"[Mere is nowhere for the prose to go. The end is factual and brief
The novel ends in wordlessness and failure, with the impasse of
life intact and its contradictions nicely exposed
	 Surprisingly,
Podhoda maintains the old distinction bothering Benstock: "And what of
this style which soars with breathtaking virtuosity at the same time
that it is yoked to a tawdry deed? It is sublimely out of whack with
its subject matter." But then, this is all part of the contradiction
and paradox holding the text together. If the "hoax"--the necessity of
the "lie"--is one of the novel's principal themes, then the style plays
out that theme to the hilt. There is, finally, "nothing we can take at
face value" and "the only resolution must come from the breakdown of
Its beautiful style to wordlessnes0. 94 (Although, it is interesting to
note how much text--at least 4 more pages of it--is generated by that
"wordlessness".)
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Edward Gunn, in "Myth and Style in Djuna Barnes's Nghtwoce
(1974), sees the text spun in the gap between a "personal past" and "an
historical and cultural past", between an individual and collective
unconscious. Night wood he intimates, is essentially a religio-
psychoanalytic reading of "the mind in tension; historically and
individually created in unknown, unknowable circumstances akin to
concepts of Dionysian darkness, chaos, and formlessness, yet shaped
unconsciously by a fusion of actual memory and given religious-cultural
myths". .5 In a fine Jungian gesture, Gunn exposes the characters as
allegoric or archetypal positions and the text itself as purely
representative (variations of the verb 'to represent' dominate this
diction) of the subject's endeavour to regain a unified consciousness.
On the Freudian hand, Robert Nadeau (1975) insists that the
"understanding of the structure of man's interior life revealed in the
narrative is remarkably close to that advanced by Sigmund Freud only a
few years before Barnes began work on the novel". In the "dream world"
that is Nightwoo4 characters represent "the interior workings of the
human mind at different points along the continuum of psychic
experience	 Nadeau offers us the following ca-librations,
Robin = Id
Nora, Felix, Jenny = Superego
O'Connor = Ego,
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and suggests that the text is essentially the dream in which the id's
instinctual needs are fulfilled as they cannot possibly be Without
catastrophe) in waking life.
It becomes apparent that by the mid-1970s the rhetorical
"excesses" of Barnes's text were becoming considerably less
"problematic". Rather, critics seem to have assumed that any "problem
of style" is merely symptomatic of the text's modernist, mythic, or
dream-like nature. Thus the problem begins to exist as an integral
part of the definition: the critic who insists that Barnes's style is
problematic is rendering a definition rather than a criticism. By the
mid-1980s, at least two critics, Laurence Schehr and Alan Singer, were
addressing the question of Night wood as a definitively problematic text
within the larger context of the contemporary post-structuralist
concern with the problematics of "writine.7
I must pause, at this point in the "little history", to explain
that we are now dealing with a quite different, if intimately related,
conception of "rhetoric" to that held by Burke in the '60s. In his
acrobatic reading of Arightwood on the double lines of Poetics and
Rhetoric, Burke shook up the conventional genre distinctions that had so
complicated earlier stylistic readings of the text. However, he still
clung to the mutually exclusive style/subject matter split that
Benstock finds so inappropriate to the reading of Barnesian texts. Both
Schehr and Singer write in the wake of significant artistic and critical
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reappraisals of this split and the exposure of its well-disguised
maintenance by the presuppositions of a traditional (at least, post-
Kantian) idealist philosophy. Within the context of the related
English-language literary tradition, at least since the eighteenth
century, the novel has been distinguished from poetry on the basis of
the nature of the relationship between style and substance, form and
content. I will be examining this distinction in more detail in Chapter
Two: for the moment, I would like to emphasize that the novel has been
generally conceived of as a "story" with plot, characters, settings and
themes--in short, with substance--that are mimetically justified
(realistic, truthful). The "style", or means of expression, is secondary
to the "story" and the reality it mimes: ideally, the presenting
Language should be "transparent", should not obtrude onto the scene of
the story. Poetry, on the other hand, exhibits quite a different (and
very much contested) balance of style and subject matter. I have
neither the time nor the space to delineate the critical arguments that
have raged over the subject: suffice it to say that whether we are
talking about Augustan conceptions of the decorous propriety of style
to subject or the Romantic privileging of style over subject matter in
the lyric, poetry is not conceived of as pure mythos (plot) "rendered"
by a transparent language.9°
"Style" or "form"--whether a reflection or a revelatory elaboration
of a poem's veritable subject matter--are obviously very much part of
its generic categorization. These splits between poetry and prose, and
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between style and substance, and the host of idealist presuppositions
about the relationship of language as "reference" or "expression" to an
objectifable Truth or reality that enforce and maintain such splittings,
have themselves been made the objects (rather than the limits) of many
a modernist discourse. Among the writers in English, Joyce, Stein,
Beckett, and, as I will argue, Barnes, were all involved in questioning,
In practice, the efficacy of distinctions between style and substance,
and between genres, and challenging the dominant conceptions of
language as referential to or expressive of any sort of objective
(ideal) Truth. As Beckett remarked of Joyce's Finnegans Wake the Wake
"IS not about something; it is that something itself1I.99
In their earnest attempts to explicate these modernist/post-
Freudian/post-Nietzschean texts in terms familiar to their rationalist
discipline, many English and American critics seem to have missed the
point of Beckett's pronouncement: modernist texts like the Wake not
only do not yield to critical analysis founded on the assumption of a
distinction between style and subject matter, they actively challenge
that assumption.
The subsequent development of post-structuralist literary theories
(semiotic, hermeneutic, deconstructive, etc.--any means of looking at
the "how" or "if" rather than the 'what" of "meaning') under the impetus
of the crisis in understanding introduced, in part, by these modernist
texts has been, by now, well-mapped and the theories themselves well-
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disseminated. I wish only to illustrate, briefly, how this alteration in
critical apprehension (or misapprehension) has affected our conception
of "rhetoric". First, having been denuded of the connotations of
ulterior or conscious motives giving rise to the need to persuade, the
term "rhetoric" is no longer simply defined as "eloquence" or "the art
of persuasion" but, to use Paul de Man's words, as "the study of tropes
and of figures". 1 °0 (If this seems like a return to the Aristotelian
text, it often is.) 1 °'
 These "tropes" and "figures" are considered in a
light quite different from that projected by the eighteenth-century
classicists of rhetoric. This new light is distinctly Nietzschean,
derived from a predominantly French reassessment of Nietzche's
"marginal" theory of tropes. 1 °2
 As de Man notes, in Nietzsche's
"rhetoric":
tropes are not understood aesthetically,
as ornament, nor are they understood seman-
tically as a figurative meaning that derives
from literal, proper denomination. Rather,
the reverse is the case. The trope is not a
derived, marginal, or aberrant form of lan-
guage but the linguistic paradigm par excel-
lence. The figurative structure is not one
linguistic mode among others but it charac-
terizes language as such.10
The significance of the Nietzschean understanding of the trope is
that it "marks a full reversal of the established priorities which
traditionally root the authority of the language in its adequation to
an extralinguistic referent or meaning, rather than in the
intralinguistic resources of figures". 3 ".
 In other words, this "new
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light" reveals the ineluctably rhetorical nature of language.'° That
language is rhetorical, determinably self-referential, seems to be a
premise upon which texts like Finnegans Wake, How It _N The
Unnameable, and, I suggest, Arightwood were created.
Certainly, both Schehr and Singer read Night wood as a text
premised upon the rhetoricity of language. Schehr, in "Djuna Barnes's
Nightwooct Dismantling the Folds", argues that the text proposes its own
theories of fiction, "of the production of the sign and of its
implementation", and thus creates its own seemingly "natural" mode of
"meaningfulness".10 Singer, who devotes a third of A Metaphorics of
Fiction: Discontinuity and Discourse in the Modern Novel to Nightwoo4
insists that Barnes's discourse subverts the "hegemony of literal
meaning" by supplanting mythos with metaphor. It is metaphor rather
than plot, according to Singer, that acts "as the formal arbiter of
contextual differences that make narrative movement originally
possible". 10
 Mythos as metaphor.
Unfortunately, although both critics offer interesting and useful
critiques of Barnes's text, neither seems willing to take their analyses
beyond what they perceive to be the boundaries of "literary criticism's.
Singer is actually very careful to distinguish his project from
Derrida ss and de Man's: "We must distinguish between the
epistemological problems upon which deconstructionism thrives, for
these are voluntary responses to the world, and the methodological
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imperatives that the novel imposes, for these are formal
necessitil l0E' Lurking here, in the forced dichotomy between
"epistemological problems" and "formal necessities", are the skeletal
remains of the old style/subject matter split; and this despite the fact
that Singer has taken much direction from the texts of de Man for whom
a 'rhetorically conscious reading" is inevitably an involvement with
epistemology and ontology. "For the metaphysical categories of
presence, essence, action, truth, and beauty do not remain unaffected by
such a reading."
Donna Gerstenberger, in 'The Radical Narrative of Djuna Barnes's
Nightwvocr, follows Singer to a certain extent by focussing on the
narrative which "constantly calls attention to itself as narrative,
validating its own existence as 'story' at the same time that it
destabilizes, in almost every case, the explanatory power of narrative,
based on the notion of historical origins". (I will be considering
Gerstenberger's brief demonstration of Night woods destabilization of
the "myth" of origin in Chapter Four of this thesis.) Gerstenberger
goes one step further than Singer by at least broaching the areas of
ontology and epistemology, but her comparatively brief essay is
especially interesting for its general and suggestive statements about
MAghtAmixpoes engagement with the principal organizing structures of
Western metaphysics:
L.J Night wood demands	 a reading against
the dominant text of binary oppositions by which
the Western world inscribes itself. It is a
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novel that rages against the imprisoning struc-
tures of the language and narratives of the
"day", which create a history built on the
oppositions of night/day, past/present,
reason/madness, "normal"/"abnormal",
truth/falsehood, gender, and origins (both
historical and textual). It is a book that
relentlessly undermines grounds for categor-
ization. [...] even the language of the novel
works to slip the acculturated binary assump-
tions of signifier and signified (....]"°
In "DJuna Barnes' Nightwood where man is with wo(e)", Mairead Hanrahan
offers a careful rhetorical reading of the text's presentation of the
problem of "identity", that concept of unicity, definition and self-
knowledge sustained by the dominant text of binary oppositions.
According to Wanrahan, Night wood demonstrates that the fundamental
human condition is "confusion" and that any determinacy (any
identification or writing) that would end or still that confusion is an
illusion. "Writing, the creation of images, can 'fix', can create
something definite from the 'space between', where being human is itself
in question", but, as Hanrahan shows, this writing "is wrought with
words whose meaning immediately wobbles". 111 Read as delimiting
addenda to Singer's A AWaphorics of Fiction, Gerstenberger's and
Hanrahan's articles can also be seen as a general introduction of sorts
to the analytic practice that I am proposing.
This "little history" of "stylistic" analyses of Nigh twood has, I
hope, not only delineated what has been done in this area but also
suggested what has not been and what may yet be done. Although it is
not a "well-known" work, NAghtwood has drawn a steady stream of
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criticism and commentary in the wake of its publication; yet, despite
this consistent and thoughtful attention, the sort of careful and
lengthy rhetorical reading that the text seems, to me, to be demanding
has still to be performed. It is within the context of this critical
gap that I wish to project a *rhetorically conscious reading"--or to
follow the reading that the rhetorical text is already suggesting.
I note that I have been continually refering to the difficulty of
Barnes's text, its ambiguity and evasions or subversions of meaning,
without either specifying or demonstrating that difficulty. Perhaps a
sample reading of a notably difficult passage--one that has
consistently drawn Barnes Critics--might serve as sufficient
demonstration and, at the same time, open the way to more elaborate
analysis of the text itself.
IV.
The perfume that her body exhaled was of
the quality of that earth-flesh fungi, which
smells of captured dampness and yet is so dry,
overcast with the odour of oil of amber, which
Is an inner malady of the sea, making her seem
as if she had invaded a sleep incautious and
entire. Her flesh was the texture of plant
life and beneath it one sensed a frame, broad,
porous and sleep-worn, as if sleep were a
decay fishing her beneath the visible surface.
About her head there was an effulgence as of
phosphorous glowing about the circumference
of a body of water—as if her life lay through
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her in ungainly luminous deteriorations--the
troubling structure of the born somnambule,
who lives in two worlds--meet of child and
desperado. (pp. 34-35)
One of the most noticeable things about this passage is that it
by far exceeds the linguistic demands of mimetic prose. What might be
considered "proper referents" to the "character" being "described"—
"body", "flesh", "head", (scent, texture, sigh-O .—are thoroughly troped,
described in metaphors which are, in turn, qualified by similes (a sort
of figuration to the second power). Where we might expect a
significant delineation of a central character, we are given an
intricate series of metaphors, metonymies, and similes which fold in
upon each other. As Singer puts it, "[h]ere the expository function of
plot [as character development] is supplanted with a practice of
linguistic foregrounding". (Mythosas-metaphor.) Of course, this
emphatic practice is a recognized characteristic of Barnes's particular
subversion of genre distinctions: Eliot himself noted, in his
Introduction to the text, that it would perhaps appeal more to readers
of poetry. Yet, there is something even more potentially destructive
than a simple threat to generic boundaries going on here. Singer
continues: "Instead of forming consistent expectations about character,
the precipitous elaboration of metaphor divests contextual markers of
their mediating power by throwing into question their continuity with
the rest of the text."11 	 Certainly, were I to perform a Character
study, I would be attracted to this conglomeration of tropes, "body",
"earth", "flesh", "sea", "sleep", "decay", and "water", offered under the
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figuration of mRobie. However, I should soon find--as Singer has
found--that these tropes exceed, by far, the contextual specification of
the character Robin and that any expectations of semantic or thematic
coherence or consistency in the figural language of the text that could
lead me to abstract an articulate "meaning' as regards this character
would be confounded by that language itself.
We might, of course, attempt to read this Character symbolically
(poetically), as an allegory, say, or a personification of theme. In
the above quotation, we find that via "odour" ("perfume'', "smells"),
"her" "body" is entangled, grammatically and metaphorically, with "earth"
(via "flesh")--exposing, or re-presenting, the Adamic configuration of
the human derivation from clay--and the "sea" (later a "body of water"),
relaying back to those origins that which crawled out of them. The
association is extended with the contextual markings of "decay":
"fungi", feeding on decay; "inner malady"; "luminous deterioration", the
combustive decay by fire (by light). This field of paradigmatic
associations delineated by the mortal body (decaying, female), the earth
and sea (origins, mothers), and the sanctity peculiar to the madonna
(halo effect) bears a weight of connotations (sacred and secular) that
are decidedly conventional in terms of the dominant organizing
principles of Western, particularly Christian, phallogocentric thought.
But what of the confusion (or con-fusion) of the field with this
apparently significant "sleep", this nova in the "centre" of the
Pasage?
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Quite obviously, "sleep" is a dominant trope (whether metaphor,
simile, catachresis or metalepsis) in this passage (as it is in the text
itself): but what does it trope? How does it function in the
paradigmatic or archetypal configuration recognized above? Does this
text help us to establish some sort of correspondence between the
foregrounded "vehicle" and a determinable "tenor" (which would lead us
to the text's proper meaning in the way that Burke claims "turn" does)?
There are three "sleep"s to be addressed in this immediate passage:
that which is invaded by "her"; that which wears away the "frame"
"beneath" "her" "flesh"; that which is "decay fishing her beneath the
visible surface". Between them, there is some dishevelment of the
oppositional relationship of interior/exterior. "Sleep" is something
"invaded", penetrated, entered into, being made the surround of that
"her" entering it; and it is something interior, wearing away the
"frame" "beneath" the "flesh" (as boundary, demarcation, between inside
and outside, above and "beneath"). "Sleep" is at once interior and
exterior, above and beneath, active/male (wearing, fishing) and
passive/female (being penetrated): it is possible to see an unusual
logic working to disrupt, or put into question, the coherence of the
passage with the introduction of oppositions that are not exclusive.
And if this "sleep"ing trope problematizes these principal binary
oppositions—inside/outside, above/beneath, active/passive--which, as
Derrida has so clearly demonstrated, have organized "phallogocentric"
discourse, what is it suggesting about the valorized and mutually
exclusive binary oppositions—femaielmale, mortal/immortal,
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madonna/whore, etc.--organizing my symbolic reading? Apparently the
unity of such a reading, of the presuppositions supporting such a
reading, is being fractured by a "doubling-up" of oppositions, a radical
ambiguity, introduced by this Magically rendered "sleep".
Nor will reference to the "sleep"s in other passages of the text
reduce the ambiguity of this trope. If sleep is, here, "decay", in
another passage it is a preservative: "I saw her come awake and turn
befouled before me, she who had managed in that sleep to keep whole"
(i 145). Nightwoods "sleep" touches upon both Donne's metaphor for
life (the chronology of aging and decay) as a sleep (p. 97) and the
timeless preservation of Snow White and Rip van Winkle. "Sleep" also,
at once, offers the immunity of anonymity--"the eternal incognito" (p.
88)--and renders us, like Endymion, vulnerable to another's advance (pp.
103-4). Between immunity and vulnerability, between "the great sleep
of the elephant and the fine thin sleep of the bird" (14). 85-6), is
"sleep" troped as the enigmatic "slain white bull" (p. 80), a polyvalent
figure of potency, power and sacrifice. (Could this bull be the slain
bull of Mithraism, or Zeus in his pursuit of lo?) Whatever "sleep"
might "be"--life, life-in-death, death-in-life, death, time, or
timelessness--the text offers no contextual demarcations of it. The
term seems to shimmer or vibrate across a textual field roughly
constituted, perhaps, by Donne, Keats, fairytales and classical myth,
although the text gives no indication that the limits should be set at
these. At any rate, this "trope" will not be pinned down. Rather than
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maintaining a symbolic system of correspondences through which the
trope could be distilled to render a vehicle and a tenor, the text goes
the other way, laying layer upon contradictory layer of tropes so that
any possible "origin" or original referent can only be a confusion of
oppositions already at work in the general text of Western discourse
(from myths of the perennially resurrected fertility gods, who "sleep"
from autumn to spring, to Freud's unconscious). If there is to be
meaning in this text, and of course there is, it is not to be found on
the basis of referentiality, correspondence, consequence, or coherence.
The above "sample analysis" has, I hope, demonstrated some of the
"problems" offered by the Barnesian text as well as some of the
possible advantages of practicing "rhetorically conscious readings" of
that text. I also hope that it has .atleast suggested the involvement
with "metaphysics" that such a reading--and such a text--demands. I
still need, however, to establish some recognizable hinge on which to
hang my projected study of Night wood The literary theories of Mikhail
Bakhtin and, in his footsteps, Julia Kristeva offer just such a hinge:
the concept of the "carnivalesque". As Kristeva notes, the
carnivalesque discourse "breaks through the laws of a language censored
by grammar and semantics, and, at the same time, is a social and
political protest": it disrupts the phalIogocentric semantic hegemony in
"figures" of "repetition, 'inconsequent' statements (which are none the
less 'connected' within an infinite context) and non-exclusive
opposition, which function as empty sets or disjunctive additions".' 13
- 70 -
In short, carnivalesque language behaves in much the same way that we
have seen Nghtwoods language behaving. In the following Chapter, I
will elaborate on and examine Bakhtin's and Kristeva's conceptions of
the carnivalesque in literature before going on with a reading of
Nightwood as the carnivalization of specific phallogocentric discourses.
CHAPTER TWO
THROUGH THE CARNIVALESQUE TO UNCERTAINTY
It may be said Jakobson works with poetry
because he has a Pushkinian love of order;
Bakhtin, on the contrary, loves novels be-
cause he is a baggy monster.,
This concept-metaphor of the "carnivalesque" (or "carnevalesque")
has become very popular in literary criticism recently. Of course,
everyone loves a carnival, a holiday from the "normal" order of things,
so the metaphor is attractive to us in itself. It also has the
advantage of seeming to be a "universal" concept: does not every
documented culture revel in some sort of carnivalesque behaviour at
some time or other, and does not history, as we understand it, suggest
that human communities have indulged in carnivalesque performances
since "time immemorial"? This universal, prehistoric concept, seemingly
Innate to humanity, with all its presuppositions of an anarchy that
needs to be released periodically and temporarily for the sake of or
because of the "orderliness" of human society, is as a dream come true
for the literary critic who would canonize works previously denigrated
or ignored out of the evaluative, racial, social, or sexual prejudices of
literary institutions. As Michael Holquist notes, Bahktinian
carnivalesque theory throws a "weird light on our received models of
intellectual history" by attending to the marginal (the obscure, the
virtually unheard of, Pigres of Holicarnassus among the Greeks, Musaus
in the 19th century) as much as to the mainstream itself? This
oblique angle of approach to literary canons and history has interested
more than a few contemporary critics, who have been quick to employ
Bakhtinian theory in their redefinitions of literary orthodoxy.3 And, as
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Jane Marcus has demonstrated in "Laughing at Leviticus", Bakhtin's
theory of the carnivalesque, because it shakes up (solicits)
orthodoxies, offers useful ways of approaching a text like Night wood
which the same orthodoxies reject or wrongfully categorize.
However, there is this problem in taking up the "carnivalesque" as
a stave against the force of a phallogocentric sword: the
authoritative "power" of the "carnivalesque" in these critical wars is
dependent upon an assumed universality that presupposes, in its turn,
constancy, unity, originality, a certain transcendentality, that Bahktin's
own carnival, in its performance, puts firmly into question. Thus, I
shall not arm myself with a Bahktinian concept with the intention of
proving, say, the 'value" of Night wood within the larger contexts of
literary tradition; but I do think it would be helpful to examine
Bahktin's "carnival" as a general metaphor for the sort of productive
strategies that Night wood practices. It will, I hope, prove a useful
and elaborative metaphor.
To lay the ground for this short examination of Bahktinian theory,
I want, first of all, to show how helpful it might be to a feminist or
poststructuralist analysis of Barnes's text, in comparison to other
encyclopaedic, taxonomic, historical/theoretical readings of literature
and/or the novel such as Northrop Frye's profound Anatomy of Criticism,
or Kenneth Burke's all subsuming Grammar, Rhetoriq and Symboliq or
even Ian Watt's specific Rise of the NovelA Its helpfulness lies in
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this, that Frye's spiralling cycles, Burke's entelechial ladder, Watt's
linear ascension ("Rise") of the novel, as models of intellectual and
literary history all owe their theoretical structures to the ideological
strictures of a Western metaphysical tradition dominated by the
concepts of presence and authority, God and truth, wholeness and unity-
-in short, Derrida's "phallogocentrism". s
 In the field of conventional
novel theory and criticism, as I noted in Chapter One, the
phallogocentric imperative manifests itself in valorized distinctions
between form and theme, between style and plot-character-setting,
between mere rhetoric and "truth". Theme, the triad plot-character-
setting, and the "truth" (the realm of the signified) are implicitly
privileged over form, style, and rhetorical ornamentation (the realm of
the signifier) as determinants of the novel's validity and value. Very
simply put, in a "good" novel, the signifier must correspond to, be
adequate to, its signified in such an harmonious and unobtrusive
fashion that the reality which the novel purports to "mime" (as mimetic
fiction) can be seen through the signifier's glass-like surface. The
novel is conceived of as primarily mythos (used in a general sense
which also encompasses ethos and dianoia): we read it, it is implied,
for the "story", characters, and themes--for its signifieds--rather than
for the craftiness of its signifiers, which is the formal impetus of
poetry (at least since the decline of the epic). This grounding of the
signified in the novel corresponds precisely to the phallogocentric
grounding of the subject in the world: both groundings rely on the
inherent, and overlapp ing, presuppositions of unity or wholeness (the
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harmony of form and theme, the unified subject), autonomy (the self-
sufficiency of the closed plot, the presence-to-itself of the Cartesian
subject), authority (the thematic manifestation of an authorial
Intention, the presence of the speaking subject as origin of meaning),
and truth (plot-character-setting as authentic mimesis, the subject
capable of objectifying lived experience, of knowing). The effect of
this conceptual grounding is that it reduces the signifier--the means
of expression, the rhetorical or figural level of fiction--to an
inferior status. It makes it supplemental or secondary to the
essential novelistic function of "miming" established social and
cultural realities. Within this context, Night wood which has been
identified as anything from a prose-poem to mere rhetoric, can only
appear as, at worst, a pretentious mistake and, at best, an assimilable
subversive tendency. (But such assimilation could only be performed by
a gross disfiguration or radical amputation of parts of the text. The
night-time text of female experience is not so easily digested by
phallogocentrism, as Burke's erratic attempt at treating it as
"lamentation" demonstrates. )5
On the other hand, Bakhtinian theory--which was spawned in the
midst of a social, political, cultural revolution far from the quietude
of Canadian, American, and British universities--is suspicious of such
dominant concepts in their claim to an all-subsuming, irreducible,
status. There is little evidence in Bakhtin's work to fully align him
with the Marxist critics. As one of his translators, Caryl Emerson,
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points out, "for Bakhtin 'dialogic' does not mean 'dialectic'; his
universe owes much more to Kant than to Hegel
	 in place of the
comfortable patterns of synthesis and Authebung, Bakhtin posits a
dualistic universe of permanent dialogue.7 We should remember, too,
that Bakhtin fell foul of the Stalinist authorities and spent several
years in internal exile in Kazakhstan. But then, there is also little to
align him positively with what might be called Western "capitalist"
criticism, particularly when we consider the challenge to orthodox
Western concepts of individualism and subjectivity in his concepts of
the "dialogic" and "heteroglossia". Bakhtin's "politics", not unlike
Barnes's, seem to consist, for the most part, of a suspicion of the
repressive authority (nmonologism” of any dominant ideology which will
not admit of difference. For Bakhtin, the "authoritative word"--the
(very symbolic) signifier that assumes an inviolable correspondence to
its autonomous signified and is thus distanced from the relative play
and modifications of "everyday language"--is actually only one
interactant in an open-ended struggle with the subject's own "internally
persuasive words", arbitrary signs which are always relative to
cultural, historical and personal contexts and thus incapable of a one-
to-one correspondence with any signified. I will elaborate on different
aspects of this struggle in the following examination of Bakhtin's
theory: what I wish to foreground here is that this theory of the
"novel" occupies the interstice between the "authoritative word" and the
word of relativity and possible difference: it assumes the arena of
their entanglement and struggle which is always, at least, two-sided.
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This "site" accommodates the marginal, obscure, or subversive text as
easily as it does the mainstream text by opening up the critical scope
to a recognition of the "other" that is always already involved with
the "one". The positing of such a space by Bakhtinian theory is what
privileges it as a ground on which to base analyses of texts like
Night wood I might also suggest that if one wishes to analyze
"monstrosities", perhaps one should first go to the "baggy monster".8
But, as I suggested above, there is more to Bahktinian theory and
its concept-metaphor of the "carnivalesque" than this attractive
gesture of overturning the hegemony of singular, determinable, meaning
and eliciting the possibility of ursurpation by other meanings, or non-
meaning. I want to draw forth this excess, this supplement to the
central Bahktinian project, because I suspect that the excess is the
"carnivalesque" itself in practice. In order to do so, I will, first,
recite and, then, solicit a reading of Bahktin's carnivalesque theory of
the "novel" as it is presented, primarily, in The Dialogic Imagination
and, to a lesser extent, in Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics and
Rabelais and His World.
The four essays in The Dialogic Imagination (and, to a
considerable extent, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics and Rabelais and
His World) were written out of Bakhtin's realization that there is no
comprehensive "stylistic" theory (or "Poetics") of the novel as a unique
genre. Prior to the twentieth century, according to Bakhtin,
considerations of the novel were based on a conception of it as an
Inhabitant of the house of "mixed rhetorical genres", and, at least from
the middle of the nineteenth century, these considerations primarily
took the form of studies in composition and thematim Only since the
1920s have there been serious studies of novelistic "style" as such;
however, these studies have tended to focus on the stylistics of a
particular novelist or novel, and "the stylistic specificum of the novel
as genre [has] remained as before unexplored". 1 ° (I should note, here,
that even the works of Lukacs [Theory of the Novell and Watts are
Insufficient to Bakhtin's conception of the specific= of the genre, for
they are involved with the privileging of certain "types" of novels as
generically definitive.) Bakhtin contends that the foci of contemporary
stylistic analyses--on the "individual artistic personality of the
author, the literary school, the general characteristics of poetic
language or of the literary language of a particular era"--"all serve
to conceal from us the genre itself, with the specific demands it makes
upon language and the specific possibilities it opens up for it' s." In
other words, all previous attempts at coming to terms with the novel as
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genre have been obfuscating displacements or evasions of the primary
quest ion—Whatis, what can be, the novel?
What Is the novel? I will try to delineate Bakhtin's "answer" as
briefly, and as simply, as I can, but the course plotted is not one
easily made straight. Bakhtinian theory is neither precisely formal nor
systematical; rather, it tends to exceed form and system by an
orientation toward that which resists closure, that which is "living"
language still in the process of becoming.1	 Bakhtin does not deal in
sets and categories as much as he does the movements and forces
disrupting formal fortifications. (In a sense, Bakhtin's delineation of
the history of the novel is, if I may play on the etymology of the verb
'to delineate', a drawing out of the threads holding more rigidly
structured literary theories together. It has the effect of an
unravelling force applied to the seams of convention's dress.) Thus,
there are no "hard and fast rules" to the Bakhtinian project which
would give my own attempt at delineation a prescribed shape. I must,
therefore, resort to pulling a few threads myself.
The first thread to take hold of is "novel" itself--this is, after
all, the foregrounded term in the translated text. In this fortunate
instance, the English term is more accommodating to Bakhtin's thesis
than the Russian romana with its derivation from the romance genre.
Thus, we are, by a linguistic accident, afforded a conducive
etymological play denied Bakhtin himself. Bakhtin's concept of the
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"novel" never deviates from the sense of the "new', the innovative, that
which opposes the "old" as "other than old" COED). The relationship of
"new" to "old" is not a standing-in-opposition, or a stasis of
opposition, but an active, even violent, opposing. The "male, as the
force of "becoming" has always been embroiled in a struggle with the
force of resistance to Change, the "old". And these forces are
interdependent, utterly inextricable. (We should recall, here, Emerson's
suggestion that "Bakhtin posits a dualistic universe of permanent
dialogue" which, perhaps, bears more resemblance to the Freudian
struggle between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, or to
a Manichean view of existence as perpetual opposition, than to Hegelian
dialectics.) Whereas Bakhtin's "history' does posit a beginning of the
novel successive to the formation of the "older genres" and the
development of writing itself, his study of parody (the fundamental
tool of the oppositional force in literature according to Bakhtin)
yields the following:
It is our conviction that there never was
a single strictly straightforward genre, no
single type of direct discourse--artistic,
rhetorical, philosophical, religious, ordinary
everyday--that did not have its own parodying
and travestying double, its own comic-ironic
contre-partle.
I will return to the entanglement of parody and novel in a moment, with
a fuller explication of this relationship, but what I wish to stress
here is that "novelnese, as parody, as opposition to the established or
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the old, has always existed. The possibility of the "novel" has thus
always already infiltrated discourse of every sort.
But I need to tie together the threads of novel and parody--at
least so that the knot can be "seen". Parody, as Bakhtin perceives it,
bears both its conventional denotation of a degrading imitation and a
weight of transforming force. This force--the force of laughter--is
directed toward not only the object but, most importantly, toward the
"direct" (conventional, authoritative, representational) word oriented
solely toward the object. The "direct" word, in the parodic movement,
becomes reified, objectivized, itself an image ridiculed, and the system
of significations supporting it in its designation as "direct", purely
representational and absolutely serious, is ruptured, shaken from its
stranglehold on reality and "transformed from the absolute dogma it had
been within the narrow framework of a sealed-off and impermeable
monoglossia into a working hypothesis for comprehending and expressing
reality".".
This seems like a tremendous amount of effect for a simple laugh,
and I think that a more explicit outline of this mechanism would not be
amiss. "Direct discourse" only is and has its being within a conception
of language as the single-voiced, authoritative, representative of the
world. Between the word and its object is an uninhibited and singular
causeway of meaning, and this relationship is inviolable. This
conception of directly representational language and its denial of the
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possibility of another word, an other's word, intruding into the
ordained causeway compose the fundamental model of what Bakhtin calls
"monoglossia", or language unconscious of its complete subjection to its
own myths of single-voicedness and homogeneity of meaning. The
languages of authority and officialdom, of law, religion, mysticism, and
even (until very recently) philosophy, are all forms of monoglossia.16
Each projects its own myths of hierarchy, its own valorizations and
historical closure, as the modes of truthful signification and resists,
by thorough exclusion, the possibility of other significat ions.
Parody, the "indirect linguistic expression of laughter", shoulders
its way into monoglossia, thrusting its word onto the scene of the
orientation of word-toward-object and taking hold of the "direct" word
In order to make an object of it, to present the representational as
the represented. 1G Parody takes the distanced, hierarchized and
valorized word and brings it up close, right into contemporaneity, for
scrutiny. As Bakhtin notes:
Laughter has the remarkable power of making
an object come up close, of drawing it into a
zone of crude contact where one can finger it
familiarly on all sides, turn it upside down,
inside out, peer at it from above and below,
break open its external shell, look into its
center, doubt it, take it apart, dismember it,
lay it bare and expose it, examine it freely
and experiment with it. 17
This exhumation of the "direct" word and its object from its historical
and metaphysical closure, and the subsequent examination and insertion
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of it into the play of contemporary, "living" language by the agency of
an other, parodic, word--by laughter--is part of the coming-to-
consciousness of language itself. The sterile power of the myth is
dispelled: language is conceived, conceives itself, as het erogenous, as
"heteroglossiO, multi-voiced and multi-contexted. Witness that
hegemonic term of the critical endeavour--"meaning"--becoming, via
Joycean parodic word-play, "meinungs", "maymeaminnine, "maimoomeining",
and, in the process, losing its "power" as it gains in generative
possibilities.le
I have laid this mechanism out as a sequence: in the beginning
there was the "direct" word, then came parody. Partly, this was done to
facilitate the reading, but it may also serve to demonstrate the power
of monoglossial myths. The authoritative discourse, the "direct" word,
is marked by its "pastness", its already-completedness, which is--if we
turn it around and look at its backside--primarily the projection of its
"to be", its fulfillment in futurity, into a positively valorized,
idealized past--an Eden, a Golden Age, the origin of the Word (the
confusion of alpha and omega).' 	 This intimation of "pastnes0, it
should be recognized, is outside of and has virtually nothing to do
with "actual historical sequence"..2° To distinguish it from
contemporary discourse (the always yet-to-be-completed, infected with
possibility, the never-as-good) on the basis of a temporal separation is
to yield to the idealizing myth of monoglossia. For example, we might
note the distinction made by some Joyce scholars between the
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nmaymeaminning of maimoomeining" and the meaning of Joyce's "meaning"
that they feel Justified in attempting to establish. The implication of
this attempt is that it is possible to set "meaning" in a sort of
determinative metaposition over the Joycean text. But is this possible?
Have not the heterogeneous possibilities of "meaning" foregrounded by
Joyce always been lurking in the wings? Obviously, they have: Joyce's
word-plays are as etymological as they are Inter-lingual. And we
should not forget that "meaning" has always been complicated by the
possibility of the lie. The myth which feigns "actual historical
sequence" is simply the hierarchizing and valorizing force of
monoglossia that has always been attended by "its own parodying and
travestying double". In other words (and there are always other words),
the "past" and the "contemporaneity" of language have always been
embroiled and implicated in each other in a process of doubling, in
ambivalence.
Parody is the mechanical principle of nnovelnese, and laughter
(both gay and serious, "Cheerful and annihilating", "ambivalent") the
force that activates and actuates it. I should mention, at this point,
that Bakhtin does not ignore other "indirect linguistic expressionfs] of
laughter"--irony, the Joke, and the various forms of the comic--but that
he does, in practice, assume the privileging of parody through its wide-
spread application in literature. As a practice of degrading imitation,
it is perhaps the most forceful model for his theory of the novel.
And, unlike the Joke, for example, parody has the advantage of being
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able to be sustained through a text or a series of texts. It is a
resilient form of double-voiced "linguistic expression" that lends
itself particularly well to the ineluctable force of laughter.
Are we now in a position to say what the novel is? Perhaps the
answer is simply: novelistic discourse = novelness = a tendency, a
force, something scarcely to be gotten hold of or set down. Although
Bakhtin does acknowledge a "prehistory of the novel", an acknowledgment
that yields a con-fusing concept of prenovel novelness, and although he
does recognize conventional accounts of the historical development of
the novel, a recognition that is adulterated by his positing of the
roots of the novel far deeper into the prehistory of the "genre" than
has been done before (or since), he offers no formal definition of the
novel itself beyond this characteristic novelness. (rhe historical
distinction between prenovel novelistic discourse and the novel is a
boundary that he frequently threatens to obliterate. For example, he
comes within a hair's breadth of calling the Socratic Dialogues
"novele.)- 1 Certainly, he does mention "that sturdy skeleton of plot
and composition that we have grown accustomed to demand from the
novel" as a distinctive structure, but is not that which "we have grown
accustomed to" always the target of the force of "novelrte?	 Are
not "structures" themselves--the set, the formed, the lineaments of
genre--threatened with mutation in any operation of force? The
concept of the novel as genre becomes impossible: what we are
realizing in the "novel" is an anti-generic force.
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We are, apparently, coming up against a particular conflict within
Bakhtin's theory, a conflict between his recognition of anti-generic
"mwaness" and his attempt at establishing a "stylistics" of the novel
as "genre". Before going on with this, however, I want to make one
more sally into The Dialogic Imagination, this time focussing on the
"difference" that is a "dialogue" (if somewhat violent) between the
anti-generic novel and the literary genres, particularly poetry. I light
on poetry because it is so perfectly "opposite to" the novel in both
the conventional and the Bakhtinian views. As such, it provides a
useful illustration of the solicitation of the conventions of genre by
the novelistic forces. I will begin by first reducing the field from
discourse in general to the "word" which is the minimal unit of meaning
and "the central problem" of theory in Bakhtinian terms: "If the
central problem in poetic theory is the problem of the poetic symbol,
then the central problem in prose theory is the problem of the double-
voiced, internally dialogized word, in all its diverse types and
variants.	 Bakhtin's use of the term "poetry", or of what has been
translated as "poetry", does not completely coincide with the
contemporary Western conception of the genre. What Bakhtin refers to
as poetry we might more readily define as, say, "lyrical" or "symbolist"
poetry. In many ways, Bakhtin's use of the "poetic" corresponds to the
English Romantics's rendering of the "poetic" as a pure subjectivity, an
absolute affinity of mind and object. (It also bears some resemblance
to Eliot's "objective correlative.) According to Bakhtin, the
"Indispensable prerequisites of poetic style", "in the majority of poetic
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genres", are "the unity of the language system and the unity (and
uniqueness) of the poet's individuality as reflected in his language and
speech". 4 However, it should be noted that Bakhtin considers these
stylistic *prerequisites" to be conventionally contrived, and he
suggests that the "traditional stylistic categories" and the
"philosophical conception of poetic discourse in which they are
grounded, are too narrow and cramped". s. His use of the *poetic"
should, perhaps, always be read with this reservation in mind, although
he, himself, seems quite happy to use the "poetic" in this conventional
and limited sense. Following Bakhtin's suggestions, I have delineated
the oppositional participants in the "difference" that is a "dialogue"
thus:
Poetic Word	 VS	 Prose Word




3. two meanings possible 	 3. two meanings
4. orientation solely toward	 4. orientation





The "poetic" word, although capable of producing two meanings, or
double meaning, in its tropaical function, knows only one context--that
of its author's voice and accent, the "expressions" of the author's
"point of view". It is directed solely towards its object, and, should
it acknowledge another word, from outside of its own context, directed
toward that object—to follow Bakhtin's organic metaphor--it
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acknowledges it as neutral, "as the word of no one in particular'''. "No
one hinders [the poetic word], no one argues with it": it sustains its
inviolable purity in an authoritative gesture of contextual exclusion.
Shall we say, in other :fords, that it subscribes completely to an
"authorial intention", or is it even more pristine than that:
In the poetic image narrowly conceived
(in the image-as-trope), all activity--the
dynamics of the image-as-word--is completely
exhausted by the play between the word With
all its aspects) and the object (in all its
aspects). The word plunges into the inexhaus-
tible wealth and contradictory multiplicity of
the object itself, with its "virginal", still
"'unuttered" nature; therefore it presumes
nothing beyond the borders of its own context
(except of course what can be found in the
treasure-house of language itself). The word
forgets that its object has its own history
of contradictory acts of verbal recognition,
as well as that of heteroglossia that is
always present in such acts of recognition.7
"The word forgets": it excludes: it represses other "contradictory
acts of verbal recognition" as consciousness represses the traumatic
experience. It is completely authoritarian, conceiving itself singular
and self-sufficient. The repression of exception and contradiction, of
an other word directed toward the same object (1 relationship that
finally devastates any direct connection between word and object and
thus destroys "representation"--although Bakhtin balks at taking it this
far), is precisely the repression that constitutes "genre", or literary
distinction in generaL In other words, there has never been a purely
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representational word: there has only always been repression of other
words, of heteroglossia.
It is this repression, this hypocrisy of ascendancy and self-
sufficiency, that the novel addresses itself to. The novel, for Bakhtin,
is a liberating force, a revolution of the contemporary and commonplace
against the autocratic rule of established genre. (Although Bakhtin's
work does not necessarily subscribe to Hegelian dialectics, it is often
marked by "Marxist" metaphors of class struggle and revolution.) The
novel's modus operandi is primarily one of contextual shifts: it
recontextualizes the poetic word by reifying it and Challenging it in
heteroglossial play. (As Bakhtin notes, a poem can appear in a novel,
but a novel can never appear as itself in a poem) But--and this is a
significant "but“--the "novelistic" or prose word does not change the
poetic word: it broaches it as an "other"; it enforces dialogue; it
interrogates the poetic word while at the same time parodying it,
exposing as hypocritical its self-limitations and degrading it The
prose word is always an "intentional" (in-tension-al) dialogue with that
which represses dialogue--a disrupting dialogue made possible by the
operation of laughter (the only complex which "never underwent
sublimation of any sort--neither religious, mystical nor philosophical
never took on an official character") on the word constituted by
repression.28 We might say that the "dialogue" of the direct, poetic,
authoritative word and the interrogating, novelistic, prose word is
essentially "Socratic":
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SOCRATES: Good, my worthy friend, just con-
tinue as you began, and mind you do not falter
through shame. And I too, it seems, must
throw all shame aside First of all then,
tell me whether one who suffers from the itch
and longs to scratch himself, if he can scratch
himself to his heart's content and continue
scratching all his life, can be said to live
happily.
CALLICLF14 How absurd you are Socrates, a
regular mob oraton
SOCRATES: That Callides, is why I frightened
Bolus and Gcrgias and put them to shame, but
you surely will not be dismayed or abashed,
for you have courage. Only give me your answer.
CALLICLFS: Well then, I say even one who scrat-
ches himself would live pleasantly.
SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, happily?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: If it was only his head that he
wanted to scratch--or can I push the question
further? Think what you will answer, Callic-
les, if anyone should ask all the questions
that naturally follow. And as a climax of all
such cases, the life of a catamite--is not that
shameful and shocking and miserable? Will you
dare to say that such people are happy, if they
have what they desire in abundance?
CALLICLFS: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to
drag our discussion into such topics
SOCRATES: Is it I who do this, my noble
friend, or the man who says so unequivocally
that pleasure, whatever its nature, is the
key to happiness, and does not distinguish
between pleasures good and evil? But en-
lighten me further as to whether you say that
the pleasant and good are identical, or that
there are some pleasures which are not good.
CALLICLES: To avoid inconsistency if I say
they are different, I assert they are the
same.
SOCRATES: Then you ruin your earlier state-
ment, Callicles, and you can no longer proper-
ly investigate the truth with me, if you
speak contrary to your opinions.
CALLICLRS: You are doing Just the soul%
Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then I am not acting rightly, if
I am so doing, nor are you. But my good sire,
consider whether pleasures so indiscriminate
can after all be the good. For if it is so,
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then the many shocking things we just now
hinted at must evidently result, and many
others too.
CALLICIRS: So you think, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But do you really maintain this,
Callicles?
CALLICIFS: I do.
SOCRATES: Then we are to take up the argument
in the belief that you are serious?
CALLICLES: Most assuredly.
The "absurd" eiron interrogates the unequivocally "serious",
pushing each "answer" into the indeterminacy of another question and
yet another context. Ambivalence (here in the form of irony) engages
the monologiced, the (self-contradicting) avoidance of "inconsistency',
in an argument that is a debasement of proper "discussion".
Socratic laughter (reduced to irony) and Soc-
ratic degradations (an entire system of meta-
phors and comparisons borrowed from the lower
spheres of life--from tradespeople, from every-
day life, etc.) bring the world closer and
familiArize it in order to investigate it
fearlessly and freely.°
Thus, the Socratic Dialogue, in its simple stmve]mme, is a convenient
model for the complex-ridden dialogues between "old" and "new", the
mythical past and contemporaneity, between authoritative discourse and
the discourse of the individual], between poetic repression and
investigative prose, between the insulation of the monoglot and the
relativity of the polyglot, between the monoglossia and heteroglossia of
language itself. These dialogues are always and already within
language, composing languages. And, more than this, the Socratic
Dialogues, in the "novelistic" activity of reifying, making an image of,
- 92 -
Socratic discourse as the intentional words of a speaking subject—the
words of Socrates—demonstrate "one of the primary distinguishing
features of the novel", the "auto-critism of cliscourse". 31 In the
series of questions and answers comprising the dialogues, do we not
find discourse testing, interrogating, itself by imaging its differences
as characters?
Bakhtin frequently and fondly introduces the Socratic Dialogues as
a model of nnovelnese: it is perhaps ironic, then, that our brief
examination of a short passage from Plato's text should bring us to a
crisis (already intimated) in the Bakhtinian text. On the one hand,
which is the hand preparing the schematization toward a "stylistics" of
the novel, we cannot assume the auto-critical tendency of discourse--
which, according to Bakhtin, only began more or less with Dtx2 Quixote--
in a prenovel "genre". CBakhtin specifically cites the Dialogues as a
genre.P2 In the schematization of the coming-to-consciousness of
language as occurring in "actual historical sequence"--as a materialist,
evolutionary, and progressive development--our conjecture that the
Dialogues are autocritical fits like a square peg in a round hole. 33 On
the other hand, which is Bakhtin's free hand, can we not assume an
auto-critical facility in discourse that has always already had "its own
comic-ironic cootry-parlie? If the "direct" or "-poetic" word has
always been constituted by the repression of heteroglossia, can we not
suppose that this repression has already been countered by
interrogative "novelne13", by at least the possibility of heteroglossial
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auto-criticism? Perhaps it is this crisis--this collision between the
formalism of history, of "actual historical sequence", and the forces of
"novelness"--that Bakhtin seeks to redress when he writes:
For the novelist working in prose, the
object is always entangled in someone else's
discourse about it, it is already present with
qualifications, an object of dispute that is
conceptualized and evaluated variously, insep-
arable from the heteroglot apperception of it.
The novelist speaks of this "already qualified
world" in a language that is heteroglot and
internally dialogized. Thus both object and
language are revealed to the novelist in their
historical dimension, in the process of social
and heteroglot becoming	 In the novel, the
"already bespoke quality" Eogovorennostl of
the world is woven together with the "already
uttered" quality Iperegovorennostl of lang-
uage, into the unitary event of the world's
heteroglot becoming, in both social conscious-
ness and language.
On the one hand, we have "the historical dimension" of the
materiality of "object and language", a "process of social and
heteroglot becoming" that is evolutionarily progressive, being "revealed
to the novelist". What is "the novelist", in this reading, but a fixed
point of consciousness, a transcendental, fully self-present, subject
capable of perceiving the "world's heteroglot becoming*--despite the
immanence of its "struggles"--as a "unitary event*? The novelist, like
the theorist himself, assumes a position above and outside of the
"historical dimension" of "object and language" that enables a detached
recognition of "actual historical sequenceEs1", "heteroglot becomingEsr,
and the schematics of a "coming-to-consciousness". In this sense, by
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being "outside of" that which is revealed to him, the novelist/theorist
is capable of the authoritative, originary (as originating from a
determinable "fixed point" of being), imposition of "unity" on
heteroglossia. Bakhtin considers the novelist (and perhaps the
theorist?) as an "author-creator" who is not quite the "human being
living his own biographical life". This "author-creator" is a sort of
organizing and unifying point-of-view, responsible for "the composition
of the work", the order and relatedness of its beginning, middle and
end, the divisions of it into chapters, etc. We "sense his activity" in
the composition although he, himself, is "outside" of the elements that
he organizes and unifies. He is "as it were tangential to them". Thus,
this novelist/"author-creator" would appear to be a sort of tangential
"system" or filter through which the diverse elements constituting the
"historical dimension" of "object and language" are gathered and re-
organized in the creation of a new and unified work. 35 On the other
hand, "the object is already entangled in someone else's discourse about
it"; the world is "'already bespoke'"; language is "already uttered'".
Thus, the novelist/theorist is only capable of repetition or reiteration
(as repetition with difference): he or she cannot step outside of or
become detached from history, from the "already bespoke" and the
"already uttered", for these are what comprise his or her speech,
language, text.36 (As Bakhtin usefully notes elsewhere, the novelist
"does his observing from his own unresolved and still evolving
contemporaneity L.] in so far as he himself is located as it were
tangentially to the reality he describes".P 7 The authoritative,
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originary, self-present, position that makes possible the perception or
imposition of a "unitary event" is inherently untenable in the face of
this reiteration that denies the immediacy of full presence. Some
absent other is always already mediating this one.
Bakhtin's theory is marked, or scored, by this tension between his
recognition of the impossibility of full-presence, self-identity, in the
reiterative play of language and his attempt, as a theorist, to assume
a position outside of this play, a position of unmediated consciousness
which can perceive "the unitary event of the world's heteroglot
becoming". We might say that Bakhtin is caught between his recognition
of heteroglossia and the monoglossia of his cognition. We might also
say that his centripetal intention to arrive at a "stylistics" of the
novel is being operated on by the centrifugal forces of "novelness"
inherent in "living discourse".
Here, in "living discourse", we have come to perhaps the most
"productive" crisis of Bakhtinian theory--at least in terms of that
theory itself. To expose this crisis, to examine its rupturing, we must
now pay attention to aspects of Bakhtin's discourse that we have
previously elided: the predominance of organic metaphors for language
and the linguistic sleight-of-hand by which the indirect, novelistic,
word becomes the "prose word".
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Whatever else it might be, whichever side of the monological-
heterological barrier it chooses as its significant site, the word is a
"living word". It acts, "plunges", "acknowledges", "presumes", "forgets":
it is conscious and capable of self-consciousness: it "speaks".
Language is "living" (or "dead"), "coming-to-consciousness" (or
unconscious), involved in "the historical process of becoming". And, of
course, it must be so for it re-presents the "speaking person", its
originator, and the speaking person's world. The persistency of organic
metaphors in the Bakhtinian discourse makes it impossible to perceive
language as anything but the reiteration--the fundamental mimesis--of
the being that speaks.
	 Plato's being that speaks--Socrates--also
talks of "persuasive" speech, "living speech", the "imitation of the
essence L.J made by syllables and letters", and the mimetic nature of
language's origination. Socrates, too, talks about language "befitting
[the] profession" or status or state of soul of the being that speaks--
the very stratification of language that enables heteroglossia. 	 At
the very heart (to employ an appropriate metaphor) of Bakhtin's theory
lies not the "Galilean perception of language [...] that denies the
absolutism of a single and unitary language" that he claims for it, but
the Platonic perception of language as speech, as the representation of
the speaking person confirming the absolutism of full presence and
"unitary" beinivto
The Platonism of Bakhtin becomes even more obvious in those few
passages where he discusses the specifically written nature--or, more
properly, inscribed nature--of the novel:
BAICHTIN
[...] the text is always impri-
soned in dead material of
some sort [...] in inscriptions
(on stone, brick, leather,
papyrus, paper)[...] the form
of a book (scrolls, codices).
But inscriptions and books in
any form already lie on the
boundary line between culture
and a dead nature; if we ap-
roach these items as carriers
of the [living] text, then
they enter into the realms of
culture and (in our example)
into the realm of literature
[....] where we find the inscrip-
tion or the book, we find as
well a real person--one who
originates spoken speech as
well as the inscription and
the book.4'
PLATO
SOCRATES: But now tell me,
Is there another sort of
discourse, that is the
brother to the written
speech, but of unquestioned
legitimacy? Can we see how
it originates and how much
better and more effective
it is than the other?
PHAEDRUS: What sort of
discourse have you now in
mind, and what is its
origin?
SOCRATES: The sort that
goes together with know-
ledge, and is written in
the soul of the learner,
that can defend itself and
knows to whom it should
speak and to whom it
should say nothing.
PHAEDRUS: You mean no
dead discourse, but the
living speech, the ori-
ginal of which the writ-
ten may fairly be called
a kind of image.4-2
As is well known, the
printing of books played
an extremely important role
in the history of the chival-
ric romance, for it served to
shift and displace its aud-
ience. It served to shift
discourse into a mute mode
of perception, a shift deci-
sive for the novel as a genre.
This societal disorientation
SOCRATES: [...] And once a
thing is put in writing,
the composition, whatever
it may be, drifts all over
the place, getting into
the hands not only of those
who understand it, but
equally of those who have
no business with it; it
doesn't know how to address
the right people, and not
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becomes deeper and more per-
vasive as the novel continues
its development, and the
chivalric romance, a product
of the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries, begins a
period of wandering between
social classes, a wandering
that ends only when it is
absorbed into the "folk
literature" of a reading
public made up of lower social
groups: from this low level
it is brought back up into
the light of a literarily
sophisticated consciousness
by the RomanticsA3
address the wrong. And
when it is ill-treated and
unfairly abused it always
needs its parents to come
to its help, being unable
to defend or help itself.'"
The incarceration of speech in "dead material of some sort", in
"dead discourse", in inscription, is an act (of cruelty, perhaps) that
severs the intentional ties linking the (living) text to its authentic
meaning. It "begins a period of wandering' and "drifts all over the
place", wandering and drifting in an involuntary fall (from proper
meaning, from grace) to the "low level" of the "wrong people". But the
text is not unredeemable: its "parents"--that is, "living speech" and
the originator of "spoken speech as well as the inscription", those
progenitors that it always carries within it, its inheritance and
salvation--can come to its rescue, bring it "back up into the light of
L.] consciousness" and presence, and restore it to proper meaning. In
Dissemination, Jacques Derrida has performed an extensive analysis of
Plato's perception of speech and writing (inscription)--of speech
(presence, logos) as privileged over writing (absence, mere dead
repetition), and of writing as death, as poisonous and patricidal (the
illegitimate son killing "the father of speech", disposing with
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authority)--and has identified this oppositional and hierarchical binary
relationship as a dominant principle of the Western metaphysical
tradition and its discourse.4 	On the basis of the evidence of this
particular binary relationship in the Bakhtinian text, we could say that
it is, in one way at least, a "phallogocentric" text. I don't think it
necessary to pursue this particular question any further than this for
it would only be going over already well-covered ground. It is enough,
at this point, to recognize the significantly Platonic and logocentric
structure of Bakhtin's view of inscription as a fall from full presence
and the validity of meaning into the "death" that is unmotivated
repetition, and that this view is the homozygous sister of the
monological view of language.
Yet, there is this crucial slippage in Bakhtin's discourse:
All these genres, or in any case, their
defining features, are considerably older-
than written language and the book, and to
the present day they retain their ancient
oral and auditory characteristics. Of all
the major genres only the novel is younger
than writing and the book: it alone is organ-
ically receptive to new forms of mute percep-
tion, that is, to reading (-1 It is the only
genre that was born and nourished in a new
era of world history and therefore it is
deeply akin to that era, whereas the other
major genres entered that era as already
fixed forms, as an inheritance, and only
now are they adapting themselves--some better,
some worse--to the new conditions of their
existence.46
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The "defining features" of the novel, then, are conditioned by the
novel's birth in a new "era of world history", the era of writing and
reading, of inscription and its reiteration. The novel is,
characteristically, inscribed discoursia Its definitive vanguard is the
"prose word"--the only word that is divorced from poetic dependency on
orality and aurality (rhyme and metre). The "prose word" does not need
the human voice: it is "organically" conditioned to the silence of
inscription and its "mute perception". What we cannot avoid here is the
recognition that Bakhtin posits the birth of the novel in the death of
spoken speech. The genre that he privileges springs from the loins of
a practice that he disparages.
Birth in death: the ambivalent 'pregnant death" is the primary
informing "image of the carnival", according to Bakhtin, and we can say,
with reasonable certainty, that it is toward this image that his entire
theory of the novel is orientated. 47
 The "carnival performance"--the
profanation and familiarization of the sacred; the uncrowning of the
king and the crowning of the jester; the ambivalent establishment of
profane sacredness, uncrowning crowning, kingly fool; the insistence on
doubling, on the one-that-is-two--is precisely the novelistic
performance of dialogical interrogation, which is why Bakhtin's concept
of "carnivalization" is generally considered the paradigm of his theory
of the noveL But is it not more than a paradigm? Can we not see, in
the "pregnant death" that carnivalizes the Platonic binary opposition of
speech and writing, the carnivalizat ion of Bakhtin's theory based on the
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presence of the speaking person? In a very exciting sense, the
Bakhtinian text "carnivalizes itself": the force of "novelness" that it
detects and investigates--the force that turns established formalisms
upside down and inside out, doubling them, rendering them ambivalent--
is at work as the problematic in so-called "direct" Bakhtinian discourse
itself.
Carnivalizat ion carnivalized: the formal concept of carnivalizat ion
solicited in its engagement to the primacy of speech signifying full
presence continually yields an excess of carnival production. It is as
though the carnivalesque always, at the critical moment, at the
threshold of meaning, escapes or defers definition in the production of
yet another self-reflective (seriously parodic) turn. Part and parcel
of a general system of significations, the carnivalesque, in its excess,
yet seems to be always at the limits of that system, challenging those
limits and so enabling their perpetual redefinition.
And lo and behold! Apollo found it impossible
to live without Dionysus. The elements of
titanism and barbarism turned out to be quite
as fundamental as the Apollonian element.
NIETZSCHE"e
After long doubts and vacillations we have
decided to assume the existence of only two
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basic instincts, Eros and the destructive
instinct I- -] The aim of the first of these
basic instincts is to establish ever greater
unities and to preserve them thus--in short,
to bind together; the aim of the second, on
the contrary, is to undo connections and so
to destroy things	 In biological functions
the two basic instincts work against each
other or combine with each other. Thus, the
act of eating is a destruction of the object
with the final aim of incorporating it, and
the sexual act is an act of aggression having
as its purpose the most intimate union. This
interaction of the two basic instincts with
and against each other gives rise to the whole
variegation of the phenomena of life.
FREUDA
"My voice cracked on the word 'difference,'
soaring up divinely (...J"
BARNES (Nightwood, p. 92)
The carnivalesque "forces" thus appear to assume a universal
propensity: they appear to be—just possibly —operating everywhere, as
a sort of "differs:Ice", in theoretical, political, philosophical, and
psychoanalytical as well as novelistic discourse, giving "rise to the
whole variegation of the phenomena" of inscription. &° In a way, the
"carnivalesque", as a sort of diff&ance, might be seen as an "origin"
which Western phallogocentric discourse has attempted to repress in its
effort to found itself on a singular absolute. (Recall Bakhtin's
"conviction that there never was a single strictly straightforward
genre L.J that did not have L..] its own comic-ironic contre-partie
[emphasis added].) Différance is "the non-full, nonsimple, structured
and differentiating origin of differences. Thus the name 'origin' no
longer suits It."s1 This origin that is not an origin, that would seem
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to be repressed by phallogocentrism, is, according to Derrida, the "very
opening of the space in which ontotheology--philosophy--produces its
system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and
exceeding it without return", not least of all because this system and
history are specifically linguistic and, if we follow Saussure, "in the
system of language, there are only differencesu.s2
As Derrida demonstrates, this *repressed" origin-that-is-not-an-
origin *returns", or "appears" (while always disappearing) at certain
times, in certain texts: Nalifferance appears almost by name in [the
texts of Nietzsche and Freud], and in those places where everything is
at stake [.-.]":s3
Ugifferance is the name we might give to the
"active", moving discord of different forces,
and of differences of forces, that Nietzsche
sets up against the entire system of meta-
physical grammar, wherever this system governs
culture, philosophy and science.s4-
Diff6ranoe, the preopening [...] of all the dif-
ferences which furrow Freudian conceptuality,
such that they may be organized, and this is
only an example, around the difference between
"pleasure" and "reality", or may be derived
from this difference. The difference between
the pleasure principle and the reality prin
iple, for example, is not uniquely, nor primar-
ily, a distinction, an exteriority, but rather
the original possibility, within life, of the
detour, of deferral (of death]
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Does differance not appear "almost by name" in Bakhtin's concept of the
differential "forces" of "unitary language" (the authoritative word) and
"heteroglossia"?
Alongside the centripetal forces [unitary
language], the centrifugal forces of language
[heteroglossia] carry on their uninterrupted
work; alongside verbal-ideological centraliz-
ation and unification, the uninterrupted
processes of decentralization and disunifi-
cat ion go forward.E.
Any "utterance" is a "contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two
embattled tendencies in the life of language", and it is this "moving
discord of different forces" that Bakhtin "sets up against the entire
system" of "linguistics, stylistics, and the philosophy of Language"
"wherever this system governs u.s7 The differential play of forces
defers the "end" of the "uninterrupted processes"--which would be the
death of "living language" either through (centripetal) implosion or
(centrifugal) explosion--by simultaneously "insurfing] its dynamics",
keeping language "alive" and evolving, and "guaranteeing a certain
maximum of mutual understanding", or meaning.s° The same apprehension
of a differential play of forces informs the concept of the
"carnivalesque", which, for Bakhtin, is the non-exclusive oppositional
relationship of monoglossial authority and the heteroglossial people.
We might consider, too, the play of forces in that "image of the
carnival", "pregnant death". This "image", which is not structured upon
an "exterior" distinction between oppositions but upon the concept of
an originary difference within the same, also suggests the possibility,
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within life, of the deferral of death (through procreation, for example).
Through this image, differance is inscribed within the "carnivalesque".
If the carnivalesque forces are everywhere in "society", as it
were, how are we to reduce the scope of the "carnivalesque" and render
it useful to the more specific aims of literary analysis (while always
being aware that such reduction is not complete and will never be fully
adequate)? Bakhtin attempts to simulate such a reduction by stating,
"We shall give the name carnivalized literature to those genres which
have come under the influence--either directly or indirectly, through a
series of intermediary links--of one or another variant of carnivalistic
folklore (ancient or medieval). The whole realm of the serio-comical is
the first example of such literature." s'9 "tClarnival, its forms and
symbols, and above all the carnival attitude itself over many centuries
seeped into numerous literary genres, merged with their characteristics,
formed them, and became inseparable from them. Carnival, as it were,
was reincarnated in literature, in a definite and vigorous line of its
development."G° He posits a genealogy of "carnivalized literature" that
runs from the Socratic Dialogues and the Menippea, through the
picaresque and the literature of the Renaissance (Boccaccio, Rabelais,
Shakespeare, Cervantes), to the novel forms of Voltaire, Diderot, Sue,
Dumas fils, Paul de Kock, Balzac, George Sand, Hugo, Sterne and Dickens,
Poe, Pushkin, Gogol, and Dostoevsky. "Having once penetrated and, to a
degree, defined the structure of a genre, carnivalization can be
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employed by various movements and creative methods [-A Every movement
and creative method interprets and renews it in its own way."€.1
The carnivalesque, then, has a history--a family history of the
successive, generational, impregnations of "literature" (authoritative,
monological, logocentric, historical) by the perpetually resurrected
"carnival". Bakhtin offers a list of generic traits by which we might
recognize the inherited "carnival attitude" in literature:
1. "The carnivalistic life is life drawn out of its usual rut, it
is to a degree 'life turned inside out', 'life the wrong way round'
('ationde a rensra-le)	 the hierarchical system and all connected
forms of fear, awe, piety, etiquette, etc. are suspended [--] All
distance between people is suspended and a special category goes into
effect--the free, familiar contact among- people."
2. "Eccentricity is a special category of the carnival attitude
which is organically connected with the category of familiar contact; it
permits the latent sides of human nature to be revealed and developed
In a concretely sensuous form."
3. "L..] carnivalistic mesalliances. The unfettered familiar
attitude encompasses everything	 All the things that were closed
off, isolated, and separated from one another L.J enter into
carnivalistic contacts and combinations 	 the sacred with the
profane, the lofty with the low."
4. "L.J profanatiorx the carnivalistic blasphemies, a whole
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carnivalistic system of lowering status and bringing down to earth, the
carnivaListic obscenities connected with the reproductive power of the
earth and the body, the carnivalistic parodies of sacred texts and
apothegms	 not abstract thought on equality and freedom, on the
Inter-relatedness of all things, or on the unity of opposites, etc.[...]
[but] concretely sensuous ritual-pageant 'thoughts', experienced and
played out in life itself."62
In the essay "Word, Dialogue, and Novel", Julia Kr-isteva--who extends
Bakhtin's genealogy well into the twentieth century by appending the
names of Kafka, Joyce, Beckett, and Bataille--offers an addendum to the
above list in her delineation of the characteristics of the predominant
carnivalesque strain in the "novel", the menippean discourse:63
1. "It frees speech from historical constraints, and this
entails a thorough boldness in philosophical and imaginative
inventiveness	 The word has no fear of incriminating itself. It
becomes free from presupposed 'values'; without distinguishing between
virtue and vice, and without distinguishing itself from them, the word
considers them its private domain, as one of its creations."
2. "Academic problems are pushed aside in favour of the
'ultimate' problems of existence: this discourse orients liberated
language towards philosophical universalism. Without distinguishing
ontology from cosmology, it unites them into a practical philosophy of
life."
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3. "Pathological states of the soul, such as madness, split
personalities, daydreams, dreams, and death, become part of the
narrative	 they destroy man's epic and tragic unity as well as his
belief in identity and causality; they indicate that he has lost his
totality and no longer coincides with himself."
4. "L.J they often appear as an exploration of language and
writing."
5. "Menippean discourse tends toward the scandalous and eccentric
in language."
6. "Its language seems fascinated with the 'double' With its own
activity as graphic trace, doubling an 'outside') 1-1"
7. "It is an all-inclusive genre, put together as a pavement of
citations."
8. "Put together as an exploration of the body, dreams, and
language, this writing grafts onto the topical: it is a kind of
political journalism of its time. Its discourse exteriorizes political
and ideological conflicts of the moment. The dialogism of its words is
practical philosophy doing battle against idealism and religious
metaphysics, against the epic.'"
At this level, the level on which the carnivalesque is reduced to
specific thematic and narrative characteristics, can we not already
place Arightwood within the host of carnivalized literature? The novel
itself is most specific about its own narrative arena: all the central
characters meet at or through that remnant of the great Renaissance
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carnivals, the circus; and, for many of these characters, the circus
functions as the very limits of their experience. From within the
"splendid and reeking falsification" (1). 11) of that "monstrous" arena,
the narrative "takeEs] its flight from the immense disqualification of
the public" (I). 12), from "historical constraints" and the constraints of
"idealism and religious metaphysics". If there can be said to be a
"theme" of this work, it must be that "'ultimate' problem(] of
existence", the problem of the "human condition", the problem of being
human. And this problem is not treated--to use for a moment, on
condition, Bakhtin's classical distinction between the "abstract" and
"concrete"--as an academic conundrum by the characters, but
"experienced and played out in life itself". Here, the hierarchies are
turned upside-down (and not only with the "ladies of the haute
sewer"Ep. 1303 and "love" being brought "down to a level" [p. 75]). And
the characters themselves--who, we might suppose, would never have
come into contact with each other but for the circus--are eccentric,
seemingly mad, pathologically afflicted, somnolent, somnambulistic,
hysteric or neurasthenic, "dead", "resurrected". At the level of
narrative discourse, the language used, the text involves itself in the
eccentric and scandalous (odd diction, the use of words in their archaic
or rare senses, ungrammatical syntax), with citation (the re-citation of
Donne, de Sade, Montaigne, Rimbaud; the insinuation of Webster,
Shakespeare, the Bible; the allusions to Madame de Steel, Madame de
Sdvigne, Goethe, Loyola, "Anna Karenina", and "Catherine Heathcliffe"),
and with inscription, the graphic ("Nikka
	
tattoed from head to heel
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with all the ameublement of depravity L.-1 hackwork of the devil" op.
161; "Is there such extraordinary need of misery to make beauty? L.-1
Why not put the pen away?" [p. 124]). Dreams, too, function as part of
the narrative, as equivalent, without being "contextualized" by
interpretation or augury. I shall go into all of this in greater detail
in the following chapters: for the moment, it is enough to recognize
that hrAghtwood—on this primary categorical level--is as definitively
carnivalesque as, say, Va-q Finnegan-s Wake, 	 orphosLs The Trial,
or the Beckettian trilogies. On this level, the only difference between
Night wood and the latter texts is that hrightwood was written by a
woman: I will be considering the effect of this difference in the later
stages of this thesis.
Before going on to the "deeper" levels of the carnivalesque, I
must take a little detour through some crucial questions. There have
been some pertinent criticisms of Bakhtin's concept of "carnival", and
these need to be attended to. For the most part, they arise from
objections to Bakhtin's view of carnival as revolutionary, as forcing
ongoing change in dominant social and linguistic structures. Umberto
Eco frames this common objection thus:
If 1Bakhtin's contention) were true, it
would be impossible to explain why power (any
social and political power throughout the
centuries) has used circenses to keep the
crowds quiet; why the most repressive dicta-
torships have always censured parodies and
satires but not clorwneries; why humour is
suspect but circus is innocent; why today's
mass media, undoubtedly instruments of social
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control (even when not depending upon an exp-
licit plot) are based mainly upon the funny,
the ludicrous, that is, upon a continous carni-
valizat ion of life. To support the universe
of business, there is no business like show
business.s&
For some reason, Eco has chosen to overlook or ignore the
essential function of the parodic in Bakhtin's carnivalism, but his
argument that carnival (or cinmanses, or the circus) has a stake in the
maintenance of power structures is paradigmatic of the objections
raised against the Bakhtinian theory. Carnival is condoned because of
its cathartic properties, and cartharsis, particularly in the social
sense, is the institutional safety-valve inhibiting explosion. Juliet
Mitchell, in criticizing Julia Kristeva's derivative theory of the
carnivalesque (which encompasses her theories of the "imaginary" and
the "semiotic"), points out that "the very notion of heterogeneity", of
the carnivalesque, "is, in fact, provided by the law, by the symbolic law
itself". "You cannot choose the imaginary, the semiotic, the carnival,
as an alternative to the law. It is set up by the law precisely as its
own ludic space, its own area of imaginative alternative	 In
other words, the law is prior to (both temporally and evaluatively) its
transgression: the church is prior to the carnival.
There is an impeccable logic to these historically validated
objections which makes them difficult to refute. Within the context of
the historical, refutation is, indeed, impossible. Our history texts, our
anthropology, sociology, and psychology texts, all inform us that Eco
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and Mitchell are "right". However, we must be wary of the systematic
prioritization implicit in these dissenting discourses, a discursive
movement that foregrounds "priority" itself as the validating principle
(thereby short-circuiting a "chicken-and-egg" type of enquiry). For
both Eco and Mitchell, in this instance, there is exclusive opposition
between the paired terms "power" and "circenses", "law" and "carnival",
"symbolic" and "semiotic", and this absolute distinction between the
opposing terms (and concepts) enables the prioritization, or
presupposition of priority, of one term over the other. Thus, the
church is prior to the carnival both chronologically and evaluatively.
Its priority is so dominant, if fact, that it assumes a parental role
(chicken before egg) in relation to its opposite: the church (business)
encloses the carnival (dhow business), limits it, imposes meaning and
causality upon it. It assumes the carnival as "its own area of
imaginative alternative". The short-circuit built into this powerful
model of valorized and exclusive opposition is apparent.67
What is being evaded, or repressed, by both Eco and Mitchell is
the possibility of a nun-exclusive opposition, an opposition in which
neither priority nor absolute distinction can gain a foothold, and which
is more than the sum of its parts. This possibility--which, after
Nietzsche and after Freud, cannot ever be discounted--once acknowledged
should leave us suspicious of the "authoritative" arguments posed by
Eco and Mitchell. Such a suspicion exposes the determining drive of
prioritization, delimits the exclusiveness of the opposition, and finds
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its niche in the crux of Bakhtin's consideration of the relationship
between Church and carnival or, more precisely, between the Christian
narrative tradition and a specifically carnivalesque discourse, the
Menippea:
The basic narrative genres of ancient
Christian literature--the "gospels", the
"acts of the apostles'", the "apocalypse"
and the "lives of the saints and martyrs"--
are connected with ancient aretology which,
in the first centuries after Christ, developed
within the order of the menippea E-..] In
these genres, especially in the numerous
"gospels" and "acts", classical Christian
dialogical syncrises are developed: the
syncrises of the tempted (Christ or the right-
eous man) with the tempter, the believer with
the non-believer, the righteous man with the
sinner L..] etc.	 As in the menippea,
rulers, rich men, thieves, beggars, hetaera,
etc, meet on equal terms in a single, funda-
mentally dialogized plane. As in the menippea,
dream visions, insanity and obsessions of all
sorts have a certain significance here
Christian narrative also underwent direct carni-
valization (independently of the influence of
the carnivalized menippea). It is sufficient
to recall the scene of the crowning and dis-
crowning of the "King of the Jews" in the
canonical Gospels.se
Thus, the "church", it might be said, is founded on an already
carnivalized canon. The "gospel" is always already carnivalized, which
suggests that the relationship between "church" and "carnival" is
something more than opposition.
Bakhtin does not, at any point in The Dialogic Imagination or
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics and Rabelais and HIS WOrN suggest
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that the carnivalesque force within language will lead to a complete,
final, overturning of monologism. Furthermore, there is no postulation
of resolution, synthesis, or any other foreclosure of the dialectic
between the "authoritative word" and the relative word, between the
monological and the dialogicaL He does not invest in the anarchic (and
naive) utopianism that would do away with conventional systems of
signification simply because they "appear" to be dominated by phallic,
paternalistic, authoritarian monologism Rather, he has attempted to
chart, or "explain", by and through a "history' of the "novel", the
continuous transformations of language and languages, "the coming and
dying of meaning".6.s This explanation is modelled as a dialectic
between non-exclusive oppositions, between the interdependent
centripetal forces that hold language together and centrifugal forces
that tear language apart. For Bakhtin (or, perhaps, even more than
Bakhtin realizes), language is both sustained and transformed, at once
and continuously, by the incestuous dialectic of "church" and "world"
that is "carnival".
We should also re-cite, here at the detour's "end", following the
evocation of "incest", Kristeva's insistence on the carnivalesque as a
"transgression"--not "Law anticipating its own transgression; but
u transgleion giving itself a laws:7° Neither precisely law nor
lawlessness, neither precisely "culture" nor "nature", the carnivalesque
lies (in both senses of the word) between these "opposites" as a
threshold, as a bridge and a breach, as something extra and something
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missing. As something extra, it makes possible the relationship
between law (culture, order) and lawlessness (nature, chaos): as
something missing, it subverts the possibility of a synthesis of
opposites. It should already be possible to discern what is lurking
just beneath this con-struction, this (con)-fusion of opposites. Earlier
on, I referred to the "carnivalesque" as a sort of "differance, and I
suggested that the carnivalesque might be one of those "nonsynonymous"
terms that "inscribe diffdrance within themselves, as Derrida says,
according to context". 7 ' Like Rousseau's "supplement" ("the missing
piece and the extra piece"), Plato's "pharmakon" (poison and remedy)) and
MaLlarme's "hymen" (virginity and consummation in marriage)--those
terms that Derrida investigates in the course of a trans-gression
through diffárance--the carnivalesque is a doubling-up of opposites
"that makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible". 7
 And,
like the "supplement" (Rousseau's term for writing), the "pharmakne
(Plato's term for writing), and the "hymen" C4allarme's term for
writing), Bakhtin's (birth and death) carnivalesque is pre-occupied
with/in the "problem" of inscription. (m-, we should remember that the
fall of hierarchically privileged "living speech" to the "low level" of
inscription in "dead material" is the carnivalesque movement par
excellence.)
One might well ask, "if the carnivalesque is only a type of
differance, why not simply use Derrida's terms and circumvent the,
perhaps, extraneous Bakhtinian consideration?" I can answer that by
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pointing out that (a) as we have seen, the concept of the carnivalesque,
not least in its proffered contexts, suggests certain strategies of
reading that appear, at once, most amenable to this text which (b)
offers itself, almost explicitly, as the (circus) arena of inscription in
which the beast and the human (nature and culture, "good" and "evil")
meet eye to eye, "the face of the one tellfing] the face of the other
the half of the story that both forgot (138)".
In the next chapter, I will be examining Nightwoods carnivalesque
performance in relation to the paradigms governing orthodox conceptions
of history, narrative, and writing in general, before going on to an
analysis, in Chapter Four, of the text's engagement with particular
theological orthodoxies. The question of the relevance of the writer's
gender will not really come into play until Chapters Four and Five,
because I think it necessary to establish Just how "carnivalesque"




[Mlodern fiction--using modern in its qualit-
ative, as well as its merely chronological,
significance--is fiction displaying some or
all of the following features. First, it is
experimental or innovatory in form, exhibiting
marked deviations from existing modes of dis-
course, literary and nonliterary. Next, it
is much concerned with consciousness, and also
with the subconscious or unconscious workings
of the human mind. Bence the structure of ex-
ternal 'objective' events essential to narrative
art in traditional poetics is diminished in scope
and scale, or presented selectively and obliquely,
in order to make room for introspection, analysis,
reflection and reverie. Frequently, therefore,
a modern novel has no real "beginning', since it
plunges us into a flowing stream with which we
gradually familiarize ourselves by a process
of inference and association; its ending is
usually "open" or ambiguous, leaving the reader
in doubt as to the characters' final destiny.
By way of compensation for the weakening of
narrative structure and unity, other modes of
aesthetic ordering become more prominent--such
as allusion to or imitation of literary motifs,
images, symbols, a technique often called
urlayttue, "leitmotif', or "spatial form".
Lastly, modern fiction eschews the straight
chronological ordering of its material, and
the use of a reliable, omniscient and intrusive
narrator. It employs, instead, either a single,
limited point of view, or multiple viewpoints,
all more or less limited and fallible; and it
tends toward a complex or fluid handling of
time, involving much cross-reference back and
forward across the temporal span of the action.7
In the passage above, David Lodge has done an admirable job of
distilling a series of features or characteristics of modernist fiction
from the great nebula of critical and authoritative opinion on the
matter. Of course, this series, as general as it is, is still quite open
to the argument of the exception--one can, conceivably, argue that so-
called "modernist" texts like Conrad's Heart of Darkness, Well's The
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History of Mr. Pcd/g or Forster's Passage to India, exhibit fewer of
these features than Sterne's Tristram Shandy, for example. Yet, Lodge's
definition does represent a general consensus on the lineaments of the
modernist novel.
Such an apprehension certainly lies behind many critics's
recognition of Nightwood as distinctly "modernist". Joseph Frank, in his
much-cited essay "Spatial Form in Modern Literature", contends that
Nightwood is the "culmination" of a "tendency" to spatial form (as
opposed to conventional chronological narrative form) toward which "such
writers as T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Marcel Proust and James Joyce [were)
movine.2 Thus, for Frank, Barnes's text is a sort of epitome of a
modernist movement. For Charles Baxter, in his "A Self-Consuming Light:
Night wood and the Crisis of Modernism", the "crisis of Modernism", a
crisis of autotelic discourse detached from its author and the historical
conventions of discursive creation, is "embodied within" Night wood, most
specifically "within" the "condition" of Matthew O'Connor. 2 Albert Cook
finds that, in Nightwooch "the nostalgia of transient details becomes
transmuted to an anguish in whose crepuscular heaving objects lose their
literal, narrative base of reference to become pure metaphors", while
Elizabeth Pochoda finds the text "an experiment to dismantle narrative",
"assaultfingl the very notion of history and with it narrative
progression and memory, those staples of plot and characterization".A On
the other hand, Shari Benstock questions the assignment of Night wood as
a "Modernist masterpiece", on the grounds that "modernism", as usually
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rendered, is a patriarchal construct in the light of which Barnes's text
must be seen as "a singular undertaking that addresses woman's place" in
that construct. Yet Benstock, too, acknowledge's Nightwoods experimental
condition and its questioning of "the notions of 'forms' and definitive
categories": Benstock's principal thesis is that if women's texts, like
Night wood, are to be considered "modernist TM, then "modernism" must be
seen as other or more than what is generally assumed by that term.5
I do not intend to take issue with any of this. Although I may
want to query certain points of Lodge's, Frank's, etc, definitions of or
insinuations about "modernism" per se--if only on the grounds that
modernist literature, taken in sum, is too ungainly a hybrid to yield to
precise delineation--such contestation would be quite beside the point
here.6 Certainly, Mightwood can be a modernist text: as the critics
mentioned above have demonstrated, it follows most of the criteria noted
by Lodge. However, the deliberation of Nightwoods position in a
modernist landscape or landscapes would be quite beside the point. I am
not insisting that this text is, in any way, absolutely disengaged from
its contemporary context, if, indeed, any text can be so singular. As I
have already noted, Night wood can be, if we choose, a modernist novel,
both similar to (in general) and different from (in particular) other
texts written within the same very general (and perhaps uncompleted)
period of Western history. However, I also suspect that careful analysis
of the "experimental" strategies employed by a so-called modernist text
like Barnes's may lead us to place in question the historically
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determined "'forms' and definitive categories" of modernism itself. We
might well ask ourselves what sort of paradox we are engaging with when
we attempt to historicize texts which, as we well recognize, "assault the
very notion of history". The following analysis will, I hope, remain
under the perversely illuminating shadow of that paradox.
I.
The central image in Arightwood is that of the
circus, where the levelling of all distinc-
tions and the ultimate containment of all
aspiration can be shown with some wit. History
is an amusement; the circus is a version of
history which cancels history out:7
In stating that "the circus is a version of history which cancels
history out", Pochoda has delineated one of the operative strategies of
Nightwood's writing, although she may have overstated the result.
History, at least in its general sense, is not cancelled out in this text.
An historical framework pertains: Felix is born in 1880 ( 1). 1); Nora
meets Robin "in the fall of 1923" (I). 53); etc- The term "history"
itself appears with some persistence throughout the text - -a numerical
accounting would show that it appears more frequently than the term
"circus". Whatever else happens to history in Nightwooch it is neither
completely cancelled out nor placed under erasure.
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I am not precisely certain what Pochoda means by "history", but I
assume that her history is history in the general sense of a dominant
chronological, narrative ordering of past events. As I have already
noted, Nghtwood docc make use of history in precisely this sense, and
in the same sense, in Felix Volkbein's sense, this history is privileged,
ennobled. For Felix, history is the "great past", "'Old Europe':
aristocracy, nobility, royality"	 9). Dr. O'Connor acknowledges this
definition, but, returning the repressed as it were, he also recognises
that which an ennobled history omits:
"We may all be nature's noblemen [...] but
think of the stories that do not amount to
much! That is, that are forgotten in spite
of all man remembers (unless he remembers
himself) merely because they befell him with-
out distinction of office or title--that's
what we call legend and it's the best a poor
man may do with his fate; the other [...] we
call history, the best the high and mighty
can do with theirs. Legend is unexpurgated,
but history, because of its actors, is
deflowered
	 15)
The reference to "actors" signals other significations of the term
"history", for history is also a "drama" and a "narrative, tale, story"
(OED). In other words, as Dr. O'Connor reminds us, history (unlike
"nature") is a fiction (fr. L. fingene, "To fashion, form, shape" WED; see
"Feign" and "Fiction"]), "the best the high and mighty can do with" their
fate. And this ennobled hiEgh]story is, paradoxically, "deflowered"--
unintact, impure, incomplete, "Elexpurgated". Dr. O'Connces "history" is a
carnivalized version of a history contaminated by other "stories that do
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not amount to much" which reveal history's inadequacy and impurity.
History has not been cancelled out: it has been forced to give its
protected and privileged self (as a "relation of incidents—professedly
true" WED]) up to fiction. Again, we might ask ourselves with what
assurance we attempt to historicize a fiction like Night wood when
history itself can be shown to be a fiction.
History, in its general sense, is patently carnivalized in Nightwooct
but that is not the end of the story. History, whether a record, drama
or story, implies some rational ordering of events and people. It makes
sense of what otherwise might be seen as random occurences, and, in
doing so, it depends upon certain well-established conventions of order
and distinction. It depends upon chronology, a linear tabling of "time",
and upon a concept of causality: in other words, it has a plot, a
temporal series of distinct events that are related by cause-and-effect.
It also depends upon a concept of mimesis as imitation: history is a
narrative reflection of "professedly true" incidents or situations. That
this narrative reflection is mediated (fashioned, formed and shaped) by
the strategies of fiction has more influence on the operative concept of
fiction than on the indubitability of mimesis, for this fiction is
"realist" in that it reflects so-called real circumstances, people
(characters), and settings. And, realism is defined according to
convention or to a dominant system of perception or ideology. The
conventional expectations placed upon the narrative of history are
precisely those placed upon realist fiction: the story must be mimetic
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(in the orthodox, Aristotelian sense); it must have a believable plot and
realistic (recognisable) characters, etc.; and it must not betray its
fictiveness--its style must be unobtrusive and/or subservient to the
other elements. It is precisely these expectations placed upon the
narratives of history and realist fiction that Nightwood defies while,
simultaneously, revealing the paradox underlying all such expectation--
that the reflection of reality has been entrusted to the suspect medium
of writing. This chapter of the thesis will be an analysis of
Nightwood's carnivalesque response to conventional expectations and a
consideration of what, in the light of this response, "writing" might be
In this text.
I will begin with a brief examination of Nightwoods subversion, or
carnivalization, of those definitive categories of both fiction and
history--plot, character, and style. I do so because I don't believe that
we can afford to assume that, as brAghtwood is a modernist text, its
subversions of these categories are simply generic. This text addresses
tradition in a particular way, from a particular perspective, that is far
more complex and intellectual than generally has been assumed. (I hope
that this much will be demonstrated through the course of this chapter.)
Nor do I believe that we can afford to assume that, after the advent of
modernism, "plot", "character", "style", etc. have lost their force as
formative tyrannies. As Peter Ackroyd has noted:
There has still been no significant Change [—I
Our writing has acquiesced in that orthodoxy
which has already been described, resting as
- 125 -
it does upon a false aesthetic of subjectivity
and a false context of realism. And it is
this conventional aesthetic which has been
reified into the English "tradition" [••..]e
We are not yet done with the tyrannical spectres of plots and
characters. Thus, an analysis of Nightkroods subversion, or
carnivalization, of these definitive categories cannot be merely an
exercize in redundancy. The matter has not been resolved yet.
IL
For Miss Barnes, as for more recent novelists
who appreciate her work, the experiment with
fictional forms is a moral necessity. This
is not mere faddishness; her idea is that
the conventions of realistic fiction are the
familiar clothes which too easily conceal
violence, horror, and impertinence?
Of course, the novel ArAghtwood does don these "familiar clothes", as
PoChoda puts it. It has a "plot", although decidedly minimalist, which
Kenneth Burke has wittily, and perhaps reductively, outlined as follows:
A *tall girl with the body of a boy' leaves
her husband after she has borne him a son.
She becomes involved in a love relationship
with two women--and it serves as a point of
departure for lamentations by one of the women,
seconded by a perverted doctor (who calls
himself an *old worn out lioness", and who
amplifies the theme by contributing many
thoughts on human decay in general). Finally,
after much promiscuity, and special interest
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In a child, the girl falls into a state of
enigmatic communion with a dog.1°
It may not be the mystery reader's dream, but it is indeed a plot. And
there can be no doubt that the novel has "characters": as T.S. Eliot has
written in his Introduction, "Eslometimes in a phrase the characters
spring to life so suddenly that one is taken aback, as if one had
touched a wax-work figure and discovered that it was a live
policeman"." (I would like to mark Eliot's significant "in a phrase",
for that is precisely where in Nghtwood a "character' springs "to life.)
One might also say that some of these characters "develop" through the
course of the noveL Felix and Nora come to some understanding of both
their particular and the more universal human predicaments, while
Matthew O'Connor eventually succumbs to hopelessness. (However, the
nature of this development will also come into play later.) The
"narrator", too, should be mentioned: this is a fault-ridden "omniscient
narrator", one who can transcend the temporal and spatial (realist)
problems of describing (as if having seen) Felix's parents, his birth, and
the adult Felix himself, but somehow consent to the mystery of Felix's
thirty year absence from "the world" (13. 7). Yet, despite such
Inconsistencies, it can be called a narrator, at a stretch. Undeniably,
NAghtwood does exhibit all of these familiar fictive constructs.
It is when we come to this other predominant facet of the novel,
style, or, as Lodge puts it, 'modes of aesthetic ordering", that the
categorical distinctions that I have Just noted begin to collapse, which
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is probably one of the reasons why, as early as 1945, Joseph Frank chose
this text to illustrate his theory of modern literature. In Chapter I of
this thesis, I have outlined the series of stylistic readings of
Night wood that followed the publication of Frank's essay and have
suggested why these readings have proved Insufficient to the rhetorical
strategies of this enigmatic text. What remains, at this point, is to
demonstrate how Night wood confounds, or carnivalizes, the theoretical
organization of the exclusive fictive categories, "plot", "character", and
"style", by "leveling [...) all distinctions", as Pochoda puts it.
One rather dramatic leveller in Night wood's discourse, a stylistic
tendency that many critics have noted (usually in connection with
Barnes's Emersonian or Wildean precedents), is the aphorism. Night wood
offers a plethora of aphorisms, some of them appearing as condensed
homilies ("The unendurable is the beginning of the curve of joy" fp.
117].), some as deliberate contradictions of traditional clichés ("We do
not 'climb' to heights, we are eaten away to them" fp. 1181), and some
seemingly incurably enigmatic ("When a Jew dies on a Christian breast he
dies impaled" [p. 3]). However, whatever their apparent direction,
whether seemingly outward to a common world of experience outside of
the text or inward to certain symbolic or figurative structures
particular to this text, these "principlels] or precept[s] expressed
shortly and pithily', these "maxim(s1" (OED) or proverbs, do not
necessarily perform the unifying function that we expect of this genre.
The aphorism is an expression of truth, the "truth of common or
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Vuniversal experience". This is how we recognize it, and, as such it is a
significant genre of that body of literature known as "wisdom
literature". We should also note, as a matter of interest, the
aphorism's etymological origin, the Greek calt-opt, "to mark off by
boundaries: to part off, determine, define.--Med. to mark off for oneself,
appropriate. IL to set apart, ordain: also to reject, banish" (Liddell
and Scott). As reference to an assumed general knowledge and as a
demarcation, definition, or appropriation (even as a banishment of the
false or inappropriate) of the "truth", the aphorism could be seen as a
sort of microcosm of the predominant (phallogocentric) organization of
literary architecture. Yet, Night wood's aphorisms seem to invert the
very structure of that organization, to turn it all upside down in the
manner of William Blake's "Proverbs of Hell" in The Marriage of Heaven
and 1111.' 2 Like Blake's "Proverbs", the aphorisms of Nightwood threaten
the very conceptions of "truth" upon which generic categories and
critical distinctions are founded.
And how does Barnesian aphorism perform this feat? I commence
this consideration with a list of aphorisms chosen at random from the
text but arranged, somewhat loosely if logocentrically, according to
"theme":
1. A Jew's undoing is never his own, it is God's; his rehabilitation is
never his own, it is a Christian's. (1). 3)
2. [...] eternity is only Just long enough for a Jew. (ix 165)
3. Man [...] conditioning himself to fear, made God; as the prehistoric,
conditioning itself to hope, made man 	 (1). 136)
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4. God laughs at me, but his laughter is my love. (x 143)
5. Laughter is the pauper's money. (1). 32)
6. Legend is unexpurgated, but history, because of its actors, is
deflowered--every nation with a sense of humour is a lost nation, and
every woman with a sense of humour is a lost woman. (1). 15)
7. To pay homage to our past is the only gesture that also includes the
future. (I). 39)
8. Time is a great conference planning our end, and youth is only the
past putting a leg forward. (p. 130)
9. Youth is cause, age is effect; so with the thickening of the neck we
get data. (p. 17)
10. Only the impossible lasts forever; with time it is made accessible.
(13. 139)
11. In time everything is possible and in space everything forgiveable;
life is but the intermediary vice. (pp. 126-7)
12. An image is a stop the mind makes between uncertainties. (1). 111)
13. Life, the permission to know death. (p. 83)
14. Love is death come upon with passion [...] that is why love is
wisdom. (13. 137)
15. Love is the first lie; wisdom the last. (p. 138)
16. A strong sense of identity gives man an idea he can do no wrong;
too little accomplishes the same thing. (p. 135)
17. Man has no foothold that is not also a bargain. (p. 32)
18. L.J those who cannot conceive a bargain cannot be saved or damned.
(p. 47)
19. Those who love everything are despised by everything, as those who
love a city in its profoundest sense, become the shame of that city, the
deb-agues, the paupers; their good is incommunicable, outwitted, being
the rudiment of a life that has developed, as in man's body are found
evidences of lost needs. (I). 52)
20. Suffering is the decay of the heart; all that we have loved becomes
the "forbidden" when we have not understood it all, as the pauper is the
rudiment of the city, which the city, for its own destiny, wants to
forget. (I). 155)
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Reading over this list, I notice two things almost immediately.
First--and this refers directly back to the instigating problem of
"character" in Night wood---Inote little distinction between the "voices"
of those four maxim-making entities: the narrator, O'Connor, Nora, and
Felix. (One might recognize in no. 7's concern with the "past", "future",
and "homage" a Felix-maxim, but the surety of that association might be
abridged by another Felix-maxim, "One's life is peculiarly one's own when
one has invented it" Ep. 118% which shifts the monolithic solidity of
"past" and "future" into the relativizing organizations of fiction.) For
the most part, there is little in the way of contextual markers by which
to distinguish character "voices", and much in the diction to confuse
them. For example, nos. 17 (O'Connor) and 18 (narrator) might be read,
although they are pages apart in the text, as one single, orthodox,
proverb Ca synonymous parallelism, see below). Similarly, nos. 19
(narrator) and 20 (Nora) are capable of con-fusion (though not a total
confusion), collapsing into each other at "pauper[s]", "rudiment", "city",
and the coincidence of "the shame" and "the 'forbidden'". Rather than
"mark[ing] off by boundaries", Nightwocxfs aphorisms tend to erode, at
certain sites, the formal distinctions between characters or "voiced".
This confusion of voices also divests the definitive concept of
plot development, as distinct from other formal components of the novel,
of much of its power, for if anything can be said to happen in
Nightwood, if there is any sort of narrative progression, it is the
assumption, post-Robin, by More and Felix of O'Connor's discourse. Most
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of what occurs after Robin's desertion is the relation, by O'Connor, Felix
and Nora, of what occurred after Robin's desertion, and in the course of
this tri-partite relation the voices of Felix and Nora gradually assume,
by expansion of their half of the dialogue with O'Connor, by the
employment of aphorism, by an increased O'Connor-like collusion with the
narrative voice (for example, the coincidence of nos. 19 and 20 reflects
the more typical coincidence of O'Connor and narrator in nos. 17 and
18), 1 a dominant, or at least equal, status to the proportionately
depleted O'Connor voice. In other words, plot and character development
are only a matter of contrasting discourses coming to the same "ends",
becoming less distinctive in a collective "lamentation" or carnivalesque
polyphony.
This is not the sum of the aphorism's contribution to Night woods
Challenge to conventional critical paradigms. The second thing that I
notice in reading over the above list is that practically all of these
aphorisms mimic the generic forms of the biblical Proverbs: there are
declarative statements (rums. 2, 5, 12, 17 and 18, for example);
oppositional "doublets" (nos. 1 and 16); "synonymous parallelisms" (no. 3
and the first clause of no. 11); contrasting comparisons (the first
clauses of nos. 6 and 9, no. 10 and no. 15); and various combinations of
all these forms. 1A Thus, Nightw000's aphorisms present themselves as a
type of conventional wisdom literature--a type, but not a "true" type,
for underlying Nightwood's proverbs is a challenge to the very notion of
wisdom by which the genre has been distinguished. In the Book of
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Po.rerbs Wisdom is the penultimate divine gift, after life itself, by
which man might know the truth, secure material wealth, and shield
himself against the seductions of the "adulteress", against carnal sin.
In Nightwoocl "wisdom" is "the last (lie]"--In both senses of the verb 'to
lie'--and, if we follow the staggered syllogistic logic of no. 14, it is
also the "love" that is "death", carnal sin. (There is more of that
renegade book Ecclesiastees 'vanity, vanity, all is vanity" than
proverbial "understanding' in Arighthrocx1) The 'wisdom" on which the
Barnesian aphorisms are premised is an anti-wisdom--an invert playing
the part of Judeo-Christian rectitude in a carnival production. It is a
"wisdom" that declaims itself as lie as it sets itself up as truth,
betraying the presuppositions upon which its distinction relies.
The Barnesian aphorism, then, may be (if we pay attention to the
vagaries of its wisdom) situated on an aporia, the Cretan paradox, a
certain "derangement in [-.] equilibrium" (p. 51) that inhibits certitude,
definition, banishment, by being the "impossible" everything-and-nothing-
at-once. "There is no truth, and you have set it between you", says the
"liar" Dr. O'Connor (I). 136), stating the condition of this text in which
the divisions evidently sustaining the narrative structure are either "no
truth", if we appropriate the liar's phrase, or "truth", if we ignore the
text's insistence on a "derangement in [...] equilibrium". We will not get
around this easily: we may not get around it at all, thanks to the
doubts introduced by consideration of certain aphorisms. To say that
there are no characters in Nghtwood is as questionable as to say that
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it is populated by living beings, which brings us to a certain formidable
question, "what, then, is (can be) a character in this text?" To which
the text might reply:
E.-] the singular failling] continually and
forever; a body falling in observable space,
deprived of the privacy of disappearance; as
if privacy, moving relentlessly away, by the
very sustaining power of its withdrawal kept
the body eternally moving downward, but in
one place, and perpetually before the eye.
(1). 51)
A "body falling [moving downward] in observable space [the page],
deprived of the privacy of disappearance [apparent, not removed from
public view]; as if privacy [presence-to-self, of "author], moving
relentlessly away, by the very sustaining power of its withdrawal
[absence] kept the body eternally moving downward [from top to bottom],
but in one place [the sheet of paper, the page], and perpetually before
the eye [generic eye, any eye reading, re-reading]": what is this "body"
but writing, inscription? (We might recall, as well, the Platonic-
Bakhtinian conception of writing as a fall of speech.)
If the character is (in) writing--leaving aside for the moment the
many other questions that the above raises--and, so, without the
criteria of a representative verisimilitude, can we assume, with Lodge,
that "other modes of aesthetic ordering' compensate for "the weakening
of [orthodox] structure and unity"? Does the "unity" of the text (on
which depends its value or status as an art form) rely on "allusion to or
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imitation of literary motifs, images, symbols, a technique often called
'rhythm', 'leitmotif, or 'spatial form'", as so many critics (Eliot, Frank,
Burke, etc.) have claimed? Alan Singer has paid particular attention to
this question and found, in his close reading of the text, that it flouts
the sort of synchronized co-ordination of images (or "forms" or
"tableaux") that would yield a metanarrative pattern from which meaning
might be derived. He examines the following passage:
The woman who presents herself to the
spectator as a 'picture" forever arranged
is, for the contemplative mind, the chiefest
danger. Sometimes one meets a woman who is
beast turning human. Such a person's every
movement will reduce to an image of a forgot-
ten experience; a mirage of an eternal wedding
cast on the racial memory; as insupportable a
joy as would be the vision of an eland coming
down an aisle of trees, chapleted with orange
blossoms and bridal veil, -a hoof raised in the
economy of fear, stepping in the trepidation
of flesh that will become myth; as the unicorn
is neither man nor beast deprived, but human
hunger pressing its breast to its prey. ( 1). 37)
In reference to this passage, Singer notes that whereas "[Ube image is
traditionally meaningful in dramatic literature as it expresses the
'inner necessity' of the plot teleology", "the image of the eland presents
a contextual impertinence because it seems unnecessary in these
terms"..' s Within its particular descriptive context, it is excessive, too
much figuration. And, although Singer traces "contextual links" (rhythm,
leitmotif) between this passage and Dr. O'Connor's disquisitions on "young
beasts" and "horns", he finds that
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[...] this is not the simple crystallization
of an image pattern across the threshold of
different contexts that we find in more con-
ventional novels. The 'pattern' denoted by
the recurrent imagery of the horn and the
human beast is above all indicative of a
'practice' of narrative digression and sup-
plementation whereby the expressiveness of
the image comes to depend on its prolifera-
tion of new relational possibilitias.16
The image is thus "a point of departure rather than a reservoir of
accumulated meanings", a "point of departure" out of the formal
integrity, or closure, of a coherent work. What happens by way of this
"point" is an inversion of the hierarchical relation of the "literal"
(unmediated and undeformed by metaphor, etc.) narrative systems of plot,
character, etc. and the "figurative" systems (image, metaphor, etc.) which
should be subserving the former. It's a very carnivalesque gesture, this
Inversion of the literal/figurative binary opposition--particularly if we
re-cite, with Singer, Aristotle's consideration, in the Rhetoric of
"figure" as "quixote, ephemeral, nonessential and supplementary' in
comparison with "the standard of verisimilitude" privileging plot,
character, et c. 1 °: nrnP"'"m.1
I have used, here, the term "inversion" perhaps rather
precipitately, for although the term does suggest the sort of
catastrophe that overtakes (or turns around) this orthodox valorization
of the literal (as "without metaphor, exaggeration, or inaccuracy" (OED])
and attendant suspicion of the figurative, there is much more going on
here. Burke's "version, con-, per-, in-" might be the more pertinent
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term to describe or designate the extra turn (or trope or figure)
Night wood shuttles with, through, against, and into the space between
woof (literal, direct, truthful) and warp (figurative, rhetorical, fictive),
between meaning and inaccuracy, between the (prior fact of the) human
body and the (subsequent) body of writing.
The literal human body and the figurative body of writing: the
body of writing as literally a book and the human body literally
"expressed by letters" (CU). The relationship of the literal and the
figurative in Nightwood is, in a certain sense, chiastic, as though
literal and figurative were mirror images of each other. (Chiasmus [a.
Gr., fr. xtgstv to mark with or like a chi (C,x)] [CYO.) There is a
great deal of mirror-imaging in this text in general--in the mirror
images of broken halves converging,- men seeking their own shadows,
lovers seen half in the dark and half in the light, etc.--, and this
chiastic arrangement, in which neither side (or clause) is privileged
over the other (see aphorism no. 10) and in which the binary parts are
nonexclusive, being inverted images of each other, appears instead of the
hierarchically arranged and mutually exclusive binary opposition
organizing Aristotelian mimesis (the real/the reflection). Note this
similaic, figurative, description of Robin:
[..J as if this girl were the converging halves
of a broken fate, setting face, in sleep, to-
ward itself in time, as an image and its re-
flection in a lake seem parted only by the
hesitation in the hour. (p. 38)
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This doubled simile is very much a figuration to the second power, and
it emphasises the figurative nature of the literal narrative system. It
follows upon and supplements a metaphoric description of Robin as a
"figurehead in a museum", and, as a figurative supplement to a metaphor,
it is twice removed from what might be called verisimilitude. Yet, it is
also in the service of the literal narrative system because it is a
description of a character. (It is, as well, quite "literal" in that it
follows "the ordinary rules of grammar" WED].) In this literal X
figurative passage, there are two primary chiastic arrangements: the
two "converging halves of a broken fate, setting face"; and the "image
and its reflection". Each chiasma seems one thing composed of two
halves which are mirror images of each other: the broken fate sets face
toward itself; and the image faces its image (itself). But, this one
thing is also always two because of a difference in "time", a deferral,
that prohibits a simultaneous at-one-ment. The halves of the broken
fate converge, but they are also held apart by the difference between
"sleep" (eternity) and "time" (chronology). The image and its reflection
"seam parted only by the hesitation in the hour". Thus, within
sameness--which is the principal informing concept of uphallogocentrism"
and the basis of the mutual exclusiveness of binary opposition19--
hightwood posits a difference that is a deferral of sameness. What is
more, the text, in the final figure of this passage, subverts the notion
of "origin" upon which the concept of sameness rests: what is reflected
in the verisimilar lake (for this figure seems to depend on
verisimilitude) is not a thing or an object but a reflection--"an image".
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There is no original object which would serve as a singular origin of
all this imaging, and the back and forth play of mirroring and inversion
cannot be stopped at some prior source of first image. The result of
this "image" placed where an object should be is the indefinite deferral
of literal meaning, for where there is no origin there can be no
singular and absolute signification. This suggested differance is
Nightwood's per-version Oa turning through and against) of the orthodox
distinctions between the literal and the figurative, between
verisimilitude and the "ephemeral and supplementary", and it might be
said that this passage is emblematic of Nightw000's challenge to the
concept of mimesis supporting the orthodox expectations of narrative,
for mimesis should always constitute a reflection of reality. It might
also be said that this passage can function as a trope for the text
itself.
Yet another possible trope for the text is the following passage in
which the figure of 'Nikke i the illustrated man, is de-scribed. In this
passage, too, the concept of origin is problematic:
'Wow I am thinking of Nikka, the nigger who
used to fight the bear in the Cirque de Farts.
There he was, crouching all over the arena
without a stitch on,	 tattooed from head to
heel with all the ameublement of depravity!
Garlanded with rosebuds and hackwork of the
devil--was he a sight to see! Though he
couldn't have done a thing (and I know what
I'm talking about in spite of all that has
been said about black boys) if you stood him
in a gigmill for a week, though (it's said)
at a stretch it spelled Desdemona. Well then,
over his belly was an angel from Chartres; on
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each buttock, half public, half private, a
quotation from the book of magic, a confirm-
ation of the Jansenist theory,	 sorry to
say and here to say it. Across his knees,
I give you my word, 'I' on one and on the
other, 'can'[..-] Across his chest, beneath a
beautiful caravel in full sail, two clasped
hands, the wrist bones fretted with point
lace. On each bosom an arrow-speared heart,
each with different initials but with equal
drops of blood; and running into the armpit,
all down one side, the word said by Prince
Arthur Tudor, son of King Henry the Seventh,
when on his bridal night he called for a gob-
let of water (or was it water?) 	 The legs
were devoted entirely to vine work, topped
by the swart rambler rose copied from the
coping of the Hamburg house of Rothschild.
Over his dos, believe it or not and I shouldn't,
a terse account in early monkish script--called
by some people indecent, by others Gothic--of
the really deplorable condition of Paris before
hygiene was introduced and nature had its way
up to the knees. And Just above what you
mustn't mention, a bird flew carrying a
streamer on which was incised, 'Garde tout!'
I asked him why all this barbarity; he ans-
wered he loved beauty and would have it about
him." (pp. 16-17)
"Nikka, the nigger who used to fight the bear in the Cirque de
Paris", brought to mind via a discourse wending its way through the
differences between "legend" and "history", "Jew" and "Christian", youth
and age, straddles the difference between the veritable body and the
fictional text. "lNikka" is not a character: "he" is a rhetorical figure
in one of the Doctor's hyperbolic dissertations, and it is as a rhetorical
figure that "Nildca" should be read. 2° This rhetorical body (is) text:
on Nikka's dark skin are incised not only legend (the story of "Arthur
Tudor") and history ("the really deplorable condition of Paris before
hygiene was introduced"), Christianity (signified by "an angel from
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Chartres") and heresy ("a quotation from the book of magic, a
confirmation of the Jansenist theory"), love ("an arrow-speared heart")
and murder ("at a stretch it spelled Desdemona")--all those contraries in
which the discourse of Nightwood is embroiled--but also some of the
predominant recurring fixtures of the text, the rose and the bleeding
heart, the quotation and the copy, the indecent and the Gothic. It is as
though Nikka the circus performer (the dark human body in its
engagement with the beast) is a body held up to the text, the self-
reflection of the text as an inscribed body (darkly seen).
However, we must be careful to avoid assigning referential priority
to either the body or the text in this text/body reflective relationship.
Certainly, the body appears to be the bearer and composite principle of
the text. In this passage, formal unity, as such, is entirely dependent
upon the composite body of Nikka. What brings together all the
disparate bits of tattooed text is their inscription on correlative
sites--belly, buttocks, knees, chest, bosoms, armpit, legs, etc.--of one
body, one skin, one page. In a reading that would locate, in this
passage, some intimation of source or prior sameness, Nikka's body would
seem to be the singular origin--as page and as referent of the various
symbols--of text. And yet, the tattoos themselves, while bearing their
own symbolic and/or carnivalesque (ribald) signification of the body
parts on which they are inscribed, bear no classificatory, thematic
resemblance to each other and often fail to meet mimetic expectation--
there are hearts on both sides of the breast, for example. The body may
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hold the text together, as it were, but the text, simultaneously, tears
the body apart, rendering it un-verisimilar. The human body, the
material referent par excellence, is also only an articulation of
disparate and contradictory parts. Even specific parts are broken up
and confused: between "Desdemone, "the swart rambler rose", and the
bird with its "'Garde tout!'", how does one fine or identify the penis?
(And the penis, of course, as the biological artifact of the phallus
organizing western systems of signification, is the one organ about
which there should be no confusion.)
The body cannot properly be said to be the origin of the image of
Nikka any more than the inscribed text can, for the same problem of
priority posed by the previous passage is obviously at work here. Note
that, in addition to the con-fusion of signification, specific
denominations of certain parts of the body--"what you mustn't mention"--
are elided as well. The antecedent of "it" in "at a stretch it spelled
Desdemona" is absent, as well as what "it" spelled when it wasn't "at a
stretch" (De...mon, Des 	 a?) Note, too, all the elisions, or deferrals, of
what would be the original texts copied on Nikka's body. There is the
uncited "quotation from the book of magic" (which book?), the unspecified
"different initials", the unrecorded "word said by Prince Arthur Tudor",
and the uncited "terse account in early monkish script". In other words,
both possible origins of this reflection--the original text or the
original object-body which would be the antecedent of all "it"s--are
absent in this passage that is already marked by an improper confusion
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and is given by an already questionable source-- "believe it or not and
I shouldn't"--even though O'Connor gives us his "word". We might
consider, too, the difficulty of reading a tattoo on black skin. At what
point does the blue/black or dark red ink end and the black skin begin?
Given the persistent darkness, there is always the likelihood of
confusing skin and tattoo, paper and ink.
Thus, through this absence of singular origins or of the original
referents for its figurative language, Night wood overturns "the standard
of verisimilitude" governing the relationship of literal narrative
systems and figurative systems. The text offers another (carnivalesque
and non-exclusive) relationship in its "version, con-, per-, in-" of the
binary terms literal/figurative, tenor/vehicle, and body/text. This
solicitation of the conventional distinctions between these binary terms
has the effect of foregroundiag writing as something more than the mere
transmission of a preconceived plot with attendant figuration.
Arigbtwoods chiastic con-fusion of the text-as-body-of-writing and body-
as-text-of-life suggests that far more is at stake here than rhetorical
categorization.
"We wash away our sense of sin, and what does
that bath secure us? Sin, shining bright and
hard. In what does the Latin bathe? True
dust. We have made the literal error. We
have used water, we are thus too sharply re-
minded. A European gets out of bed with a
disorder that holds the balance. The layers
of his deed can be traced back to the last
leaf and the good slug be found creeping.
L'Echo de Paris and his bedsheets were run
off the same press. One may read in both
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the travail life has had with him
	 The
French are dishevelled and wise; the American
tries to approximate it with drink. It is
his only clue to himself. He takes it when
his soap has washed him too clean for identi-
fication. The Anglo-Saxon has made the literal
error; using water, he has washed away his page."
(pp. 89-90)
This writing (on the page, the bedsheets, the body), which is "our sense
of sin", the record of "the travail life has had", the traces of the dirty
"deed", is both personal history and identity. In other words, the
"subject", the "I", is a printed/written page. If the subject makes the
"literal error" of washing off the dust/ink/marks/traces in the attempt
to do away with "our sense of sin" and recapture a prior and singular
state of cleanliness or purity (order), he loses his identification and
gains only a sort of universal sin "shining bright and hard". In this
case, original innocence (purity, cleanliness) is also a sort of original
sin. The perfectness of origin is already, at its source, complicated by
the notion of trespass. It is worth noting, too, that in this written
passage, the antecedent of "it"--"It is his only clue [...]"; "He takes it
(...]"--is again indeterminate. (Is "it" dishevelment and wisdom, or is
"it" drink?) The primary English signifier of object-ness, the "it", does
not accurately refer to a specific antecedent that would guarantee its
meaning. Thus, in this text, it would appear that identity and history
are very much a matter of printing (or writing) without the specific
antecedence of an object/referent, whether inter- or extra-textual, that
would finally determine meaning accurately, literally.
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This relationship between writing and identity and/or history
recurs, as a fundamental question, later in the text where, in certain
small incisions in O'Connor's demand that Nora stop writing to Robin, can
be seen what might be a (peculiarly Beckettian) textual "I" pleading for
writing (identity and history) itself to stop:
"Can't you be done now, can't you give up?
Now be still, now that you know what the world
is about, knowing it's about nothing?
	 And
me who seem curious because no one has seen
me for a million years, and now I'm seen! Is
there such extraordinary need of misery to
make beauty? C...J Why not rest? Why not put
the pen away?	 Can't you let any of us
loose? L.-1 So, I say, was Robin purposely
unspun? Was Jenny a sitting bitch for fun?
L.-1 Can't you rest now, lay down the pen?
Oh pepelanoi have I not summed up my timer"
(14). 124-26)
This passage can be read on several levels: as a question directed
by one character to another; as a character questioning (in search of)
an author; as a text querying its own necessity. All of these are quite
valid readings and could be used to make any number of theoretical
points regarding characters aware of their own fictive status, implied
authors, and/or self-reflective texts, but what is perhaps most striking
in this passage is the simple posing (does it matter by whom?) of a very
fundamental question. Why writing? Why the constraint: "Caret you let
any of us [author, characters, reader?] loose?" Why the labour (as
opposed to "still"ness), the making visible ("seen"), when motivation--the
principal instigating force of speech, rhetoric, writing, according to
Aristotelian tradition--is itself indeterminate? "'Was Robin purposely
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unspun? Was Jenny a sitting bitch for fun?" "Is there such
extraordinary need of misery to make beauty?" Why write? The question
is particularly provocative when posed (cited, situated) in a novel, that
literary form defined as the progeny of writing and the book, if we
recall Bakhtin's (written) history. (We might also recall, here, Beckett's
provocative "expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with
which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no
desire to express, together with the obligation to express.")
That hrightwood is a text within which the matter of writing takes
some precedence over character, plot development, etc. is a proposition
well recognized by literary critics, as I have already noted. That the
matter of writing may be posed as the question of writing, however, has
occurred to few. Mairdad Hanrahan does note that, for Barnes, writing
seems to be an attempt to halt the confusion that being human entails,
but that writing "can only fix 'dismay'; the 'end' it attains is indecent".
And, Hanrahan finishes by questioning if the "end" "would be better off
unattained". However, for Hanrahan, writing is apparently palliative and
predicated on a notion of "fixity" not unlike Plato's and Bakhtin's
notions of an encrypted speech, and so her interesting suggestion is not
particularly useful here, although it does intimate a direction that I
will be taking by the end of this chapter--following the notion that
writing is peculiarly involved with "the confusion that being human
entails".	 And, almost alone among the critical crowd, Elizabeth
PoChoda pays considerable attention to "the writer's suspicion of the
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morality of writing itself." In the course of her argument for a
negative teleology (the novel paradoxically striving for wordlessness) as
an organizing principle of the text, she makes the interesting suggestion
that the "goal for [the] characters in Arightwood is impersonality--to
become anonymous and deprive the novelist of her material".
	 But,
unfortunately, Pochoda pays little attention to the con-fusion of body
and writing that we have already seen at work in the text, and her
suggestion is predicated on a distinction between text and "material". I
think that we need to pay particularly close attention to this con-
fusion. Around about the con-Junction of body and writing posited by
this text, there is more at stake than the "morality of writing itself".
Epistemological, and even ontological, orthodoxies are challenged,
carnivalized, in Nightwoods solicitation of the relationship between
writing and being.
I offer the following passage as an exemplary bridge between this
section on Nighthrood's carnivalization of the orthodox structures of
novelistic discourse and the next section on the text's foregrounding of
"writing":
In the tones of this girl's voice was the
pitch of one enchanted with the gift of post-
poned abandon: the low drawling "aside" voice
of the actor who, in the soft usury of his
speech, withholds a vocabulary until the profit-
able moment when he shall be facing his audience
--in her case a guarded extempore to the body
of what would be said at some later period when
she would be able to "see" them. (p. 38)
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Here we have a "speech" which is marked by a withheld vocabulary, the
deferred presentation of an explanation or meaning that is an already
extant text, as the actor's speech is already the "text" of the play.
The economy of this deferral is evident--payment (meaning) will be
withheld until the "profitable moment" of full presence "when she would
be able to 'see' thee'. In the meantime, the listener will be given an
interest payment, a "guarded" (careful, protected) "extempore" (out of
time, immediate) to what will be paid when the listener can be seen.
This is the "soft usury of L..] speech", the withholding of capital (the
sum of meaning) for the sake of a profitable accrual of interest.
However, when this full meaning might be payed is indeterminate; after
all, at this point Robin is already in the presence of her auditors--she
has woken up and "recognized the doctor" ( 1). 36)--, and she can "see"
them. What will be, then, the "profitable moment" of seeing and saying
"the body of what would be said" if it is not the moment of being in the
presence of auditors? And what about this other intimation of deferral
within speech: "In the tones of this girl's voice was the pitch of one
enchanted with the gift of postponed abandon"? Between the "gift" of
postponed abandon and the "usury" of a withheld vocabulary, is there not
some derangement in this economy? It might be said, in reply to these
questions, that what is suggested here, by this passage, is that the
"profitable moment" of seeing and saying it all is the future moment of
a fatal investment in which the promised meaning will turn out to be,
also, the relinquishing of the constraints and conventions of meaning and
of identity. It might also be said that the "profitable moment" will
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turn out to be Robin's ultimate orgiastic salterello with Nora's dog,
another delivery of the body of what would be said.
To make another beginning, on this side of the bridge, we might
start with the matter of "speech", because it is supposed to have come
before "writing", because it is supposed to signify the full presence (of
the author) that writing lacks, because it is supposed to be involved
with the truth, and because there is a great deal of speech, and speech-
making, in the writing of Nightwood
"Are you both really saying what you mean,
or are you Just talking?" (1). 18)
wWhy talk?" (p. 49)
"I am deceiving your And he wondered what
he meant, and why she did not hear. (13. 45)
Is speech in NAghtwood motivated? This may seem merely a
rhetorical question. Certainly, rhetoricians and those philosophers
concerned with rhetoric, from Plato and Aristotle to Kenneth Burke and
Wayne Booth, have treated of speech as essentially, fundamentally,
motivated. It is purposive, emanating from an intention and bent toward
an accomplishment. Although it may appear an achievement in itself, as
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in the great classical orations, its proper (and good) function is to
achieve some other end. Speech is never unmotivated: after Freud, even
babble and the nonsensical are seen to have their motivations, for even
unconscious intentions count in this scheme. Therefore, without
intention or motivation, there is no speech. What is more, speech is
distinctly human. The ability to speak is what distinguishes the human
from the animal; and if speech is distinctly human, and if there is no
speech without motivation, then motivation, intention, purposiveness,
desire, must be the essential enabling Characteristics of human "belle.
Because we speak, we must be capable of motivation: because we are
capable of motivation, we are human and more than mere animals.
This more than is important; by this increment, humankind exceeds
its animality: by this increment, humankind perceives itself as divided
(being both mind and body, eternal and mortal, strong and weak) and yet
unified (by the mastery, or ascendency, of mind or spirit). And because
humankind can *perceive itself", is capable of that sort of speech-
enabled speculation, it can assume its own presence, its presence-to-
itself. Thus speech is so much more than a tool of communication: it
is significant of thought, intention, motivation and thus definitive of
the human being as that living being capable of thought, self-awareness,
of being beyond the body.
Of course, I am introducing nothing new here, simply reiterating
the well-worn pattern organizing Western perceptions of humankind at
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least since Plato. But I do think that such reiteration is necessary in
a discussion of speech in Nightwooe4 for Barnes has situated the
fundamental dilemma of the human condition precisely on this speech-
enabled presupposition of a division between man and beast, between the
mind and its body. In this text, speech is itself a "predicament".
One more point, before proceeding with this reading of speech in
Night wood we should recall, once more, Bakhtin's emphasis on speech,
the utterance of the speaking subject, within the definitive context of
the novel. According to Bakhtin, the novel possesses this singular
specificity: it is the only genre in which the inherent dialogism of the
"word" is exposed or exteriorized. And this exposition occurs in,
primarily, the speech of characters, motivated (by the necessity of plot
teleology) speech relativized, made ambivalent, by an other superseding
motivation, that of the "author" or "narrator". Thus, speech in the novel
may be said to be literally poised on cross-purposes, and it is this
speech-enabled conception of a dialogism of purposes that permits the
very concept of the carnivalesque in language.
In the light of these considerations, the question posed above--"Is
speech in Nigh twood motivated?"--takes on a new hue. What is speech in
the nightwood? "Why talk?" What is the strange necessity of this
speech that marks off the human from the beast? Why, indeed, talk? As
an intermediary answer, or suggestion of the possibility of an answer, I
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recite the following passage, the first paragraph of "Chapter One: Jesus
Mundane" ("By Way of Introduction") of Barnes's Ryden
Go not with fanatics who see beyond thee
and thine, and beyond the coming and going
of thee and thine, and yet beyond the ending
thereof,--thy life and the lives that thou
begettest, and the lives that shall spring
from them, world without end,--for such need
thee not, nor see thee, nor know thy lamen-
ting, so confounded are they with thy damna-
tion and the damnation of thy offspring,
and the multiple damnation of thy offspring,
and the multiple damnation of those multi-
tudes that shall be of thy race begotten,
unto the numbers of fishes in thin waters,
and unto the number of fishes in great waters.
Alike are they distracted with thy salvation
and the salvation of thy people. Go thou,
then, to lesser men, who have for all things
unfinished and uncertain, a great capacity,
for these shall not repulse thee, thy physi-
cal body and thy temporal agony, thy weeping
and thy laughing and thy lamenting. Thy ren-
dezvous is not with the Last Station, but
with small comforts, like to apples in the
hand, and small cups quenching, and words
that go neither here nor there, but traffic
with the outer ear, and gossip at the gates
of thy insufficient agony.24
We should note, here in this carnivalesque parody of biblical
language, a fundamental Juxtaposition--which runs throughout Barnes's
work--of the "fanatics" "confounded" and "distracted" by the
transcendental abstractions of eternal damnation and salvation and the
teleological function of the "Last Station", the cross (and crux of
damnation and salvation) which gives form and meaning to the apparent
vicissitudes of human history, and the "lesser men, who have for all
things unfinished and uncertain [the temporal, the quotidian, the
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physical] a great capacity", who have no truck with the making of
history or religious metaphysics, but a "rendezvous" with 'words that go
neither here nor there" toward any kind of meaning. In this passage,
the biblical insistence on the priority of the religious and
metahistorical transcendental is countered and contradicted by a quasi-
biblical insistence on the priority and propriety of the mortal. The one
way lies Truth and belief in the Word; the other way lies physical
experience and palliative chatter.
By temperament Nora was an early Christian;
she believed the word 	 The world and its
history were to [her] like a ship in a bottle;
she herself was outside and unidentified,
endlessly embroiled in a preoccupation without
a problem. (pp. 51-53)
"Look here", said the doctor. "Do you know
what has made me the greatest liar this side
of the moon, telling my stories to people
like you, to take the mortal agony out of
their guts, and to stop them from rolling
about, and drawing up their feet, and scream-
ing, with their eyes staring over their knuckles
with misery which they are trying to keep off,
saying, 'Say something, Doctor, for the love
of God!' And me talking away like mad."
(1). 135)
In both directions, there is a confounding and a distraction, some
attempt to extricate the human being from its (physical) self, its
"mortal agony'. On the one hand, there is belief in the "word", the
Christian logos or Christ, that which was with God, and was God, from
the beginning and through "whom all things were made".25 In the first
chapter of his gospel, John goes on to explain that this logos became a
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"light" revealing God to mankind immured in the darkness of the world.
Light and dark: perhaps the fundamental binary opposition organizing
Western thought,26 and within this "opposition", the "word", which should
be read here as "speech" because of its involvement with the Holy Spirit
or "breath" of God, is definitely on the absolutely good side, along with
truth, understanding, right reason, pure spirituality, all those clarities
made possible by the purposive shedding of a metaphorical light. The
opposing "world", dark sphere of physicality, bestiality, and mortality,
the vast speechless material otherwise known an "flesh", does not stand
a chance in Christian teleology. Word becomes flesh, in Christ, that
flesh (death) might be destroyed and existence (being) become eternal.
To believe in the logos as that "early Christian" (and Platonist) John
did, is to believe in the eventual ascendency of "light" (immaterial,
spiritual, contemplative, eternal) over "dark" (material, physical,
unconscious, mortal). Thus the world, which is both secondary and
doomed, might be detached from contemplative "reality" and contained
"like a ship in a bottle", having been formed, identified and, therefore,
rendered sensible as a referent within a system of meaning. In this
context, the suffering of the body may be diminished, or confounded,
considered either insignificant (because temporal) or instrumental to a
higher purpose (which is the ideal function of martyrdom). Herein lies
the endless "preoccupation without a problem", the contemplative speech-
enabled detachment—or perhaps more properly, distraction--from the
material body.
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On the other hand, there is Dr. O'Connor's insistence that speech is
simply, and insufficiently, palliative. Ode should recite, here, O'Connor's
admonishment that "the contemplative life is only an effort [...] to hide
the body so that feet won't stick out" (p. 134], the "feet" being the
most unbearable sight (or site) of death, much more sorry than the head,
for "Miley are most awfully tipped up from the earth" [p. 154].) Speech
is only the doctor's altruistic lying, the telling of stories to distract
the agonized patient: it cannot cure: it cannot totally obliterate, even
for a time, "mortal agony". Neither light nor truth, neither
understanding nor victory over flesh, speech is only motivated by a
purpose that can never be realized, by impossibility. It is redundant
from the very start, being only a trafficking with the "outer ear" of an
informal, ineluctable, physicality that is the condition of human being.
(Herein lies the "preoccupation that [-Is] its own predicament" (p. 47]?
The speech-enabled contemplation that cannot detach from the material
body because the "predicament" [pre-dica-ment, before speaking, before
consecrating, as well as saying before, premising] of human being lies
obstinately in the breach?) This is speech pushed to the periphery of
being: no longer the essential centre of a hierarchically organized
system of life, it is simply the rider to an amorphous, "unfinished and
uncertain", materiality that exceeds the boundaries, or closures, of a
system of logocentric binary opposition.
This peculiar decentering of that system privileging speech, as
logos, marks, in one way or another, practically all of the doctor's
speeches. In his earliest conversation with Nora, he remarks:
"I, as a medical man, know in what pocket a
man keeps his heart and soul, and in what
jostle of the liver, kidneys and genitalia
these pockets are pilfered. There is no
pure sorrow. Why? It is bedfellow to lungs,
lights, bones, guts and gall! There are
only confusions; about that you are quite
right, Nora my child, confusions and defeated
anxieties--there you have us, one and alL"
(I). 22)
"There is no pure sorrow	 There are only confusions." In such
speech, the ideality enabled by the categorical distinction between light
and dark, soul or mind and body, is disrupted or disorganized, Jostled as
it were, in a carnivalesque movement that solicits the rigid foundations
of hierarchical or entelechial organization from the genitalia up. In
such speech, light becomes "lights", organs, offal.
"I, as good a Catholic as they make, have
embraced every confection of hope, and yet
I know well, for all our outcry and struggle,
we shall be for the next generation not the
massive dung fallen from the dinosaur, but
the little speck left of a humming-bird;
so as well sing our Chi vuol la Zir2garella
Chow women love it!) while I warble my &mate
an Grepuscule, throwing in der ErlkonAT for
good measure, not to mention Who is Sylvia?
Who is anybody! (1). 154)
Since we are bound, for all our noise, to insignificance, to
indiscernable dust or dung, why not simply "sing" of the twilight and the
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mystery of love? This subversive argument for the "lesser", for the
quotidian ("anybody") and unenlightened, runs like a coloured thread
through the doctor's speeches, whether addressed to the form-loving
Felix or the high-minded Nora or to no-one in particular. (We should
recall, here, O'Connor's earlier disquisition on "legend" and "history".)
But are we justified in positing such a clear-cut comparison: is this a
literal case of characters representing a nlorIO (the narrated idealisms
of Nora and Felix) and its ameliorization or subversion (in the speech of
O'Connor)? I would suggest that things are not quite that simple, that
there are resistances in the text--instigated, perhaps, or exposed, by
the doctoral speeches challenging the logocentric privileging of speech--
Inhibiting the sort of foreclosure of meaning that such allegorization
conventionally entails. In other words, the tremors set to work by the
challenging of the concept of the centrality of speech in a particular
ontological system reverberate throughout the text in such a way that it
is impossible to reduce any aspect of the text to a specific,
extract ible, meaning or "idea".
One more small example: if we return to, or recite, the passage
describing Nora's belief in the "word", which has already been discussed
as an effect of logocentric organization, we might note certain crucial
Inconsistencies. "By temperament Nora was an early Christian; she
believed the word." In the predicating analysis, I made the, perhaps
forgiveable, assumption of association between "early Christian" and "the
word". Within the contextual specificity of Christianity, "the Word"
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means Jesus Christ; that is what the Logos is But, here, in this
passage from Night wood we have "the word", small '1,1% If we continue to
assume a Christian association, we are faced with the possibility of "the
Word" having been decapitalized, decapitated, dismissed from office,
divested of funds. And if "the Word" itself is usurped and/or bankrupt,
what might we say for that entire logocentric system of meaning which
it sustains? Is it not shaken, decentred (con-, per-, in-, verted) by
ambivalence, if not ambiguity? What is more, if we continue with the
recited passage, past its ellipses, we come to Nora's contemplative
detachment from the *world and its history° and yet another peculiarity.
Here, Nora is described (or de-scribed) as "outside" of world and history
which, in the either/or terms of orthodox Christianity, would signify
being in a "state of grace", or eternity, or in the presence of God. To
be in the presence of God, in the full presence (that presence which
privileges speech as unmediated) of the Absolute "I Am""--is this not
also to be identified, to be made one, with Presence Itself? Yet, Nora
is "unidentified", "outside and unidentified". Of course, it might be
suggested that "the world and its history" functions as a definitive
antecedent for "unidentified" as it does, perhaps, for "outside", but such
a grammatical relationship is not made clear by the syntax. Under the
shadow of ambivalence, that *unidentified" can be read either way: the
important thing to note is that, under a word divested of its authority,
both identity (along with history) and full presence are impossibly
remote.
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What, then, can we make of speech in this text, of those numerous
passages (crossings, portages) set apart by doubled inverted commas or
quotation marks signifying the thought-intention-presence of this or
that speaking-character, when the text itself seems to disrupt such
systematic distinction? Is it not possible that these set apart
passages, in the absence of thought-intention-presence, along with their
(grappling, lifting) quotation marks, are writing too--writing
masquerading as speech, carrying speech along, projecting the illusion of
a separate speech, pretending to quote (the price of) pre-texts that do
not exist?
I am following two connecting threads in moving from speech to
writing. First, of course, I am being complicit with the predominant
either/or insistence of binary opposition in viewing writing as the
(deprivileged, duplicitous, denigrated) other or opposite of speech. If
speech is not "speech", if the presence that guarantees speech turns out
to be an absence, then speech must be writing. Secondly, and more
pertinently, I am taking a lead from a particular sort of metaphor, the
general metaphor of writing, as it makes its many and varied appearances
in the text. I have already noted the complicity of body and writing in
Night wood, a complicity that might be reinforced in logocentric,
Christian, terms by the formula "as writing is to speech, so body is to
soul". The alignment might be seen as quite conventional, were we not
already aware of the incipient decentering of logocentrism in the text.
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What, then, of this complicity of the metaphor of writing and the
body in this particular body of writing that is the text? Dr. O'Connor
tells Nora that 'The scalpel and the Scriptures have taught me the
little I did not already know" (p. 153), and it may prove useful to
dwell, for a space, on the conjunctive coupling of scalpel and Scripture
(putting aside, for a later Chapter, the provoking question of O'Connor's
preknowledge). On the one hand, we have an alliterative, poetic, coupling
of two opposing series of connotations, these being the series
instigated by "scalpel" (body, anatomy, physicality, mortality, etc.) and
the series instigated by "Scriptures" (language, ontotheology,
transcendental signification, immortality, etc.). On the other hand, we
have a certain etymological connivance between "scalpel" (< L.
scalpellunz "a small knife, scalpel, lancet", sharing its root with L. vb.
scaApena "to scratch, to cut, carve, engrave [of surface work]" [Lewis
and Short]) and "Scriptures" (< L. scriptura "a writing, written
characters" [Lewis and Short]), facilitated by the etymological history of
the verb 'to write' (< OE wrilan < ON rite: "to score, write"; 'To form
[letters, symbols, words, etc.) by carving, graving, or incision, OE"; 'To
impress or stamp marks indicating [some condition or quality] on, in, or
over a person, etc. ME"; "To inscribe letters in, on, or upon a hard or
plastic surface by scoring, tracing, engraving, OE" HEM Thus,
hAThtwood might be seen to proffer, under the general aegis of pedagogy
("taught me") or epistemology, a 'writing" that is--as well as "penning"-
-surgery, incision, scratching, cutting, carving, engraving, impressing,
stamping marks, tattooing, scoring, tracing, any process of leaving a
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trace or mark or scar on both animate and inanimate matter. Recall the
exemplary case of the tattooed "Nildca". Writing, then, in the event of a
fallen or decapitalized speech, radically exceeds its conventional
designation as the mere skeletal remains of an absent full presence. It
might be seen to usurp (or cut into or add marks to) the general terrain
of speech proper, as I noted earlier in those passages where experience
imprints (writes) both history and identity on the skin of the body. In
a sense, writing, in this text, seems to pervade all those areas and
human arenas in relation to which it has traditionally been marginalized.
Certainly, this writing has cast its shadow (recall Nikka's dark skin)
over that which has been defined by "light".
Take, for instance, the following complication of that "spiritual"
emotion "Love" with the metaphor of -writing:
Love becomes the deposit of the heart,
analogous in all degrees to the "findings"
in a tomb. As in one will be charted the
taken place of the body, the raiment, the
utensils necessary to its other life, so in
the heart of the lover will be traced, as an
indelible shadow, that which he loves. In
Nora's heart lay the fossil of Robin, intaglio
of her identity, and about it for its main-
tenance ran Nora's blood. Thus the body of
Robin could never be unloved, corrupt or put
away. Robin was now beyond timely changes,
except in the blood that animated her. That
she could be spilled of this fixed the walk-
ing image of Robin in appalling apprehension
on Nora's mind--Robin alone, crossing streets,
in danger. Her mind became so transfixed that,
by the agency of her fear, Robin seemed enor-
mous and polarized, all catastrophes ran toward
her, the magnetized predicament; and crying
out, Nora would wake from sleep, going back
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through the tide of dreams into which her
anxiety had thrown her, taking the body of
Robin down with her into it, as the ground
things take the corpse, with minute persis-
tence, down into the earth, leaving a pattern
of it on the grass, as if they stitched as
they descended. (pp. 56-57)
There are two "writings", or two developments of the trope (simile)
of writing, in this paragraph, one opening it and one closing it (opening
and closing the grave's (graph's] door). The first posits an analogy
between the precipitates of love and death, precipitates that are legible
traces of what might have once been, or seems to have been, but is not
now. The second posits an analogy between burial and patterning
(tracing or weaving). In both tropes, the marking (charting, tracing),
the very possibility of marking, depends upon absence (of the body or
present lover) for it is the processes of absenting, or making absent,
that render the precipitates or castings constituting the marks. Of
course, this is precisely the point that Plato and Bakhtin (and, between
them, almost everyone else who has considered the point) make: writing,
as such, is the (dead) remainder of an absent presence. Note, however,
in the first trope, the "taken place" of the body which is a scene of the
usurpation of the body by its metonymic remainders ("the raiment", etc.).
This is a scene of replacement or substitution, rather than of abdication
or loss. But, is writing simply a sort of metonymic substitution for
speech? What about this writing on the heart? Certainly, there is
nothing new in this metaphor ("in the heart of the lover will be
traced"): God has been writing his laws on men's hearts since time
immemorial. Yet this last consideration suggests another possible
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direction, for surely God's laws are more than mere remainders, being
valued dicta, just as a "deposit" is more than a chemical precipitate
(the alchemy of the word?), being, also, funds or goods stored (in a
bank) for safekeeping and geomorphic stores of valuable ores and
minerals. In the course of the cited passage, "deposit" becomes "fossil
of Robin" becomes "intaglio of her identity", the engraving of Robin's
identity (both genitive and objective?), becomes "the body of Robin", now
in safe-keeping space, enwombed/entombed in Nora's heart and, so, "beyond
timely changes" (infinitely recurring like the writing that inhabits
space, independent of the time of the voice's passing). Two things are
worth noting here: first, the identity of Robin Who is elsewhere,
consistently, defined as being without identity or self-awareness) is
(in) writing rather than in speech-signifying-presence; secondly, the
usurpation of a bankrupt presence by- inscription yields a certain extra
value rather than a depletion of funds, even though the actual principal
has disintegrated. Obviously, this dream-writing, in which we find the
identity and body of Robin perpetuated, does not depend on any actual
presence of Robin. Rather, the identity and the body of Robin are like
fetishes, overdetermined and over-valued inscribed images standing in
the place of an irrecoverable lost object. (Note the polarization of the
image of Robin, the assignment of positive and negative [attractive])
values.)
Yet, the dream ends--and it is important that this little salterello
by the trope of writing takes place in the dream, for the dream is the
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site of the carnivalizing of personal history and identity where formal
expectations are played with or thwarted in the operations of an other
sort of logic. Here, the "real" narrative determinants of chronology,
cause-and-effect, mimesis, are shaken loose, fragmented and re-ordered,
as constituents of form rather than determinants, according to another
sort of necessity, which I will turn to in a moment. As the dream ends,
the dreamer awakes to consciousness, the "ground things" take the
"corpse" "down into the earth, leaving a pattern of it on the grass, as
if they stitched [a text-ile?] as they descended". Here endeth Nora's
first dream, with a burial and a pattern, a memory-tracing, of the
dreamed event on the surface of the grave. Her third dream also
involves the opening of a grave Cher grandmother's) and its closing with
a staged return to consciousness: "And I woke up and still it was going
on: it went down into the dark earth of my waking as if I were burying
them with the earth of my lost sleep" (1). 149). 9.0 wake' is to bury,
cover-up, hide (the ambivalence of "wake" is played on here--to come to
consciousness, the funereal celebration, the draught left of an object
moving through water): 'to sleep' is (perchance) to dream, to dig (cut,
incise), to enter the grave (en-grave). And in dreaming, in the grave, is
writing.
Her second dream ( 1% 62-63) sets itself in a house, on the "last
floor but one" of which is Nora's "grandmother's room", "saturated with
the lost presence of her grandmother" although it is "the absolute
opposite of any known room her grandmother had ever moved or lived in".
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The room is "set with all the belongings of her grandmother", which are
listed as "portraits" of a great-uncle who had died, time-faded carpets
and curtains, "a plume and an ink well--the ink faded into the quill".
It is a portrait of absence and the mark (of time, paint, ink). Once
again, the dream is in a crypt, a house of the dead. Nora, from her
grandmother's room, looks down "into the body of the house E..J where
now Robin had entered the dream". She calls to Robin to "'Come up'",
"knowing it was impossible because the room was taboo". Her
(censorious, taboo-making?) grandmother is also in the dream, in two
figures: the one "flowing away in a long gown of soft folds and chin
laces", seeming "in the continual process of leaving" the room; the
other "dressed as a man, wearing a billycock and a corked moustache, E...]
in tight trousers and a red waistcoat,	 greeting Nora] with a leer of
love". The former is "not entirely her recalled grandmother": the
latter is a recollection "of her childhood" (the grandmother in wolf's
clothing?). The "architecture of dream had rebuilt" a doubled
grandmother who seems the aged counterpart of Robin (who "is incest
too" [p. 156]), the "invert" who also wears both "gowns" "that made her
seem newly ancient" ( 1). 42) and "white flannel trousers" (p. 34). The
dream itself is interesting, for it seems to offer, quite obviously,
certain insights into Nora's condition and her love for Robin. Yet, are
these insights, these proffered possibilities of analysis, trustworthy or
well-based references when the dream-figures of Nora's grandmother are:
[..J her grandmother "drawn upon" as a prehis-
toric ruin is drawn upon, symbolizing her life
out of her life, and which now appeared to
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More as something being done to Robin, Robin
disfigured and eternalized by the hieroglyphics
of sleep and pain. (13. 63)
Again, we are faced with the "writing" of the dream, a non-phonetic
"hieroglyphics of sleep and pain", that at once draws upon life as a
source of figure and draws upon life as the Egyptian scribe marked the
crypt walls and the modern graffiti artist marks the "ruin", disfiguring
(by condensation, substitution, displacement) as it eternalizes (makes
"perpetual, incessant, always recurring" and, also, "infernal, damned"
[CEA see "Eternal9),27 making a symbol of life as it symbolizes life.
And, we should note the non-phonetic nature of the hieroglyph, which
does not presuppose the priority of the phone of the voice. The
hieroglyph is scarcely a proper substitute for a logocentric speech-
presence-totalizing intention: if this writing is a substitute for
presence, then it is a substitute with interest, with a certain accrual
that exceeds the loss of principle. It is both loss of meaning and
proliferation, an eternal proliferation, of meanings--a defence against,
or deferral of, the expenditure without reserve that is climax and
"death". Freud, in The Interpretation of Dreams which is always an
interpretation of a writing (analogous to the "hieroglyphics" of "the
ancient writers"), describes the same sort of economy:2e
Wherever a wish-fulfillment is unrecognizable
and disguised there must be a tendency to de-
fend oneself against this wish, and in conse-
quence of this defense the wish is unable to
express itself save in a distorted form [....]
The political writer who has unpleasant truths
to tell to those in power finds himself in a
like position. If he tells everything without
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reserve, the Government will suppress them
Thus the loss of desire that is "wish-fulfillment", the dangerous telling
"everything without reserve", is deferred by masking and distortion, the
proliferation of faces, veils, and images. Later in the text, in
reference to a certain sort of masking., or substitution, Freud notes:
The process of shifting and rearrangement which
replaces material of psychic significance by
material which is indifferent [...] has already
taken place in those earlier periods of life
and has since become fixed in the memory.
[Recall Nora's first and second dreams in
which there are the fixing of an image, the
leaving of a memory-trace, and the recollection
of a "figure" from childhood.] Those elements
which were originally indifferent are in fact
no longer so, since they have acquired the
value of psychologically significant materiaL
That which has actually remained indifferent
[never been written?] can never be reproduced
in the dream.
From the foregoing exposition the reader
may rightly conclude that I assert that there
are no indifferent dream-stimuli; and there-
fore no guileless dreams 	 Dreams which are
apparently guileless turn out to be the reverse
of innocent if one takes the trouble to inter-
pret them; if I may be permitted the expression,
they all show "the mark of the beast".3°
Thus, we have dreams "show[ingl 'the mark of the beast'", the added
value that is an effect of this economy of substitution and reversal,
and that is also a deferral of, or detour around, a fatal investment
without reserve. Of the "French", who have not made the "literal error"
of washing away their "page", Dr. O'Connor remarks:
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"The French have made a detour of filth-
iness—Oh, the good dirt! Whereas [Americans]
are of a clean race, of a too eagerly washing
people, and this leaves no road for you. The
brawl of the Beast leaves a path for the Beast."
(I). 84)
Perhaps, this is why the "American" Nora must dream, to accomplish that
writing which her washing prohibits. But, to recite that question
already quoted, "Why write?": is it not to trace the "mark of the beast"
as "a path for the Beast" (a "road for you"), "a roadway for it", to avoid
it becoming "an engine stalling itself upon your chest, halting its
wheels against your heart" (I). 84)? This pathmaking "for the beast"
bears a certain similarity to Freud's Bahnung (UI. "pathbreaking", though
frequently translated as "facilitation" or "breaching"), a "natural
science" model of the repetitious furrowing or engraving of the neurones
that occurs in the reception of stimuli and results in the constitution
of memory. 1 As Jacques Derrida points out in his reading of Freud,
this (painful) repeated tracing of paths which is memory is also a
deferral of pain "beyond a certain quantity" which would destroy psychic
structure:
In accordance with a motif which will con-
tinue to dominate Freud's thinking, this move-
ment is described as the effort of life to
protect itself by deferring a dangerous cat-
hexis, that is, by constituting a reserve
(Vorrat). The threatening expenditure or pre-
sence are deferred with the help of breaching
or repetition	 Is it not already death at
the origin of a life which can defend itself
against death only through an economy of death,
through deferment, repetition, reserve?
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This life-preserving "movement" of breaching and repetition, of course,
"conform[s] to a metaphorics of the written trace", for what other
supplement both preserves (records) an event and permits its repetition
(reading), though not beyond a certain dangerous quantity of pain, as
well as writing does?
	
Perhaps the writing, the barbarous inscription,
of Night wood--in its speech, its characters, and its dreams as well--is
just such a tracing, and just such a deferral. Perhaps the text is the
Inscribed body in a necessarily staged "fight [with] the bear in the
Cirque de Paris".
Writing-metaphors frequently appear at critical turns in the text--
when Nora works at the knots of her dreams or when Dr. O'Connor
confronts her with her obsessional behaviour, for example. It is as if
writing itself is somehow precedent to history or narrative, as though
it were a fundamental activity of the human psyche before it became the
crypt of living speech or the static medium of a story, message, or
history. Writing in this text is not, as Hanrahan would have it, the
making of an image out of confusion; rather, it is an integral part of
the con-fusion that is psychical activity (conscious and unconscious).
Writing is not a tool: it is a compulsive "effort of life to protect
itself" against the end, against closure. History, and written narrative
In general, are but reflexes of a real drive against closure and not
unadulterated relations or re-presentations of a prior "reality". By
faking closures (chronologies; beginnings, middles and ends;
identifications) that can be traced over and over again, writing defers
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what we fear--the threatening presence of death. As O'Connor points
out, unexpurgated "Edlestiny and history are untidy; we fear memory of
that disorder" (p. 118). So, "we" make a path for that untidy, fearful
beast to stop it "halting its wheels upon [our] heart". Why write?
Because it is the only way to hold on to one's heart.
Obviously, then, writing is in essence a (primary and necessary)
subterfuge and not an innocent or lifeless carrier of truth. Writing,
like crime, is a way to go back, "unspin fate" (p. 125), and "lay hands on
the shudder of a past that is still vibrating" (1).119) in a perpetual
repetition that is also a deferment. In this text, writing is a crime, a
prolongation of (Robin's, Nora's, the doctor's) suffering. "'But'", as the
doctor points out, "'all dreadful events are of profit'". The criminal
and the profitable are con-fused in a writing that is an "economy of
death" rather than an orderly relation of external (to writing) events.
This criminal and carnivalesque con-, per-, in-version of orthodox
conceptions of writing itself informs all of NAghtwxxfs responses to the
conventional expectations of history and so-called realist fiction.
At this point, the question of Nightwood's relationship to Freudian
psychoanalytic theory arises, and along with it the question of writing
and gender: to what degree does the barbarous inscription (the "path
for the Beast") of Night wood rely on what might be called a non-phallic
pen? I will be addressing this question specifically in Chapter Five.
First, however, I want to bring the text face to face with the very
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paradigm of Western phallogocentric onto-theology (which also
underwrites the Freudian text as it underwrites western history)--
Pauline Christian discourse.
CHAPTER FOUR
JUGHTWOOR GOD'S LITTLE BAG OF TRICKS
The carnival is always involved with the Church: it is, properly,
the Church's "other", an other simultaneously inside the church, as the
inherent possibility of the system's inversion, and outside, as an
operation without the limits of the church's dicta but incorporating, if
perversely, the system's structures. The two cannot be disjoined. In a
certain, terministic sense, then, the carnivalesque text is always
involved with/in the "'Church", with/in the predominant Western system of
significations ordered under the sign of the One God. The text
organizes itself, produces itself, both within and against the Church (as
discourse): it adopts and exploits--as it is composed of--Pauline
Christian doctrines, inverting and perverting them, turning them back on
their grand progenitor (the first speaker and omnipotent sire) so that
the progenitor might be laughed With a very "serious" laughter) out of
countenance.'
Night wood is pre-occupied with the "religious": theological and
ontotheological questions of origin, belief, faith, hope, and doubt riddle
the narrative; characters are defined, define themselves, in terms of
varying religious (spiritual) proclivities; "God" is invoked, evoked,
questioned and examined, but never revoked--at least, not properly. In
this (largely definitive) sense, Nghtwood could be--and has been--called
a religious text. But, in its engagement with the religious, Nightwood
Is most overtly "carnivalesque", and if its critics, with the notable
exception of Jane Marcus, have not employed this particular adjective--
and its attendant theoretical complex--they have certainly noted the
-173-
text's carnivalesque inversion, perversion or corruption of Pauline
Christian paradigms. '2 Kenneth Burke remarks upon Nightw000's
secularization of religious passion, its development of the concept of a
"transcendence downward", and its secular rewriting of the conventional
(Christian) reading of the New Testament as fulfillment of the 01d.3
Donna Gerstenberger suggests that the first chapter of hrightwood
presents a "mock-creation narrative" which is a (perverse) rewriting of
Genesis.A Ulrich Weisstein, writing in the Catholic journal Renascence,
examines Arightwxxfs institution of "sham categories" in the place of
conventional typological distinctions, so that "theatre" replaces
"history", "museum" replaces "church", "acrobat" replaces "priest", and
"liar" replaces "prophet", and he closes his article with the intriguing
suggestion that hrightwood is a sort of nighttime Divine Comedy, the
"confused dream" of Dante's "clear vision of the beyond". s Elizabeth
Pochoda suggests that the text has "found a way for satire and the
apocalypse to merge", and quotes Hawkes's statement that, in writing
Night wood, Barnes assumed "a prophetic role in reverse". 6 And so on.
Even F.R. Leavis, in The COMMCM Pursuit, recognizes the text's (immoral)
inversion of Christian desire: "Then there is Djuna Barnes's Night wood
it deals, of course, with EviP. 7 As this is all he writes about the
text, we might be forgiven for assuming that this is all he noticed, but
he must be given credit for having hit the nail, more or less, on the
head. Certainly, to secularize the divine, laitize properly clerical
discourse, introduce "sham categories" in the place of proper types, is,
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from the point of view of a certain dominant morality, to deal with
"Evil", to divert the gaze from the Good, to participate in carnival.
The sort of simple in(per)version intimated by Leavis--the
focussing on the inverse or negative terms of binary oppositions--is
projected overtly by Nigh twood. "T...J we do not "climb" to heights, we
are eaten away to them'", says Dr. O'Connor (1). 118), replacing the
conventional connotations of ascension with those of diminution or
deprivation and offering an exemplar of the perverted condition of
progressive movement in the text (Burke's "transcendence downward"). Of
course, if we attribute an overriding general significance to the title
itself, this text is "nightwood", an unillumined shadowy place where
things may not be known (seen) in what is proper to them, their truth in
the Aristotelean/Platonic sense, but speculated upon--if we can speculate
in these conditions--in the unlight of their impropriety. Thus, we
should expect to find that inversion is the text's informing discursive
principle. Is this much not obvious in the titular turning away from
the Light? It might be said that Night wood flowers (like the carnival)
at the point of inversion, at the point where the eye reverts to seeing
"through a glass darkly", which is also to say that inversion itself
cannot be the aim of the text.° In a sense, inversion is already
assumed as the condition of being: the text makes no pretence at
discovering or unveiling or introducing the (negative) dark backside of a
seemingly absolute term. "Evil" has always "here: tithe night has been
going on for a long time". (1). 82)
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Of course, this is going to complicate things considerably. If we
were able to state quite simply, with Leavis, that the text "deals with
Evil", that it turns "Good" on its head to expose the opposite term
inscribed on its bottom, then our analysis could proceed in a clear,
straightforward, demonstrative fashion. However, we are not going to
get off so lightly. On the one hand, in the carnivalesque text, the
distinctions between, or the polarization of, the terms Good and Evil--
and all other seemingly exclusive, absolute terms--are problematized,
even rendered impossible. On the other hand, the very system of
prioritization that informs Pauline distinctions between Good and Evil--
the system that posits God the Father as the First Cause, the source or
origin, and Evil as the absence or withdrawal of the Good that is God--
is put into question by this text that offers the invert (Robin) as a
pre-historic "first position" ( I). 134)--"the only position" ( I). 146) "that
we have forgotten and would give our life to recall" (p. 118)--and
suggests a genesis that is as much the projected dying of the mother
(Hedvig Volkbein) as the procreative mimesis of the Father. In other
words, it might be said that the nightwood is constituted by and upon
that which Pauline Christianity, in particular, and Platonism, in general,
have forgotten or repressed, that to which their eyes are blind--to whit,
the mortal/fleshly source and the (always unsuccessful if necessary)
murder of the (maternal) source in the name of the Father, for the sake
of identity. Beyond the penetrating rays of the sun, carnival masks and
shadowing branches both supplement and obscure distinctive features in
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such a way that recognition is nothing more than a guess, a shot in the
dark, a fumble through "God's bag of tricks".
As I noted earlier, in her article 'The Radical Narrative of Djuna
Barnes's Mightuvocr, Donna Gerstenberger suggests that Night wood begins
with a "mock-creation narrative", an other genesis. '3 The novel opens
with the birth of Felix Volkbein who is the text's emblem of "that race
which has the sanction of the Lord and the disapproval of the people",
the race of the Chosen People, the Jews. As Gerstenberger notes, it
takes Hedvig Volkbein seven days to give birth to her "only son", and on
the seventh day of her labour, she "named him Felix, thrust him from her
and died" (IN 1). Felix's father, whose distinguishing physical feature
had been his stomach, "protruding slightly" and emphasized by the
buttons of his waistcoat which marked "the exact centre of his body with
the obstetric line seen on fruits", had died six months previously.
Between the dead, pregnant-looking father, marked by "the obstetric
line", and the naming, thrusting, dying mother, Felix's origin, this
genesis of the Jew, is a con-fusion of the Judeo-Christian narrative of
creation by a (naming, speaking) Father (without antecedents) and the
(antecedent) matter which that myth forgot or rendered inert (though
malleable), the matrical, material body. Certain distinctive
characteristics are exchanged: the already dead father bears the
distinctive mark of maternity; the dying mother names, gives her name to,
the "only son". The immediate result of this is, of course, that the
maternal aspect which has been almost completely obliterated in the
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engendering-Father creation narrative is brought into the play, and a
certain dominant binary opposition is, at least partly, inverted.
But this is only the beginning. Felix's father turns out to have
been a fake--a false baron with "a coat of arms that he had no right to
and a list of progenitors (including their Christian names) who had
never existed" (p. 3). FelLes mother, though "genuine", was a Gentile
(martial, Valkyrean), very much an "other" and inaccessible in her racial
difference. ("Her body at that moment became the barrier and Guido died
against that wall, troubled and alone" ( 1). 3].) At the point of Hedvig's
death and Felix's naming, "exact history stopped for Felix who, thirty
years later, turned up in the world 	 what had formed Felix from the
date of his birth to his coming to thirty was unknown to the world, for
the step of the wandering Jew is in every son" (13. 7). Between the
adult and his (false, fictive, alien and dead) source is a diaspora, a
wandering and scattering, that cannot be recouped, through an unmapped
unknown wilderness, and this diaspora bears a certain universality--it is
stepped by "every son". The diaspora, the dispersion, is a severance, a
cutting-off of "every son" from an origin which is already fake or
inaccessible and is already a fiction. (It is worth noting that the
conjunction "for", in the cited passage, which should signal a causal
relationship between prece.ding and succeeding clauses, actually con-
joins clauses that have no logical relationship. Thus, the syntax of the
passage enacts a severance Eno logical relationship] under the guise of
a (causal] conjunction.) The only traces of Felix's origin are two
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ancestral portraits which have turned out to be "reproductions of two
intrepid and ancient actors" (1). 7). Thus, there is a double exposure of
the narrative of "origin": the Judeo-Christian paradigm appears in
inverted form to reveal the involvement of that which has been
repressed; then, via the detour of "thirty years" Os Christly span of
time) in the wilderness, the entire concept of origin is rendered
irrecoverable and in-valid, a matter of a necessary fiction or theatre
(Felix's ancestors are actors) or false conjunction. The umbilicus is
severed.
This complication, at the beginning of the novel, of the Judeo-
Christian creation narrative, is indicative of a strategy that realizes
the inherent (or parturating) elements, etc, concealed (or forgotten) by
a phallogocentric theological discourse and brings these elements to
term, as it were, brings them out to the light and to the world,
severing, as it does so, the line between the origin and the product.
This strategy might be called taking "the obstetric line"--that line
which bisects and articulates the father's pregnant-looking belly--a
significantly other line to that phallic line that determines patronymics,
patrimony, patrilinear descent, and assures the privilege of the all-
engendering Father over that too material, matrical origin, that
dangerous body that must be idealized out of materiality or refuted
before "every son" realizes that he has been "thrust" out of it into the
world and into an eternal homelessness, that the umbilicus has been
severed and that there is no way back but, perhaps, death--for this
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origin is death too. Taking "the obstetric line" through the Pauline
Christian structure of conversion--for it is through this particular
structure that this chapter is headed--Arightwood cuts through, while
following the arc of, the ideal of Christian desire, the ideal of
atonement or at-one-ment. Taking the obstetric line", hrightwood
performs a (Bloomian--for is this not a matter of "anxiety of
influence?) c/inamen (taking the -lime. in the "c...men") within a Pauline
and Platonic tradition of conversion toward the articulation of that
which the tradition would (alfan to) obscure--the possibility of
conversion to an other that is not One.1°
Believe me, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of
these divisions and collections, that I may
gain the power to speak and to think, and
whenever I deem another man able to discern
an objective unity and plurality, I "follow
in his footsteps where he leadeth as a god".
PLATO"
This chapter will be both a division and collection, an articulation
as it were, of Pauline Christian intertexts of or for Barnes's writing of
Night wood I am not attempting to suggest, or prove, that Barnes was
actually familiar with the works that I will be discussing in this
chapter--although it is certainly possible that she was. 12 Such bio-
bibliographic considerations are almost beside the point here, for what I
am trying to establish is Nightwoods "obstetric" clinamen through a
general Pauline structure of conversion (the predominant structure of
Christian conversion) that is hinged on the figurative death of the
convert and a re-turn to a Source. (As I will demonstrate below, this
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is a very Platonic structure.) The carnivalesque text, because of its
specific involvement in the Church as such, does not depend on
particular allusions to or influences of theological texts for its
intertextuality to be at work. It is necessarily already engaged with
the discursive structures informing theological discourses.
The conversive structure, following the model of St. Paul's
conversion, is composed of three stages conjoined by two crises or
crucial points: the proto-convert begins in the depths of sin or error;
he is then, while on a "journey" (the road to Damascus, life's roadway to
death, the path to God, etc.), overwhelmed by a light that is an
unbearable revelation of Truth; having seen (and heard) the presently
unbearable truth, he falls (back) into blindness until he accepts God's
truth and is properly converted. The crucial points are "being overcome
by light", which awakens the soul to God's truth, and "accepting that
truth", in which the convert is "born again". The second, intermediate,
stage would seem to be a period of death (blindness) or entombment
during which the convert dies to his "old self". St. Paul, himself, spent
three days in blindness (recalling the three days between the
crucifixion and the resurrection) between being struck by the light and
being "filled with the Holy Ghost". The intermediate stage of death is
essential to the Pauline concept of conversion:
Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized
into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death?
Therefore we are buried with him by baptism
into death: that like as Christ was raised
up from the dead by the glory of the Father,
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even so we also should walk in newness of life.
For if we have been planted together in the
likeness of his death, we shall be also in the
likeness of his resurrection: Knowing this,
that our old man is crucified with him, that
the body of sin might be destroyed, that
henceforth we should not serve sin.
For he that is dead is freed from
The Confessions of St. Augustine, as a confessional narrative of
conversion, and The Spiritual Exercises of 51. Ignatius Loyola, as a
system for converting to the will of God, offer, perhaps, the most
extensive delineations of the Pauline process of conversion. After St.
Paul, Augustine is the principal shaper of the Christian concept of
conversion, and Loyola's Exercises represent perhaps the first practical
application of that concept as method. But I have other reasons, as
well, for lighting upon these two. First of all, both Augustine and
Loyola articulate a "desire" that is specifically mortal, allied with the
flesh, and intellectually apprehensible in a way that separates them from
the mystics or ecstatics who, it might be said, "do away with" both the
intellect and the body right from the beginning and, thus, with
signification (for the ecstatic experience is ineffable). Whereas the
writings of the mystics are taken to be secondary, insufficient
reductions of the ecstatic experience, both the Augustinian and Ignatian
practices produce an articulate, examining text that is intended to be
educative, to stimulate reproduction of text (in
reading/converting/exercising) and signification. Both texts present
themselves as 'texts" in the educative sense, and this insistent
textuality indicates the nature of the discursive tradition that
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Night wood turns or swerves within. There is indeed, I would argue, an
"anxiety of influence" driving the writing of Mightwrop&-although not
quite the oedipal anxiety of Bloom's poetic system, which intimates, I
hope, the problem of gender unexamined by Bloom (The male poet may be
driven by the influence of a particular poetic progenitor, but where does
the female writer stand in this patrilinear system? Certainly, one
stance for her is that which places her in an anxious, influenced,
relation to the entire tradition marked out by "fathers and sone.)
Again, this is not to suggest that Barnes was reacting to the Ignatian
and Augustinian texts per se, but that these two texts can be used as
emphatic paradigms of a discursive influence by/against which Nghtwood
is written. (Of course, the figure of Dante will appear, from time to
time, in this chapter. Dante is, after all, the principal poetic inheritor
of Augustinian and Pauline theology, and The Divine Comedy has certainly
left its marks on Nightwood, and not only on Dr. Matthew-Mighty-grain-
of-salt-Dante-O'Connor. However, an examination of Barnes's debt to
Dante, in this context, would only lead us right back to Augustine [and
Plato], and so I am, with some regret, stepping around the complicated
system of loans, bursaries and embezzlements--evident in O'Connor's
name--that constitute that specific debt.)14-
There is, too, a second reason for choosing these two texts, and
that is that, despite the lack of certain proof that Barnes read either,
there are certain similarities between Barnes's writing and the writings
of Augustine and Loyola. As Burke has pointed out, both Augustine and
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Barnes emphasize (by repetition) the same rhetorical figure for
conversion, the "turn". Both Loyola and Barnes use a practice of
composition (making a picture) as a function of the desiring (converting)
subject.'
How then do I seek Thee, 0 Lord? For when I
seek Thee, my God, I seek the blessed life
How then do I seek the blessed life?
[-..] Is it by remembrance as though I had
forgotten it, yet still retained that Ihad
forgotten it? Is not the blessed life that
which all desire, so that there is absolutely
none that does not desire it? Where have
they known it that they so desire it? where
seen it that they so love it? Truly we have
it, how, I know not.
MICA1STINE"€.
What then takes place in the soul, when it is
more delighted at finding or recovering the
things it loves, than if it had ever had them?
AUGUSTINE1
The doctrine of return or conversion is the
meaning of Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence,
i.e. that all knowledge is a recalling to
mind of what one once knew (in a previous
existence) but had forgotten. This doctrine
the Neoplatonists, and Augustine after them,
largely replaced by the notion of divine il-
lumination directly shining within the souL
HENRY CHADWICK1°
As regards Aug-ustine's Confessions the
most notable use of the vert-family is in the
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contrast between Book II, concerned with what
he calls his adolescent perversity in stealing
pears L.J, and Book VIII that describes his
conversion. Nora's turning to Robin in this
moment of their first meeting at the circus
is indeed a romantic passion analogous to the
religious passion 	 Dell Hymes, a former
student of mine [..J offered an excellent sug-
gestion when, in his paper on Nightwood, he
characterized Robin as a kind of "unmoved
mover" (the term that Aristotle applies to
God). It is the eromenon; the loved, a God
that moves us not by paternal or paternalis-
tic participation in our affairs, but purely
as an impassive destination for us to aim at,
like a target or beacon.
the idea of Robin as the "unmoved
mover" in connection with Nora's conversion
to perversion or inversion does help bring
out the sense in which Nora's passion is a
secular variant of the religious passion [....]
And, it all has to do with turning, turning
towards or turning away (conversion, perver-
sion, aversion).
True, the transforming of the religious
passion into the romantic passion makes for
quite paradoxical kinds of devotion and mar-
tyrdom. But I believe that once you get the
pattern in its simplicity, you can understand
how it can lead to alembications.
KENNETH BURKEle
Shall we try to "get the pattern in its simplicity"--at least to
start off with? Obviously, the specific concept of conversion that
underpins the above citations (each to each) is a particular version of
the concept of re-turning to an origin. Ode should recall, here, that
for Nora, Robin is the "self" and "like a relative found in another
generation" fp. 157].) And, that origin is the primary object of desire,
the eternal eromenon that precedes, is prior to in every sense, the
individuation of the lover/subject. Our desire is to re-turn to that
"bliss", that "blessed life", that we had once known (and still recall in
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the "extremity of memory" Cp. 1583) before our mortal present. This is
the structure at its simplest. We must add, though, to define more
clearly this structure, the concept of Free Will, for the condition of
our mortality is that we must choose to re-turn--God will not turn us.
We must also add the realization that conversion involves death, at
least a figurative death like Augustine's death of the "old self" or
Dante's entry into Hell, and that it thus involves a great risk to the
individual, to the subject (or seems to). Conversion may be as simple
and natural as the heliotrope's turn toward the sun, but it is neither
easy nor painless nor quickly accomplished. It involves a great deal of
work. (A great deal of writing? Augustine's conversion takes, at least,
two books, VII and VIII.) What should be noted at this particular point,
though, is that conversion is a turn--not a linear or progressive
movement from point A to point B (remember Dante's turn-around at the
centre of	 that the turn is motivated by desire--however enabled
by Free Will--, and that the desire is for a primary beloved or beloved
state that is also source or origin.
Before broaching the specific "turns" of Augustine's and Barnes's
con-versions, I would like to dabble a bit in etymology in order to
elicit the lineaments of a term that I have been/will be employing
compositely and variably without any concession to the possible vagaries
of translation. "Turn", of course, does not share the etymological root
of the -vert family of terms--although vertere is usually translated as
'to turn'--but has its origin in the designation of a particular
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instrument--the lathe or tornus, the latter term descended from the
Greek Topvoc, compasses. (Vertere emerges in English in terms like
"writhe", "wrist", "wreathe", "wrest", etc.) It might be said that 'to
turn' is, in a certain sense, laden with a specificity that seems foreign
to vertere 'to turn', as well as being the action of changing course or
direction, or of simply altering, is also "to move round on an axis or
about a centre" (OED), revolving or rotating on a fixed support, in the
process of making something or--harking back to the compasses--
signifying or measuring something. To translate vertene, then, as 'to
turn' is to contaminate the prior term, to involve vertere with revolvere
and, perhaps, fingena This contamination may be unavoidable,
particularly in the context of this thesis which, as it is written in
English, only comes to vertere through 'to turn', but it is not
necessarily detrimental. (We might note that it doesn't seem to bother
Burke in the least.) It might, even, be seen as a fortuitous, if
somewhat accidental, foregrounding of an already latent complicity
between vertere and revo/vere in the "turning" of the individual soul or
mind or eye (the "orbit of L.J light" or of sight, as Night wood has it
[p. 54]). Fortuitous or not, this composition is exploited in Night wood
as characters turn in relation to a seemingly fixed object of desire,
much as Augustine turns in relation to a fixity, a centre or sun, that is
the One (or Three in One) of a Christianity informed by Platonism.
We need to make one more detour through this not-quite-determinate
substantive/verb 'turn'. We need to note that within the workings of
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theological discourse, the turn is properly a metaphor in itself. Not
only is it a translation of the generic term "trope", it is also already
a trope as metaphor, or even as catachresis, in that it is a natural
word, in the Aristotelian sense, substituting for a word (if there is
one) signifying an analogous spiritual movement. The soul makes a
metaphoric turn toward or away from God, toward or away from a
metaphoric Light. This realization of the complicity of metaphor in the
designation of a spiritual movement provokes a question of priority
(which came first, the concept or the metaphor?) that so far exceeds the
scope of this thesis that it cannot be addressed here. 2° The
possibility of that question, however, is in a particular way pertinent
to this study because such a possibility, such a realization of
metaphor's possible responsibility in the development of seemingly
natural theological concepts, problematizes the notion of a transparency
of language that would prohibit a discussion of theological and fictional
discourses on the same ground (that of rhetoric?). In other words, we
can consider the theological and the fictional discourses within the
same context if we annul the privilege assigned to the theological
discourse (as revelation, as a window through which Truth may be seen)
over the fictional (as the not-real, the made-up, and thus inherently
metaphorical) by seeing both discourses grounded or dependent upon
metaphor, upon the turn of language. (Agl .a.in, I am indicating the same
adjustment of a distinction between the literal and the figurative that I
indicated in Chapter Three.) At this point, we are less concerned with
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the Truth than with a certain tropaic structure. And, at this point, we
turn to that structure.
In The Rhetoric of Religion, Burke pays considerable attention to
Augustine's use, in The Confessions, of the '" -vert family' of terms", of
the (playful?) contrast between perversion and conversion. 21 This use
is so extensive that Burke is later led to remark, in his essay on
Nightwood, that "I sometimes wonder whether the good Bishop of Hippo
could have ever written that work were it not for the many Latin words
that grow from this root, meaning Iturn.".22 Certainly, the Augustinian
text is replete with -versions and turnings: it might even be said that
the entire text hinges on the prefixed breach between perversion and
conversion.
Why then art thou perverted to follow thy
flesh? Let it be converted and follow
thee.ma;
This bi-partite -version, this turn, between a perverted following
of the flesh (which takes life only from the spirit) and a converted
following of the spirit Which takes life from God), functions as a
paradigm of the text's general narrative movement. The Confessions
follows Augustine's perverted course, then turns to follow his conversion
(Books VII and VIII) through to a summation (BkKAcs X - XIII) that is,
essentially, an analysis of that progress and the purpose of the text.
Of course, we should not be surprised by either the precise turn of the
narrative or the playful use of the -vert family of terms in
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establishing essential comparisons. After all, Augustine was a
rhetorician before he was a Christian. (It is interesting that Augustine
resigned from the profession of rhetoric as he was baptized into the
church.) And it should not be surprising to find at the end of Book IV,
just before the ultimate Book of the first (perverse) half of the text in
which he describes his discovery of the "fallacy" of Manichaeism and his
attendance at the lectures of St. Ambrose (following which he 'began to
return to his right mind"), this nova of -vert
Our good ever lives with Thee; but when we
turn away from thence we are perverted Let
us now, 0 Lord, return, that we may not be
overturned because with Thee our good lives
without decay, which good art Thou alone; nor
need we fear, lest there be no place whither
to return, because we fell from it: for
through our absence, our mansion fell not--
Thy eternity.24-;
Here, we have the kernel of what is already a neoplatonic Christian
doctrine. "Our good ever lives with [God)" "which good [is God] alone":
as God is good, and as God is the creator (the source, the fountainhead),
everything that springs from God (which is every thing) is, in its
essence, good--and evil is no more than the turning away from or
withdrawal of good. This is, of course, Augustine's answer to the
theoretical problem of continuing evil in God's creation, and it is also
his refutation of the Manichean heresy of an essential and infinite
struggle between the two antipodal principles. Augustine could not
finally reconcile his experience of a loving God with the concept of a
God who could create evil; thus he adopted, principally from the works of
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Plotinus, and elaborated this doctrine of good and the absence of good
(which is not properly absence because good is always "there" to be
returned to) that is, at once, the doctrinal annulment of evil as an
active (threatening) principle and the rhetorical suppression of the
problematic term in that seemingly prehistoric binary opposition
Good/Evil As Burke notes, "it all has to do with turning": we cannot
escape the realization of the metaphor's complicity in this masterful,
repressive system. (Could there, indeed, be a concept of good and the
absence of good were it not for this metaphor? What, if not the turn,
would make the entire structure of the concept possible?) Augustine
unfolds his theology through a substitutive series of prefixes for the
root -vert: in other words, the root of his doctrine (as written text,
as writing) is the -vert, the turn, the trope. This initiating metaphor
enables the suppression of, or mastery over, evil by providing a detour
(a substitute route) or turn-about that circumvents and annuls the
necessity of dealing with Evil as an obstacle. It supplies (supplements)
another more direct or amenable way of "getting to the truth".'s
This particular Neoplatonic (supplemental) route around the problem
of persistent evil has proved tenacious. Ten centuries after The
Confessions were made, Dante described "the simple soul" as born "pure
In ignorance" but with a propensity for "turnEing] to anything it likes"
unless properly guided by "Free Will!". To "turn[1 toward evil or
pursue[]/ some good with not enough or too much zeal" is to "turnE] on
[the] Creator", to not be "fixed on the eternal Good". 26 (Note the
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equilibration of "turning to evil" and "pursuing good improperly".) Six
centuries later, Cardinal Newman wrote, with assurance: "If evil is not
from God, as assuredly it is not, this is because evil has no substance
of its own, but is only the defect, excess, perversion, or corruption of
that which has."27. It might well be said that for the past seventeen
hundred years (at least), a certain influential branch of Christianity
has been busily (incessantly) writing the concept of an active,
autonomous Evil out of the system, literally writing it into an absence,
turning it into a void.
Of course, on one level of this binary system, what is also being
written into absence is that which, in the Platonic consideration, has
never had any "substance of its own", at least not a formed and
therefore visible substance, in the solar projection that guarantees
truth and existence.
Therefore, if they shall be deprived of all
good, they will entirely cease to be.2'3
For both Augustine and Plato, perception of truth begins with the bodily
senses, especially with sight. According to Plato,
L.J the true analogy of this indwelling
power in the soul and the instrument whereby
each of us apprehends is that of an eye that
could not be converted to the light from the
darkness except by turning the whole body.
Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned
around from the world of becoming together
with the entire soul [...] until the soul is
able to endure the contemplation of essence
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and the brightest region of being
E.-1 there might be an art, the art of
the speediest and most effective shifting or
conversion of the soul L..] on the assumption
that it possesses vision but does not rightly
direct it.2
The journey from Plato's cave is marked by a progressive series of
"sightings" enabled by turning the body and by, first, the fire in the
cave, then the more revelatory light of day--in which, first, shadows,
then reflections in water, then objects themselves are seen in order
that the eye not be blinded too suddenly by too much light—, then the
reflected light in the moon and the stars (note the persistent
ascension) before the sun itself may be seen. This ultimate sight, too
great for physical eyes , which would be destroyed in the sighting, can
only take place metaphorically, in the meta-physical, in the Meal. It
marks the telos of the Platonic conversion from error (insufficient
sight) to truth (the unreflected light of the metaphorical solar origin),
a truth which is only apprehended briefly before the convert returns to
his new (enlightened) place in the cave from whence he shall desire only
the truth as he has seen it. For Augustine, not surprisingly, the
journey (that is always a return journey) begins with the bodily senses
and rises to a sighting beyond the bearing of physical sight:
Yet there dwelt with me a remembrance of Thee;
nor did I in anyway doubt that there was One
to whom I might cleave	 thus by degrees,
I passed from bodies to the soul, which per-
ceives through the senses of the body; and
thence to its inward faculty, to which the
bodily senses communicate external things t.-1
and thence further to the reasoning faculty
L.J And when this found itself in me also
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to be a changeable thing, it raised itself up
to its own understanding...that so it might
discover what that light was, by which it was
bedewed L...] And thus with the flash of one
trembling glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS.
And then I saw Thy "invisible things under-
stood by the things which are made" (Rom. i.,
20). But I lacked strength to fix my gaze
thereon; and my weakness being struck back,
I returned to my accustomed ways bearing with
me (...] longing for that, the scent of which
I had perceived.°
Although the other senses are, at certain points, involved in these
processes of conversion, it is sight that is complicit with truth. Sight
is enabled by light, the light that is truth and God and sun and Father
and Good. In the solar light, in the lightning "flash of one trembling
glance", THAT WHICH IS is apprehended. In turning toward that light, for
an instant, the convert sees everything-. Or does he? In the singular
focus of that gaze, is not some thing left out, that which is left
behind, the shadow stretched behind the sun-turned convert, the back of
the head, the night? What is more, in this beginning of conversion that
is a re-turn to a solar origin, is not some thing eclipsed: that other
origin of mortal being, that which beyond the orbit of light remains--
peripheral, obtuse and formless--in the dark? Of course, we cannot
speak for God, but for the mortal being, the totality of the Father as
All can only be thought in the obliteration of the matrical, in the
erasing of the memory of the matrical origin which will henceforth be
temporal, corrupt, and "Evil" or sublated into an ideal form--the woman
when she is most, for Plato, like a man; the immaculate Virgin;
Augustine's mother.31 Conversion, then, at least in Plato, Augustine,
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and--naturally enough--Dante, is also a (figurative) dying to/of the
material origin, a tropaic aversion--the tropaic aversion that creates
"Mary", "Monica", and "Beatrice"--from that truly deathly chaos that must
be rendered null and void lest man recall his brutal thrusting-out from
that (semiotic) bliss to which there can be no return.
(I interpolate, here at the point of no re-turn, the illicit
obstetrician Dr. Matthew Mighty-grain-of-salt-Dante-O'Connor's inverted
speculation on this "grave mistake of nature":
"How more tidy had it been to have been born
old and have aged into a child, brought final-
ly to the brink, not of the grave, but of the
womb; in our age bred up into infants search-
ing for a womb to crawl into, not be made to
walk loth the gingerly dust of death, but to
find a moist gillflirted way. And a funny
sight it would be to see us going to our
separate lairs at the end of the day, women
wincing with terror, not daring to set foot
to the street for fear of it."(p. 98-99)
But then, this is a speculation made in the dead of night, and it is a
laughing matter.)
Seriously though, for the sake of the solar system, this other
origin must be absent. But, how is this absence written? Recall Dante's
"turnEl toward evil or pursuellksome good with not enough or too much
zeal" and Newman's "evil L..] is only the defect, excess, perversion, or
corruption of that which has" substance. In other words, this absence is
written as both the "not enough" (the less than, defect, corruption) and
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the "too much" (the more than, excess, the supplement) of the Good
(substance, presence, meaning), which brings us to a curious (possible)
complication of the Christian tale for if there is anything that is both
"not enough" and "too much" in the Platonic system of propriety, it is
writing itself, the "not enough" of presence and the "too much" of
possible meaning that obscure the Proper. If writing is that which
enables the subordination of evil to an autonomous principle of good, it
is also, at the same time, evil itself. Here, we have stumbled, perhaps,
on a systemic blind spot of the predominantly Neoplatonic Christianity
that would treat of writing as a transparent medium of the truth in one
instant and as the perversion of meaning through "inscription in dead
material" in the next. Of course, there is good writing (God's writing
on the wall, on the heart, on tablets of stone) and bad writing (too
much rhetoric, style)--It all depends on what that writing is turned to
or turned by--; but what of the writing of the turn itself, of writing
as con-, per-, in-version? If the turn has been used (literally and
metaphorically) in a certain writing that, although it declares itself
transparent, is yet materially inscribed, is it not possible to read it as
writing (to read it in its so-called "evil" or criminal sense), thus
shaking it at the point of its fixture in the divinely inspired hegemony
of signification?
It is, I would argue, just this sort of "reading" that Night wood
gives to the turn, by foregrounding it in an excessive use, making it
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"too ramil", while rendering it, often, "not enough", a verb without a
proper object.
At that moment Nora turned. (1). 54; emphasis
added)
"LA the Great Enigma can't be thought of
unless you turn the head the other way, and
come upon thinking with the eye that you fear,
which is called the back of the head; it's
the one we use when looking at the beloved
in a dark place, and she is a long time coming
from a great way." (1). 83)
And it all has to do with turning, turning
towards or turning away (conversion, perver-
sion, aversion).
Once alerted to this term and its "flaring forth" in crucial
passages, we can begin to see it as a trigger, a term which appears to
be setting the text in motion. It is everywhere, in its various
grammatical and etymologically related forms, from the first 'Turning" on
the opening page,
Turning-upon this field, which shook to
the clatter of morning horses in the street
beyond, with the gross splendour of a general
saluting the flag, she named him Felix, thrust
him from her, and died. (1). 1; emphasis added)
to the "turned" of the last paragraph,
The dog, quivering in every muscle, sprang
back L..] moved backward, back, as she came
on, whimpering too, claming forward, her head
turned completely sideways, grinning and whim-
pering	 He ran this way and that, low
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down in his throat crying, and she grinning
and crying with him; crying in shorter and
shorter spaces, moving head to head, until
she gave up, lying out, her hands beside her,
her face turned and weeping
(p. 170; emphasis added)
Turning towards, turning away from, turning into, and being turned:
these turns constitute, perhaps, the principal narrative action. The
paradigmatic nova of turns that Burke, in his essay, wishes to cite but
can't--"since permission to quote was not obtainable from Miss Barnes," a
refusal that turned a citation into a blank space, an enigma--is as
foLlows:32
A girl sitting beside Nora took out a cig-
arette and lit it; her hands shook and Nora
turned to look at her; she looked at her sud-
denly because the animals going around and
around the ring, all but climbed over at that
point. They did not seem to see the girl,
but as their dusty eyes moved past, the orbit
of their light seemed to turn on her. At that
moment Nora turned
(-1 Then as one powerful lioness came
to the turn of the bars, exactly opposite the
girl., she turned her furious great head with
its yellow eyes afire and went down, her paws
thrust through the bars and L.] she regarded
the girl (...J (1). 54; emphasis added)
As Burke notes, this nova appears "just at the point where Nora first •
meets Robin", the point at which Nora's "conversion to perversion" begins.
Ode should note that this point is set in a "circus", a carnivalesque
site.) Certainly, all the tropes of Platonic/Augustinian conversion are
here: the turn (in abundance), light, the eye(s) and the gaze, the
suddenness of the glance. But is there not, also, a different reading, a
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different writing, of these conversion tropes here in the circus ring?
Look at the light -ing. For Augustine, as for Plato, there is only one
Light - -all other lights are but shadows of that Light. Here, though, in
Nightwood, there is no singular Light, but rather a variety of different
lights: the lighting of the cigarette that first catches Norais
attention; the orbital (solar?) "light" of the animals' "dusty eyes"; and
the "yellow eyes afire" (again, solar?) of the lioness. And these
(lesser?) lights are not reflections--they may be shadowy, the lights of
"dusty eyes", but they originate in those eyes, in the lighting of the
cigarette, in the fire-in-the-eyes of the lioness, suggesting no other,
singular origin. We should also note that these lights spring from the
girl (the girl's action), the beasts, and the female beast - -a variety of
origins that seem to exclude, specifically, the male and the spirituaL
There are many original lights in this round arena, but no sun, no
Father. And, as there is an excessive number of lights in this absence
of One Light, so is there an excessive number of gazes in the absence of
the "one trembling glance". Here, the gazes are, at the very least,
doubled and come from, at least, two directions: the woman gazes upon
the girl from without the ring, the centre; the beasts gaze upon the
girl from within the ring/centre. Unlike the singular gaze of the
subject/convert CSC Paul, Augustine) that marks or constitutes the
initial crisis of Pauline/Augustinian conversion (the subject gazing at
the overwhelming light), the gaze here is doubled, a doubling which
simultaneously subverts the distinctions between the beast and the
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spirit and between exterior and interior that support the Pauline
structure (remember Augustine's movement inward to find the Light).
The end of Nora's affair with Robin is marked by a similar nova
when Nora, following a dream in which "Robin and she, in their extremity,
were [like] a pair of opera glasses turned to the wrong end" (a
significant mis-reflection)(p. 62; emphasis added), awakes to look out of
her window and see Robin and Jenny caught in an embrace:
Waking, she began to waik again, and look-
ing out into the garden in the faint light of
dawn, she saw a double shadow falling from the
statue, as if it were multiplying, and think-
ing perhaps this was Robin, she called and was
not answered. Standing motionless, straining
her eyes, she saw emerge from the darkness the
light of Robin's eyes the fear in them deve-
loping their luminosity until, by the intensity
of their double regard, Robin's eyes and hers
met. So they gazed at each other. As if that
light had the power to bring what was dreaded
into the zone of their catastrophe, Nora saw
the body of another woman swim up into the
statue's obscurity, with head hung down, that
the added eyes might not augment the illumina-
Liar; her arms about Robin's neck, her body
pressed to Robin's, her legs slackened in the
hang of the embrace.
Unable to turn her eyes away, incapable of
speech, experiencing a sensation of evil, com-
plete and dismembering; Nora fell to her knees,
so that her eyes were not withdrawn by her voli-
tion, but dropped from their orbit by the fal-
ling of her body: Her chin on the sill she
knelt, thinking, "Now they will not hold to-
gether", feeling that if she turned away from
what Robin was doing, the design would break
and melt back into Robin alone. She closed
her eyes, and at that moment she knew an awful
happiness Robin, like something dormant,
was protected, moved out of death's way by
the successive arms of women; but as she closed
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her eyes, Nora said .whr with the intolerable
automatism of the last -Aim- in a body struck
at the moment of its final breath. (1). 64)
Like St. Paul and St. Augustine, Nora "wakes to see" "THAT WHICH IS"
In "one trembling glance". Then, unable to bear the sight (of so much
light, of so much evil), her "weakness being struck back", she falls back,
and "at that moment she knew an awful happiness"--the terrible happiness
that will sustain her desire through another 106 pages of text until she
finds Robin again.	 Here, in this dark "garden" (paradisial?,
primordial?), in this "zone of L..] catastrophe" (the turn of crisis, the
subversive turn), where everything is, at least, doubled--lights, shadows,
gazes, bodies--, Nora (No Re (no god], Nor a [neither this nor that]) sees
THAT WHICH IS, and THAT WHICH IS is dreadful, "awful", "evil, complete and
dismembering'. But then, this is a mother's garden, signified by the
obscuring "statue" that is "a fountain figure, a tall granite woman
bending forward with lifted head; one hand L.J held over the pelvic
round as if to warn a child who goes incautiously' (p. 55), and we
should remember that, according to Platonic phallocentrism, the natural
realm of the metrical is the realm of the flesh, of corruption and decay.
In the "pelvic round" of this "garden" there is no significant phallus
(of the Father, the Origin) but an other sort of "fountain figure", a
"tall granite" figure that is definitely material, matrical and obscuring.
This metrical scene is not the scene of wholeness, of at-one-ment, for
it is both "complete and dismembering", entire and fragmenting (a very
dangerous, catastrophic scene indeed): it is, in short, "evil", the evil
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about which Pauline doctrine has made a detour which is not followed by
this text.33
NAghtwood does follow the conversive turn of The	 fessiorisj and
of Pauline (Platonic) doctrine in general, but executes, at a critical
moment, before the detour sign, a certain swerve. It takes an "obstetric
line" that suggests an other, "evil", route, a route that traces the
severing (dismembering) of the umbilicus. To re-turn on the cata-
strophic "obstetric line" is not to follow completely the hello-tropic
version. Dante begins his conversion in the "selva oscura", the dark
wood. Augustine begins his conversion in the darkness of error, of
ignorance. Plato's cavedweller begins his conversion in the cave. But
Nora Flood (swelling flux, destructive flow) begins her conversion on a
hill: 'the only woman of the last century who could go up a hill with
the Seventh Day Adventists and confound the seventh day--with a muscle
In her heart so passionate that she made the seventh day immediate" (1).
52). And, her conversive course takes her from this height, from belief
In the word, through a figurative death--through an "iih!" that signifies
simultaneously recognition, the final exhalation, and orgasm (that little
death)--, and through the night wherein her beloved lies (in both senses
of the word) hidden, the unsublated beloved who "carried the quality of
the 'way back' as animals do" (I). 40), before she finds Robin again in
the candlelit garden chapel. (This inverted movement is Burke's
paradoxical concept of a "transcendence downward".) However, "the
obstetric line" is not a simple inversion of the Augustinian turn, nor is
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it a re-turn to the womb predicated by Dr. O'Connor. For Augustine, the
Father waits eternally: "nor need we fear, lest there be no place
whither to return [..J for through our absence, our mansion fell not".
In other words, this source does not, in itself, disappear. However, in
Nightwood, there are two sources, real mothers (Hedvig and Robin), and
both "thrust from" them their children. Nora's conversion cannot
culminate in a re-subsumption in a one, for the "prehistoric" and
childbearing original--Robin--has withdrawn and obscured itself, cut
itself off from its offspring and from its lover.
Yet, despite this severing, something goes on, continues. In the
absence (or not enough) of Origin, the mother is doubled (made too
much). Caught in the half-light of the garden, Nora sees at least two
mothers in the "double shadow"--the rejecting mother (Robin) and the
figure (image/ trope) of a nurturing, enwombing mother (the statue with
its "pelvic round" and its (notably figurative--"as if"] warning to "a
child who goes incautiously"). The (refusing) mother is supplemented by
an imaging of matriarchal space that is substitutive and repetitive (the
"pelvic round", "the successive arms of women"), of which Nora is a part.
Although the mother (as Robin) is "dismembering", she can be made
complete in her imaging (as Nora, as the statue), can substitute for
herself an image of herself which can be repeated (as a primal scene)
forever. Which is, perhaps, why Nora imagines herself as Robin's mother
("my lover and my child" (p. 156]) while acknowledging that Robin is her
"self" too (p. 143, for example). This would account for the repeated
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foetal image of Robin as "something dormant", as a "fossil 1-1 intaglio
of her identity" maintained by "Nora's blood" (p. 56). In this doubled
reflection, the image of the (original, childbearing) mother is bourne as
a fossil foetus (dormant, perpetually deferred) in the imagining of
motherhood. In this doubled imaging, the con-version to the Origin is
rewritten in its "evil" sense, a sense that recuperates that which
Pauline doctrine has blinded itself to, that which can be seen only by
"the back of the head", the impossibility of recapturing the origin, and
the necessity of creating images (of tropiRg) in the face of that
impossibility. All that is left is the reading/writing of umbilical
traces:
"She sees her everywhere", [the doctor] added,
glancing at Nora as she passed into the dark.
"Out looking for what she's afraid to find--
Robin. There goes mother of mischief, running
about, trying to get the world home." (p. 61)
In The	 fessions the turn, the -vert, is meant to be subservient
to and in the service of a Truth that is beyond language (written or
spoken). It is a mere verb of a divine syntax Imitating the ideal
relationship of ideal subject and object, of the proper nouns--Man and
God, Son and Father. No matter that the writing of this transcendental
relationship emerges from a rhetorician's play with the root -vert or
that the emphasis on subject or predicate is also a repression of the
verb (one can't see the copula for the pillars), the turn has been
understood throughout the history of Platonic/Pauline metaphysics as a
useful metaphor on the syntactic path to unity. In the carnival play of
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Nightwood, however, this slave of divine syntax has broken its chains and
made a nuisance of itself by re-calling that bodily turning or turning
of the body (remember Plato's "except by turning the whole body') from
which the metaphor of the converting soul ascends and by re-calling the
possibility of an other turning (the generation of images/tropes), an
articulation, in the absence of Origin.
"The true good who meets the true evil (Holy
Mother of Mercy! are there any such?) learns
for the first time how to accept neither;
the face of the one tells the face of the
other the half of the story that both forgot."
(1). 173)
"Corruption is the Age of Time. It is the
body and blood of ecstasy, religion and love."
(1). 147)
"C iest le plaisir qui me bouleverse." (p.132)
And, now, we turn from the verb to the subject.
IL
A simple operation which myth attributes to
the Creator of the world, separating day,
night, man, woman, elements and species,




In his search for the particular Comedie
humaine Felix had come upon the odd. Conver-
sant with edicts and laws, folk story and
heresy, taster of rare wines, thumber of rarer
books and old wives' tales--tales of men who
became holy and of beasts that became damned--
read in all plans for fortifications and brid-
ges, given pause by all graveyards on all
roads, a pedant of many churches and castles,
his mind dimly reverberated to Madame de
Sevigne, Goethe, Loyola and Brantfte. But
Loyola sounded the deepest note; he was alone,
apart and single. A race that has fled its
generations from city to city has not found
the necessary time for the accumulation of
that toughness which produces ribaldry, nor,
after the crucifixion of its ideas, enough
forgetfulness in twenty centuries to create
legend. It takes a Christian, standing eter-
nally in the Jew's salvation, to blame himself
and to bring up from that depth charming and
fantastic superstitions through which the slow-
ly and tirelessly milling Jew once more becomes
the "collector" of his own past. His undoing
is never profitable until some goy has put it
back into such shape that it can again be of-
fered as a "sign". A Jew's undoing is never
his own, it is God's; his rehabilitation is
never his own, it is a Christian's. The Chris-
tian traffic in retribution has made the Jew's
history a commodity; it is the medium through
which he receives, at the necessary moment,
the serum of his own past that he may offer
it again as his blood. In this manner the Sew
participates in the two conditions; and in like
manner Felix took the breast of this wet nurse
whose milk was his being but which could never
be his birthright. (pp. 9-10; emphasis added)
The above paragraph lies between and connects the descriptions of
Felix Volkbein's obsession with the "noble past" and of his fascination
with the ignoble circus. An articulation between descriptions, it is
Itself articulated: the first part is a list of the *oddments" (mostly
literary and historical) that Felix has "collected" in his search for the
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Comedie huraaing the second part is an ironic, carnivalesque,
dissertation on "the Jew's history" (a "particular Camedie humane) and
the Christian's usurpation (fulfillment) of that history; and the two
parts are joined (and separated) by "Loyohi". "But Loyola sounded the
deepest note; he was alone, apart and single." This is a crucial
sentence not only because it stands at the crux of at least two
articulations (between the past and the circus, between the Jew's history
and Felbes odd collection), but also because its separate halves sound
two themes that reverberate throughout hrightwoodr—depth (the depths of
dreams, of the earth, of the body, of the unknown) and the singular or
solitary (adjectives describing, at some point, every character in the
text). Furthermore, not only does the sentence sound these themes, it
intensifies them superlatively. "Loyola" sounds the deepest note and is
trebly (most) solitary ("alone, apart and single"). But why this emphasis
on "Loyola'', who only appears in this paragraph? Why is "Loyola" being
"offered as a 'sign" of two of the text's critical themes, only to
disappear again into the more general term "Christian" before vanishing
from the narrative altogether?
It is worthwhile, I think, to focus on Loyola and his function in
this paragraph before going on to examine, on another level, Barnes's
assumption of St. Ignatius's "method of composition", because not only
will such a focus justify my interest in the conjunction of Barnes and
Loyola, it will also bring to light a particular scepticism that marks
all of Nightwood's perverse dealings with Christianity (the Church) and
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the Truth. In focussing on Loyola, I would like to suggest that one
historical "fact" not be forgotten: this passage was written in Europe
(perhaps in Paris, perhaps in Berlin), in the thirties, as Fascism was
fattening itself on the fodder of a common anti-Semitism. That
Nghtwood suggests that the predominant and privileged religion,
Christianity, is no more than a usurpation of a divinely sanctioned
Judaic privilege ("undoing" and "salvation") is, in itself, a subversive
gesture. The Christian (who is, perhaps, no more than a surrogate of
the Chosen People) is being held accountable for the sacrifice of (the
"offer-[ing] L.J of L.J blood"}--and, indeed, for the creation of--the
scapegoat Jew. In the light of the contemporary political, social and
religious prejudices, this was a damning and daring assignment of
accountability. It was also notice of an horrific irony: "traffic in
retribution", or the accountancy of retributive justice, is a cornerstone
of the Mosaic Law which Christ came to supplant with Faith. That the
eye-for-an-eye, pound-of-flesh-for-pound-of-flesh, code was adopted as
part of the enabling code of anti-semitism (the Jews being the
*murderers" of Christ) remains one of the shining examples of orthodox
Christian perversity. The Jew suffers retribution not only on account of
his own disobedience, but on account of a peculiarly displaced Christian
guilt as well. Nghtwood is pointedly anti-fascist, if we read fascism
as an ideology of sameness (one race, one social order, one Church, one
Signifier, one meaning) bent on the elimination of difference
(Jews/gypsies, homosexuals, heretics, women, the dialogical). Barnes
blatantly foregrounds everything that fascism cannot admit and
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carnivalizes the so-called norm by revealing it as perverse, tainted or
"deflowered".
But what, then, of Felies participation in this Christian
"superstition"? Why should the Wandering Jew be so intent on seeking
"his own disqualification", on establishing "an alibi for the blood"?
Partly, perhaps, because he is half-Jew, half-Christian, half-damned and
half-saved, and being neither completely one nor the other desires the
"privileged" state, the privileged half of his history (the idealized and
lost perfect parent, the Gentile mother) as the perfect state of
wholeness. We should note these operations of desire: substitutions,
images, representations or projections of an always unattainable primary
object of desire, the origin, the mother before identification, before the
splitting and articulation. Certainly, the (half-Jewish) son of a dead
mother is in need of a "wet nurse": that he should fix his desire, his
lips, upon the partially attainable but not rightful "breast" Of Mother
Church, of Robin Vote, of the noble past), fixing misapprehensions in the
place of the impossible primary object, is not, however, a peculiarity of
this character Felix. It is, rather, a fundamental peculiarity of desire
itself, for desire (which can never be satisfied and yet remain "desire")
instigates representations that can only ever be misapprehensions (the
object itself, primary or substitutive, necessarily being wholly or
partially absent, a gap or hole to be covered by a projection, an image).
"Strange, I had never seen the Baronin in
this light before", the Baron was saying, and
he crossed his knees. "If I should try to put
-209-
it into words, I mean how I did see her, it
would be incomprehensible, for the simple
reason that I find that I never did have a
really clear idea of her at the time. I had
an image of her, but that is not the same
thing. An image is a stop the mind makes
between uncertainties." (I). 111)
Between "uncertainties" (between primary and substitutive objects,
between subject and object of desire?) is a "stop" (a stop-gap?): the
"image"; the "intaglio" of the beloved's "identity" (1). 56); the "word" but
not its "alchemy" (1). 83), the signifier ("pet name" fp. 127]) sans
signified. (It seems rather convenient that a Viennese non-orthodox Jew
should make this primary distinction between the "image" and the "idea"
of the object of desire.) And, this "image" or "intaglio" or "pet name"
is a production of desire--the making of a "target" by the "fearful eye",
as O'Connor 'puts" it (I). 148)--by which it negates the absence of the
beloved. Desire, then, and its image-making faculty are the properties
of the displaced, the solitary, those who must "dazzle (their] own
estrangement" (13. 11). The "estranged" are often the most bewitched.
Desire perpetuates itself by illusion: Felies (Christian) desire is
perpetuated by the trickery and illusions of the theatre and the circus
ring.
The people of the theatre and the ring
were for [Felix] as dramatic and as monstrous
as a consignment on which he could never bid.
That he haunted them as persistently as he did
was evidence of something in his nature that
was turning Christian (1). 12; emphasis added)
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At this point, we should return to Loyola and ask what Loyola has
to do with "estrangement" and dazzlement. There never was, perhaps, a
lover (unless it was Augustine) more intent than Loyola on maintaining
his estrangement, by continually reminding himself of his inadequacy, by
methodically composing "images" or "signs" to mediate that estrangement
between the inadequate and his God. As Roland Barthes points out, "the
area of the Exercises is essentially that of the exchanged sign" between
God and Man.3s This area, this gap wherein the exchange of signs takes
place, is never bridged in the Exercise there is no mystic or ecstatic
union with the divinity, no transcending of the exercitant's identity.
And the "articulation current" of this exchange of signs "is that of a
question and an answer", or at least a question on the presumption of a
possible answer that perhaps never comes. (Loyola, in his journal as
Barthes notes, comes to "the final and difficult fruit of ascesis E..J the
reverential acceptance of God's silence".) 	 The interrogative structure
presupposes a distance (separation) between the subject and object of
interrogation; it also presupposes uncertainties (the lack of pre-
knowledge of the answer or of God's will in the matter of election--
"which way should I choose?" or "which way would God have me choose?").
The Ignatian interrogative structure is also definitively subjective:
the exercitant must be "in retreat"; he must be minimally instructed so
that he may "through his own reasoning' enjoy "greater spiritual relish
and fruit, than if he who gives the Exercises had fully explained and
developed the meaning"; 7 he must, in composing an image for
contemplation, "see with the eye of the imagination", the inward eye;3e.
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he must "ask for an interior sense" of that upon which he would meditate
(the pain of the suffering in hell, etc.) For the proper questions to be
posed, the Ignatian subject must be "alone, apart and single": alone
among men; apart from God; and singularly within his own imagination.
Certainly, the separations marking out the Ignatian subject also
mark out, albeit profanely, this character Felix--"the accumulated and
single [..J huntfing] down his own disqualification, rearticulating the
bones of Imperial Courts long forgotten" (p. 9) much as Loyola hunts
down his own sins and rearticulates the scenes of the Christian
narrative in order to place himself, as image, on the periphery of each
scene and thus stop the gap forced by time (history) and sin. (Can we
not see, in each of these instances, an analogue to the active nostalgia
for a primal whole, an origin before/above the separation and
articulation?) Felix asks questions--of Robin, the press, the Pope--and
receives no answers. "He expected none. He wrote to clear some doubt
in his mind" ( 1). 109). Writing "to clear some doubt", to stop somewhere
between the uncertainties, about his son's election--and we should note
that one of the aims of the Exercises is to clear the mind of doubts
that inhibit the making of an election--, Felix proceeds in the Ignatian
manner, "indifferently" comparing (from the separate, objective position)
"Franciscan monks and French priests" (13. 108) and "the very different
confessional states" of Italy and France ( 1). 109). There is a great deal
of Ignatius in Felix, however inappropriate a vessel this accumulated
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character might be (and here we might detect a carnivalesque play in the
misalignment of Jesuit theory and Jewish pseudo-aristocracy).
But we must (recalling the carnivalesque ambiguity of Night wood) be
careful not to confine the constellation of Ignatian themes and practices
to Felix. As I noted before, singularity or solitariness marks every
character in the text: O'Connor is "pathetic and alone", "the single and
beholden bird" at "the holy water stoup" (1). 29); Robin is "alone and
engrossed" (1). 45), "alone, lost and conspicuous" (13. 46); Nora is the
"singular" "body falling" (13. 51); Jenny, who "could never be part of" her
time, is the "one person E.../ missing the importance of the moment" (1).
67). All are "lost", in all that that adjective connotes, separated, dis-
membered; all, in some fashion, ask questions that will not or cannot be
answered and accommodate their expectations to those possible "zeroes"
of signification, the echo and the silence ("she called and was not
answered", for example cp. 641); all compose, or attempt to compose,
"pictures", either as figures or as image-makers or as both
simultaneously.4-°
 It might be said that each character (with the
notable exception of O'Connor?) is a carnivalized composition of a proper
Ignatian subject, This subject, who is simultaneously observing and
observed (for the exercitant is still always observed by the "director",
who attunes the exercises to the exercitant's needs), seeks to make an
election (Vote-ing, as it were). He seeks to become (Christian, human,
animal) somethirw in relation to that which is desired, to become that
which is desired, and thus obliterate the separation that marks out the
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arena of desire. And, why is O'Connor--he who is closest to Loyola in
relative status and in religion--a possible exception? Perhaps because
O'Connor, the "man with a prehistoric memory" (x 164) who was "dead in
the beginning" (i 152), is on the other side of election and desire,
where separation is simultaneously acknowledged and mourned as
necessity, where the nostalgia for an original or primal wholeness is
repudiated ("now nothing, but wrath and weeping!" Cp. 1667), where
rhetoric, narrative, is but the trace of an absent desire/origin.
"Oh, for God's sweet sake, couldn't you
stand not learning your lesson? Because the
lesson we learn is always by giving death and
a sword to our lover. You are full to the
brim with pride, but I am an empty pot going
forward, saying my prayers in a dark place;
because I know no one loves, I, least of all,
and that no one loves me, that's what makes
most people so passionate and bright, because
they want to love and be loved, when there is
only a bit of lying in the ear to make the ear
forget what time is compiling [....3"
(14). 146-147)
Is it not possible to read this indifferent "empty pot [...] saying [his]
prayers in a dark place" as some sort of inverse realization of an
Ignatian ideal? His soul, having been exercised, having "rid itself of
all inordinate affections", A" is a perfect Ignatian cypher, the
indifferent void between question and answer.
There is, then, on one level, a certain perverse propriety in the
citing of Loyola as an epitome of the aloneness marking the characters
of this text. Loyola, however, strikes yet deeper than that: on an
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other, less obvious, level, the Ignatian system of composition seems to
be informing the composition in/of Night wood itself in at least two
ways: the concept of "making a picture" and the manner of picture-
making.
One of the principal methods (the "first prelude") of
"contemplation" in The Spiritual Exercises is the "composition" of scenes
with "the eye of the imagination". Loyola gives precise instructions for
this process of composition in the Fifth Exercise of the First Week:
The first point will be to see with the
eyes of the imagination those great fires,
and the souls as it were in bodies of fire.
The second, to hear with the ears the wail-
ings, the groans, the cries, the blasphemies
against Christ our Lord, and against all His
saints.
The third, to smell with the sense of smell
the smoke, the brimstone, the filth and the
corruption.
The fourth, to taste with the sense of
taste bitter things, such as tears, sadness
and the worm of conscience.
The fifth, to feel with the sense of touch
how those fires touch and burn the souls.4-2
This "composition of place", this first prelude making way for a
second which is always "to ask for that which I desire" Os desire which
is specific to the theme of the composition), depends upon a distinction
of the senses, a virtual dividing up (dismembering?) of the subject into
its five senses, five body parts. The images that such a process evokes
are themselves concrete, substantial. The body, it seems, always marks
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the limits of Ignatian composition, even when the theme to be meditated
on is abstract:
In a meditation on an invisible thing, such
as the present meditation on sins, the compo-
sition will be to see with the eyes of the
imagination and to consider that my soul is
imprisoned in this corruptible body, and my
whole compound self in this vale (of misery]
as in exile among brute beasts; I say my whole
self, composed of soul and body.43
The body is the limit of, the wall around, the soul as the realm of
"brute beasts", of corporeality and mortality, marks the borders of the
"whole self" Os notably split self), which is why the body, as exterior,
must be chastised or caused "sensible pain" "in satisfaction for past
sins" (of both body and soul) and why the position of the body (thus
determining the position of the soul in its humility) in contemplation is
crucial:
f...1 one or two paces from the place in which
I am about to contemplate or meditate I will
stand for the space of an Our Father, with my
mind raised on high, considering how God our
Lord sees me, etc I 	 3
LA to enter upon the contemplation, at
one time kneeling, at another prostrate on the
ground, or lying face upwards, or seated, or
standing, always intent on seeking that which
I desire I-3 if kneeling I find that which
I desire, I will not change to another posi-
tion; if prostrate, in like manner, etc [.•••].44
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Not only is the (articulated) subject bound by an insistent
corporeality, the objects of contemplation, whether animate or inanimate,
mortal or divine, are pictured or composed as bodily images:
The first point is to see the persons on
either side: first, those on the face of the
earth, so varied in dress and bearing, some
white and other black; some in peace, and
others at war f--] some being born, others
dying, etc.
Secondly, to see and consider the three di-
vine Persons as on the royal seat or throne
of the divine Majesty, how they behold the
whole face and circuit of the earth L.-3
It will be here to see with the eyes of the
imagination the road from Nazareth to Bethlehem,
considering its length or breadth, and whether
it be level or goes through valleys L...] to
see our Lady, and S. Joseph, and the maid-
servant, and the Infant Jesus after He is born,
behaving myself as a poor and unworthy little
servant L..] ministering to them in their
necessities as though I were present there
L.J then to reflect on myself in order to
derive some profit.4-s
The material or body--its articulations, faculties and positions--forms
the precise arena of Ignatian contemplation and composition. and, as
Barthes notes, the human body is "of course" 'the basis, the force of the
materiality, the immediate total of desire", being both the guarantee of
separation and the focus of acquisition.
	
Is this not also the arena
of Nightwoods composition?
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Every character in this text is de-scribed in fragments: eyes,
mouths, heads, necks, bellies, legs, hands and feet, skin, postures,
gestures, clothes are run through in description, as though each
character is, first and foremost, a body of articulated parts. From Nora
to Jenny ("Only severed could any part of her have been called 'right'"
Cp. 657), from Frau Mann to the image of "Nikka", not a single character
is pictured without this articulation (and every character and almost
every figure are pictured). It might prove profitable to adopt, if
somewhat out of context, Scott's term "tableau" and suggest that each
character is, in a particular sense, a tableau or a composite and
material scene of articulated parts--a visible space Os photograph, a
paragraph, a page?). It might also prove profitable to reconsider the
initial tableau of Robin, that common object of desire:
On a bed, surrounded by a confusion of
potted plants, exotic palms and cut flowers,
faintly over-sung by the notes of unseen birds,
which seemed to have been forgotten--left with-
out the usual silencing cover, which, like
cloaks on funeral urns, are cast over their
cages at night by good housewives--half flung
off the support of the cushions from which,
in a moment of threatened consciousness she had
turned her head, lay the young woman, heavy and
dishevelled. Her legs, in white flannel trou-
sers, were spread as in a dance, the thick-
lacquered pumps looking too lively for the
arrested step. Her hands, long and beautiful,
lay on either side of her face.
The perfume that her body exhaled was of
the quality of that earth-flesh, fungi, which
smells of captured dampness and yet is so dry,
overcast with the odour of oil of amber, which
is an inner malady of the sea, making her seem
as if she had invaded a sleep incautious and
entire. Her flesh was the texture of plant
life, and beneath it one sensed a frame, broad,
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porous and sleep-worn, as if sleep were a decay
fishing her beneath the visible surface. About
her head there was an effulgence as of phos-
phorus glowing about the circumference of a
body of water--as if her life lay through her
in ungainly luminous deteriorations--the troub-
ling structure of the born somnambule, who
lives in two worlds--meet of child and desperado.
(14). 34-35)
Practically the entire Ignatian system of composition operates in
this description of the "troubling structure of the born somnambule".
First, the place is composed--the bed, the plants, palms and flowers
(note this excessive practice of trebling, the trebly floral which later
becomes "a jungle" and "the wilderness" [p. 35]), and the birdsong, and
the "unseen birds" (the invisible presence which later becomes the owner
of the "set", an "unseen dompteur, half lord, half promoter" [p. 35]) are
given substance metonymically by reference to "cover" and "cages". Then,
the body is pictured--its position in the place, the head (most notably
"turned"), the legs, trousers, shoes, hands, "perfume", flesh, its visible
"effulgence" or aura. Finally, there is what might be called a
"profitable reflection", an intermediate interpretation of the specific
tableau ("the structure of the born somnambule") that asserts or assigns
Its value and meaning in the larger context (this exercise of NiThtwood).
Throughout the composition, four of the five senses are utilized: the
place and the body, with its visible "effulgence", are "seen"; the "unseen
birds" are "heard"; the "perfume" is "smelt"; and the "texture" of the
"flesh" is simultaneously "felt" and "seed". Crhe fifth, omitted, sense--
taste--is carried over to the paragraph concluding a digression on the
"woman who presents herself (...] as a 'picture" [p. 37]. I will be
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turning to this crucial digression and the deferred sense in a moment.)
The images are, for the most part, precise and concrete: even the
"effulgence" is figuratively rendered in concrete terms, "as of
phosphorous glowing about the circumference of a body of water" (and we
should make note of this "circumference of a body"). It might even be
suggested that this image of Robin is informed by the Ignatian theme of
the "corruptible body" which both imprisons the soul or life and is
imprisoned in the realm of "brute beasts" (the gv1ng1l4n the "set" of a
"half lord, half promoter" "over which one expects to hear the strains of
an orchestra of wood-winds render a serenade which will popularize the
wilderneselp. 35])."
Of course, the oppositional pairs soul/body,
spirituality/corporeality, and heaven/vale of brutes are among the
principal binary oppositions informing Christian theology (as Pauline
theology), and the assignment of the theme of the corruptible body, etc,
to the text of the Exercises alone could be made to seem most
unforgiveably reductive. However, there is this difference in the
discourse of the Exercises that distinguishes it from the general body
of Christian writings on these matters, and this difference is
constituted by what Barthes calls an "upward movement toward matter (...]
conducted in the manner of a conscious fantasy". The body, the material
proper, may be cast among "brute beasts", but it is still the "real
referent" that Ignatian discourse moves up to, the corporeality of
Christ, the materiality of the cross.
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Semiologically, the image always sweeps on
beyond the signified toward the pure material-
ity of the referent. Ignatius always follows
this flow, which attempts to found meaning on
matter and not on concept; placing himself
before the Cross (placing that body before the
Cross), he attempts to go beyond the signified
of the image (the Christian, universally medi-
tated meaning) to its referent, the material
Cross, this crossed wood whose circumstantial
attributes he attempts, through the imagining
senses, to perceive.4-a
Can we not see in Felbes " If—) how I did see her [...] I never did
have a really clear idea of her L.J I had an image of her s", some sense
of a gap between a signifier ("the image") and a real referent where a
signified ("clear idea of her") should be? In FeLbes case, the image
seems to be a substitute for an absent or impossible signified and, for
Felix, the referent is indeterminable. However, in one of Nora's
revelations to O'Connor, there is an attempt at sweeping past the
signified, or the gap where the signified should be, to a "real" site:
"Looking from (the girl seen through an open
door] to the Madonna behind the candles, I
knew that the image, to her, was what I had
been to Robin, not a saint at all, but a fixed
dismay, the space between the human and the
holy head, the arena of the "indecent" eternal.
At that moment I stood in the centre of ero-
ticism and death." (pp. 157-58)
Nora moves the "image" from "the Madonna behind the candles" to 'hi..That I
had been for Robin" (a signified) to what might be a "real" referent--
"the centre of eroticism and death". The image would go beyond the
(mistaken) signified, beyond the saint (the sublated/imaginary mother) or
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more correct signified, to the "centre of eroticism and death" which is
simultaneously the (matrical, Marian) body (that "real" locale of
eroticism and death) and the (imagining) "space" articulating the human
and the holy, the space of the "'indecent' eternal" which suggests an
other origin or source, a sort of material/eternal source (referent)
of/for the Marian image, like Ignatius's Cross. We might note, as well,
what is placed in this "space", "arena", "centre"--the "I". The "I" takes
the place of the "image", or is displaced into the image, becomes a
substitute image in the image of the "Madonna". (We should recall, here,
the imaginary nature of Nora's motherhood.) This, too, is broaching on
Ignatian practice, this positing of an "I" that "is not a person" properly
but an imaged subjectivity (a sort of Lacanian 'mirroring") in the
biblical scene of contemplation. 	 This would appear to be, perhaps,
another attempt at shortcircuitiRg a signifier-signified-referent path:
an attempt to place an "I" in the proximity of a real referent. However,
hrightwood also, in this "evil" writing of the Marian image, appears to be
sweeping that image beyond even a real referent to a "real", in the
Lacanian sense, lying beyond representation itself. At this point, I
return to the deferred sense, the "taste" that doesn't appear in the
initial description of Robin Vote.
The woman who presents herself to the spec-
tator as a "picture" forever arranged is, for
the contemplative mind, the chiefest danger.
Sometimes one meets a woman who is beast turn-
ing human. Such a person's every movement will
reduce to an image of a forgotten experience;
a mirage of an eternal wedding cast on the
racial memory; as insupportable a joy as would
be the vision of an eland coming down an aisle
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of trees, chapleted with orange blossoms and
bridal veil, a hoof raised in the economy of
fear, stepping in the trepidation of flesh
that will become myth; as the unicorn is neither
man nor beast deprived, but human hunger pres-
sing its breast to its prey.
Such a woman is the infected carrier of the
past: before her the structure of our head and
jaws ache--we feel that we could eat her, she
who is eaten death returning, for only then do
we put our face close to the blood on the lips
of our forefathers. (1). 37; emphasis added)
The image, in reduction, is being swept toward what appears a
"real" referent--a prehistoric, presymbolic "real"--in the possibility of
the taste of "blood". This is an "image of a forgotten experience", an
impossible image without a concept, as it were, without a signified or a
meaning in the rational, intelligible sense which is a function of re-
membering. It would seem to indicate a referent that is prior to the
Oedipal organization of the sexual instinct which, according to Freud,
informs the marriage alliances, etc, upon which human societies are
founded.s° Just beyond this hymeneal image, this obscuring "mirage of
an eternal wedding"--articulating (marrying, copulating) the beast and
the human, flesh and myth--lies an infectious past, "eaten death", the
"body" and "blood" eaten by our fore- fathers those (phallic) uni-corns
which are but (sexual, infant) "human hunger". Just beyond the reach of
this hymeneal image that the dangerous woman reduces for herself, to
stand for herself, is a "real" (original, female?) that "we feel we could
eat": the material, matrical body, "a sort of earth on which love feeds"
(I). 118). (We might profitably contrast this feeding with that posited
by Augustine, "L.J as if I heard this Thy voice from on high: 'I am the
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food of them that be full grown; grow and thou shalt feed upon me"', and
by St. Paul, "I have fed you with milk, and not with meat: for hitherto
ye were not able to bear it [...J", both of which suggest that eating of
the body or of meat is only for the adult." And, we might note, too,
that children are forbidden the communion--the eating and drinking of
Christ's body and blood--until they have reached an age of reason or can
rationally profit from instruction and confirmation. Nightwoods feeding
is a precise inversion of the Pauline metaphor.)
This (impossible) attempt to touch the "real" via the reduction to
an image implies the reduction of signifiers but this implication seems
to be a mirage itself. In this passage, the image that purports to be a
reduction, that would reduce that distance between signifier and
referent, is, in the proliferation of wedding significations, anything but
reduced. Instead of the strict reduction that is implied by the
movement of the image (bearing a subject) toward a "real" or referent,
there is a virtual explosion of signification, an excess of writing--in
effect, a "Metaphysical conceit" (in both senses of the phrase). This is,
apparently, "the chiefest danger" "for the contemplative mind" that would
reduce superfluity to a truth or to reach the truth: the attempt to
place the image with the "real" or true referent (an attempt always in
the imagination or in fantasy, for it is only there that "I" can "taste"
the "real") results in a conceit or a text or a highly structured
contemplative system--a writing. In short, the driving desire to recoup
the "real" or referent makes for a writing beyond which the real world
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recedes. As Dr. O'Connor says: "Even the contemplative life is only an
effort L.J to hide the body so the feet won't stick out" (i 134).
I have mentioned before, in this thesis, the repetitive (excessive)
nature of Nightwoods writing--the recurrence and/or clustering of
particular terms ("turn", "sleep", "decay", etc.). 	 And, in Chapter Three,
I considered the necessary economy of writing in which repetition (along
with deferment and reserve) plays its part. The Ignatian system is also
structured on repetition: each contemplation or composition repeats both
the prescribed order and a biblical or doctrinal scene; each exercise is,
in itself, infinitely repeatable. Such repetition is symptomatic of the
drive of desire toward the "real"--toward that which is "hidden" beyond
representation--and, in its consistent replaying of the image of a primal
or primary scene, it weaves "text"; It is by such textual
repetition/composition that the Ignatian conversion of will is enabled.
And, Ignatian conversion is, indeed, a conversion of the will to the Will
of God, a conversion that passes through a death of the subject of Free
Will which will henceforth be "indifferent", "as disposable as a corpse",
its will having become (the space of) God's WirL s This "indifference",
whether it be sensible and/or intelligible, is, according to Loyola,
"desiring and choosing only that which leads us directly to the end for
which we were created". And, the "end for which we were created" is, of
course, "to praise, reverence, and serve God" who, ta the perfectly
circular orbit of Pauline Christianity, is the origin:
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E.-) consider how God dwells in the creatures;
in the elements, giving them being; in the plants,
giving them growth; in the animals, giving them
sensation; in men, giving them understanding; and
so in me, giving me being, life, sensation, and
causing me to understand; likewise making of me a
temple, seeing that I am created in the likeness
and image of His divine MaJesty.°-
The persistent materiality of the Ignatian discourse is bent toward
an ultimate origin that, in its ideality, precludes both the metrical
(material) and difference. It is this ideal in-difference that Loyola
seeks beyond, or in spite of, the primal scene: to be one with God, to
be lost (as identity possessing Free Will) in the Joyousness of the
divine Will. Only God's in-dwelling gives matter being: without that
in-dwelling, there is no being of matter. In a certain sense, Loyola
would reach God through matter (this is Loyola's delightful practicality),
but that matter has no being, no "real"-ity, without God. There is, even
in Loyola, no other origin and no other end than the Father, and that
Father creates in His "likeness".
For all its likeness to the Ignatian system of composition,
Nghtwood takes, here at the point of origin, as we have seen already,
"the obstetric line". "'We were created'", reports Dr. O'Connor, 'that the
earth might be made sensible of her inhuman taste; and love that the
body might be so dear that even the earth should roar with it'" ( 1). 106),
thus offering a perverse causality of creation and love--we were created
that the material might be made conscious (of its materiality), and to
this end, we "love" (prairie, reverence) the "dear" body. Nightwoo4
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taking "the obstetric line.", in a certain sense, extends the swerve
upwards toward matter that Loyola initiate 's, taking it further toward
that other end which Loyola must cut off at the crucial point of
difference--the corruption and difference that is "the body and blood of
ecstasy, religion and love". In that end (which is no real end) is
presupposed a material origin, a primal scene that can only ever be
repeated in its image, never real-ized--except, perhaps (but then, who
knows?), in death, for "death" is but "'intimacy walking backward" (x
161). This is, perhaps, why, in Nightwoo4 "resurrection" is neither a
culmination nor a sublation but "the second duel", yet one more bout in
the ring.
Yet sometimes, going about the house, in passing
each other, they would fall into an agonized em-
brace, looking into each other's face, their two
heads in their four hands, so strained together
that the space that divided them seemed to be
thrusting them apart. Sometimes in these moments
of insurmountable grief Robin would make some
movement, use a peculiar turn of phrase not hab-
itual to her, innocent of betrayal, by which
Nora was informed that Robin had come from a
world to which she would return. To keep her
(in Robin there was this tragic longing to be
kept, knowing herself astray) Nora knew now that
there was no way but death. In death Robin would
belong to her. Death went with them, together
and alone; and with the torment and catastrophe,
thoughts of resurrection, the second duel.
L.J Nora spoke to herself: "In the
resurrect ion, when we come up looking backward
at each other, I shall know you only of all that
company. My ear shall turn in the socket of my
head; my eyeballs loosened where I am the whirl-
wind about that cashed expense, my foot stubborn
on the cast of your grave." In the doorway
Robin stood. "Don't wait for me," she said.
(pp. 58-59)
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This apocalyptic passage bears almost all the traces noted, in this
chapter, of AUghtwroods carnivalesque engagement with Pauline Christian
discourse in its Augustinian and Ignatian guises: the turn, which is
also only a "turn of phrase"; the unbridgeable "space between" and the
impossibility of at-one-ment; the doubled glance from the back of the
head ("looking backward at each other"); the composition of a picture
(Nora's resurrection scenario) as a function of so-called profane desire;
and the persistent materiality of images ("My ear [...] my eyeballs [...]
my foot") aimed toward an other end. At the very crucial point of
resurrection, upon the central tenet of Christian doctrine, the traces of
NAghtwoods "obstretic line" converge to bisect the Father's pregnant-
looking belly in an other economy of death (of "cashed expense") that
does not offer re-subsumpt ionin one origin/end but an acknowledgement
of irreparable severance. Nora imagines a perverse or carnivalesque
version of at-one-meat, but this version is itself subverted, doubly-
carnivalized, by the other's supplemental and uncontextual response:
"'Don't wait for me 	 And, the Christian Nora is left--with her
"foot" on the "cast" (remainder, excess grave dirt, mark, image) of the
other's "grave" (marking irreplaceable loss)--to cover the
"insurmountable grief" of separation and unresolvable difference with the
writing of letters, epistles.
In order to open up both a conclusion to this chapter and an
introduction to the next, I would like to posit a little speculation
brought to mind by Luce Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman.	 One
of the matters that Irigaray analyzes in this text is the reflective
nature of Platonic metaphysics: in the section, "Plato's h5Istera",
beginning with "the myth of the cave" ("Ground, dwelling, cave, and even,
in a different way, form--all these terms can be read more or less as
equivalents of the hystena") and with the reflections on the "back of the
cave, which will serve as the backcloth for all the representations to
come", Irigaray uncovers the Platonic obliteration of the essential
Inversion (the mirror imaging) underlying the concept of likeness."
Such an inversion, acknowledgement of which would upset everything,
would necessarily be the first thing to be eclipsed, forgotten, repressed
by Pauline theology. In the light of Irigarars speculum, it is possible,
perhaps, to see Nighthrood, in which inversion appears to be the
precondition of being, as re-activating that which has been suppressed
at the heart of Pauline Christianity--the primary inversion of that
image which is Man made in the likeness of God. Consider this theo-
descriptive statement of Matthew O'Connor, "the other woman that God
forgot", made upon his return to the place from which his rhetoric set
out:
"So we come back to the place from which I set
out; pray to the good God; she will keep you.
Personally I call her 'She' because of the way
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she made me; it somehow balances the mistake."
(1). 150)
The Father has made a mistake in the creation of likeness: it is better,
then, that the Father be called "she". That will balance (correct,
ameliorate) the apparent unlikeness of this invert O'Connor. It will also
unsettle, humourously, the Pauline Christian expectation of a source or
origin that is infallible, beyond trickery, and definitely male.
I will be discussing the theme of homosexuality in the following
chapter, but I would like to point out here that in predicating
(carnivalesque, sexual) inversion as its (already constituted) ground,
Night wood has brought out of the closet the essentially inverted nature
of a theology of likeness, of the ("masculine") Christian desire for a
Same, the Father, in whose likeness we (men) are made--or who we (men)
made in our likeness:
"Ilan," [Nora] said, her eyelids quivering,
"conditioning himself to fear, made God; as the
prehistoric, conditioning itself to hope, made
man--the cooling of the earth, the receding of
the sea. And I, who want power, chose a girl
who resembles a boy." (p. 136)
Perhaps we should also recall, here, Balchtin's suggestion that "ancient
Christian narrative literature (including the canonical) [..J was
permeated by elements of the menippea and carnivalization". "It is
sufficient to recall the crowning and discrowning of the 'King of the
Jews' in the canonical Goopels."47
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Nigh twooch following the "obstetric line", has not only re-called
the material, matrical origin repressed by Pauline Christian discourse,
but also demonstrated that the entire western concept of source as
sameness has always already been contaminated by difference. Cherished
distinctions between good and evil, soul and body, light and dark,
paternal and maternal, etc, can no longer hold under the perverse
possibility of O'Connor's (bisexual?) carnivalized God or Nora's man-made
God. And Christian teleology can no longer hold alone when, in a
carnivalesque double-play, the spiritual "end" is revealed as also an




"There's nothing to go by, Matthew', she
said. "You do not know which way to go. A
man is another person--a woman is yourself,
caught as you turn in panic; on her mouth you
kiss your own. If she is taken you cry that
you have been robbed of yourself. God laughs
at me, but his laughter is my 101M" (p. 143)
"At that moment I stood in the centre of erotic-
ism and death, death that makes the dead smaller,
as a lover we are beginning to forget dwindles
and wastes E.. .1 I knew in that bed Robin should
have put me down. In that bed we would have
forgotten our lives in the extremity of memory,
moulted our parts, as figures in the waxworks
are moulted down to their story, so we would
have broken down to our low.." (pp. 157-58)
"Tor Robin is incest too; that is one of her
powers."(p. 156)
Night wood is not essentially a "lesbian novel". Nor is it
primarily, as Monique Wittig would have it, the work of a "minority
writer', or a writer belonging to a minority determined by sexual
preference.' Of course, homosexuality is one of its themes, but not, I
would argue, the determinate theme. Night wood does not "tell" of the
hidden (unspoken, unillustrated) experience of a certain minority--"Life
Is not to be told, call it as loud as you like, it will not tell itself"
(1). 129). If we were to read it as such a telling, we would probably
be forced to place it in the "pathological" school of accountancy
instituted by Havelock Ellis and Krafft-Ebing, for there appears to be
nothing redemptive or constructive in the loves of Robin, Nora and
Matthew.2
 But then, as we have seen, Night wood is not the sort of text
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in which conventional categories (majority/minority, for example) are
preserved.
It is interesting to note the words that do not appear in this
novel, adjective/substantives like "homosexual", "sapphic", and "lesbian".
The dis-appearance of such words in certain minority texts could be,
and has been, explained as a necessary subterfuge, an evasion of
censorship, on the premise that the public considers such words so
dangerous that their concepts can only be rendered euphemistically.3
While such an explanation may justify, say, Gertrude Stein's euphemistic
style (and I don't think that it does), it is quite beside the point in a
discussion of Night wood where there can be no mistaking the
connotations of the words that do appear, and appear emphatically,—
"invert" and "third sex". 4. The fact that Barnes, in writing Night wood,
has Chosen these particular terms, and the attendant "uninhabited
angel", over "homosexual", etc, suggests that an other sort of emphasis
is being placed on the theme of homosexuality. "Homosexual", "sapphic",
and "lesbian" each bear a certain, specific, and closed singularity of
reference and/or condition: the homo of "homosexual" is a taxonomic
reference to a "genus of which Man is the single species" (OED); and
"sapphic" and "lesbian" both have singular-, specific etymological
referents--Sappho and Lesbos. All three terms connote a love that is
uni-sexual, between samenesses, and a set that is closed, exclusive.
The terms of Night wood, by comparison and despite the contexts of their
origins, are at least bivalent and ambiguous: "invert", while containing
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the trace of its obverse--the "proper"—, also opens up to the entire
contiguous series of "the -vert family of terms"; the "third sex"
suggests, at once, something more than or in excess of duality and the
mingling (indiscriminately) of what had been mutually exclusive sets--
male and female; and the "uninhabited angel" con-Joins two other
parallel and exclusive sets--(divinity, presence, eternity, etc.) and
(void, absence, nothingness, etc.). The use of such open or opening
terms obviates the designation of Nightwood as belonging to the closed
set "lesbian novel". It is the difference in purported sameness, not
sameness itself, on which the vision of Night wood is focussed: "My
voice cracked on the word "difference", soaring up divinely', says Dr.
O'Connor, emphasizing that difference between homosexual loves qi 921
I would also like to put to rest, at the outset, the nottua
(frequently expressed) that ArAghtwood is somehow about androgyny. In
the much cited passage delineating "the Invert" as androgyne,QMAmmor
suggests that the androgyne--the reversible boy/girl that overcomes
difference by subsuming two in one and is generically a Platonic
figure—is a utopian sort of "myth" and "the sweetest lie of all" cp.
137X The "invert" as "'the pretty lad who is a girl L.J, the prince-
princess in point lace" is but "the painting on the fan"' (I). 136), a
covering signification that would ameliorate the painful recognition of
difference. To be "unsexed", and so above difference, like the
androgynous Frau Mann (p. 14) is to have absorbed the covering
signification, to have become what a "'miscalculated longing has
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created"' (1). 137), a "doll", or a "painting on a fan". For Frau Mann
"exact difference" is the difference between disparate substances
("meat and liquid" [p. 15]). When it comes to a sameness, the same
family, Frau Mann is half-blind "with one eye closed": "I've an album
of my own [...] and everyone in it looks like a soldier'" ( 1). 27). The
sublat ion of difference in androgyny is not, I think, accredited in
Night wood which reaches for the "troubling structure"--"meet of child
and desperado"--beneath the covering signification of apparent
sameness. After all, the bi-sexual Robin is not a doll: she plays with
dolls--and smashes their heads.
Rather than having arisen from the realm of the homosexual (or
androgynous?) minority (which is distinguished by its sameness to
itself), Night wood is situated at that carnivalesque point where the so-
called minority opens up and reveals its difference--there where the
"heat of (..J suppuration" mingles "core" with "core" ( 1). 153)--in a
practice that explodes distinctions, samenesses, categorizations. Wittig
states that a "text by a minority writer is effective only if it
succeeds in making the minority point of view universal".s To a
certain extent this is what Arightwood does, by breaking down the
barriers between the minority and the universal, by assuming inversion
at the outset, although the wholistic notion of a "universal view" is
oppressive in this context. It might be more to the point to say that
Nightwooc4 by cracking the mirror of sameness into a myriad
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differences, radically alters the distinction between minority and
universal.
Any fictional theme is, by definition, a
challenge to the single signified since it is
a polyvalent signified, a "blasting of the self-
hood" (Georges Bataille). This is no doubt so
because the fantasies that nourish such a theme
converge on that impossible focus, that unthink-
able "origin" constituted by the scene of scenes,
the so-called primal scene.E
In examining the homosexual theme--or, to follow the text's
instruction, the "invert" theme--in Nightwoac4 I will be reading it as
the sort of "challenge to the single signified" suggested by Julia
Kristeva in Powers of Horror. The "fictional theme", in Nightwood, goes
far beyond the "single signified" of home-sexuality (as sexual/social
preference and practice) to the verge of that "impossible focus", "the
centre of eroticism and death", where "incest" (transgression) itself is
power -(rather than the power of law prohibiting incest). Going
backward, it might be said, through object-choice and fantasy to the
place, the (parental) "bed" at "the extremity of memory", where lovers
are "moulted down to their story", Nghtwood approaches what might be
called the universal, if we recall that "universal" is only another
member of "the -vert family". Beyond home-sexuality and the separation
of minority and majority, through in-version and through "writing", the
text addresses a "so-called primal scene" which is not quite, perhaps, a
Freudian primal scene, although its Freudian lineaments are evident.
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Seemingly following Freud, Barnes focuses on a "so-called primal
scene" through the agency of dis-ease--the unidentical twin diseases of
inversion and hysteria7' (It is because of this apparent agvnfy of
homosexuality that I refused to call Nghtwood a "lesbian novel" as
agency implies emphasis on another object which the agent is to
affect.) However, Barnes's "hysteric", Robin, is not quite what Freud
might have had her be, although Freud's fascination with elusive
hysterics might be seen to be in some ways analogous to Nora's (vrid
the text's) passion for Robin.° Nghtwood presents quite an other
reading of hysteria and, through hysteria, the primal scene to that of
properly Freudian analysis: this reading is actually a carnivalizing of
certain Freudian theories. Disengaging the hysteric from her cause
(Robin has no family), taking her out of the protective (patriarchal)
house and setting her loose to wander the night streets and circuses,
Night wood re-writes the pathology of hysteria and, in doing so,
reconstitutes "the other woman that God CFreud?1 forgot" (p.
In this chapter, I will attempt to follow through Nghtwood the
course of the hysteric and the marks of "abjection" (which enables the
writing of hysteria) in order to broach the text's re-presentation of
the "prehistoric" "primal scene" on which its other themes of history,
religion and memory seem to depend. I will, in due course, be
delineating more closely my use of each of these two seminal terms--
"hysteria" and "abjection"—, but I think it necessary to explain here
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why I have connected these two seemingly disparate conditions.
Kristeva points out that:
Contrary to hysteria, which brings about, ignores,
or seduces the symbolic but does not produce it,
the subject of abjection is eminently productive
of culture. Its symptom is the rejection and
reconstruction of languages.3
Barnes is, I will argue, a "writer of abjection", as Kristeva has defined
that being in Powers of Horror. And, Barnes writes, also, about
hysteria. Of course, hysteria (although it wreaks all sorts of
signification on the body) cannot produce the symbolic--it is mute, a-
lingual as such. It cannot be written properly, except, perhaps, in a
text like ArAghtwood where the hysteric is made the "abject", the non-
object as it were. All of Kristeva's writers of abjection, as might be
expected, are men--Dostoevsky, Proust, Joyce, Borges, Artaud, Celine--
(whether hetero- or homo-sexual doesn't matter at this point).1°
According to the Kristevan scheme, it shouldn't matter that the writer
of Nightwood is a woman; but I suggest that, in a certain sense, it
does matter for only a woman (perhaps) could find the hysteric (ad. L.
hystericus, ad. Gr. patepi.xoc tf.vo-rEpcc womb) [M]) abject, as something
(or no-thing) to be sublimated in writing. This may be a forced
intrusion of biologism into Kristeva's system (which seems always to be
trying to evade the exigencies of biological determinism), but I think
that Nightwotx4 with its emphasis on the biological and on the "beast",
Justifies such an intrusion.
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hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.'
Speaking as a whole, hysterical attacks,
like hysteria in general, revive a piece of
sexual activity in women which existed during
their childhood and at that time revealed an
essentially masculine character. It can often
be observed that girls who have shown a boyish
nature and inclinations up to the years before
puberty are precisely those who become hyster-
ical from puberty onwards.1
The bisexual nature of hysterical symptoms,
which can in any event be demonstrated in nume-
rous cases, is an interesting confirmation of
my view that the postulated existence of an
innate bisexual disposition in man is especial-
ly clearly visible in the analysis of psycho-
neurotics.13
Taking its prehistory as a starting point, I
will only emphasize here that the development
of femininity remains exposed to disturbance
by the residual phenomena of the early mascu-
line period. Regressions to the fixations of
the pre-Oedipus phases very frequently occur;
in the course of some women's lives there is a
repeated alternation between periods in which
masculinity or femininity gains the upper hand.
Some portion of what we men call the 'enigma of
women' may perhaps be derived from this expres-
sion of bisexuality in women's lives.1'
In the following months (Felix] put his faith
in the fact that Robin had Christian procliv-
ities, and his hope in the discovery that she
was an enigma. He said to himself that pos-
sibly she had greatness hidden in the non-
committaL He felt that her attention 1...1
had already been taken by something not yet
in history. Always she seemed to be listen-
ing to the echo of some foray in the blood
that had known no setting	 (p. 44)
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Hysteria would seem to be the cause celebre of the Freudian
psychoanalytic project. It was the subject of hysteria (and Cheroot's
treatment of it) that first turned Freud's head from cerebral anatomy
to psychopathology. (We might note, as well, that this sea-change of
Freud began during his courtship of Marthe Bernays and at a time when
he suspected himself of suffering from hysteria.) s And, his
fascination with this subject, the hysterical subject, never waned. Of
course, over the years, his view of hysteria changed. In his, and
Breuer's, first major analysis of the condition, Studies on Hysteria
(1895), hysteria is a particular form of neurosis, distinct from
neurasthenia and the anxiety neuroses, to which either gender may be
subject and which is identified by ("its basis and sine qua nod') "the
existence of hypnoid states". 1	 By the time of his writing of New
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, hysteria appears to have
become the female condition par excellence, so intimately bound to
woman's psychology that all of Freud's postulations about that
psychology--penis envy, the oedipal phase succeeding the castration
complex, the lack of a female libido and the fact that "the little girl
Is a little man", the "innate bisexual nature disposition of [woman?
and) man"--can be traced back to his treatment of his hysterics. 17 It
might be said that hysteria was, for Freud, the threshold of the
"other": through the rupture that hysteria made in normal feminine
behaviour, Freud sought to identify the essential structures of the
other sex's psyche. 19 However, he does not appear to have stepped over
that threshold. Despite his many essential discoveries (observations),
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Freud could not undo the "enigma of women"--women's psychology
remained for him a "dark continent", its earliest phases "so difficult
to grasp in analysis--so grey with age and shadowy and almost
impossible to revivify L-3" that its proper history was ultimately
ineluctable. 19
 Peering through the rupture of hysteria, he seems to
have found everything but what he was really looking for--the essential
"other".
Part of Freud's problem with the "woman question" could be his
attempt to identify femininity within a specifically phallic system of
signification. If the object of desire is the phallus--and Jacques
Lacan has demonstrated that, for Freud, the object of desire is always
the phallus20--, and if woman's psychology is constituted by the lack
of the prototypical phallus (penis envy), then Freud's object of
investigation (his object of investigative desire, the unknown, the
"other") is literally a no-thing, nothing that can be grasped. This gap
and other similar gaps around the "enigma of women" in the
comprehensive Freudian text have been the subject of much critical
comment and debate in recent years. 21 Yet, despite Freud's problem
with a good 50% of the human race, the Freudian text has exerted an
irradicable influence on the Western conception of human psychology:
the split subject, the structured unconscious, the psychological
efficacy of dreams, the libido, etc, are all (inordinately useful)
"givens". We are, as Joyce puts it, all "Jung and easily freudened".22
But, as the Freudian project is an investigation into the psycho-
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universals of the distinctly Pauline and Platonic (logocentric,
phallocentric) western civilization, we should not be surprised that
here, too, woman is mis-apprehended, if "she" is apprehended at all.
The Freudian view of women (the view taken through the hysterical
rupture) is, whether or not it is always acknowledged, a predominant
20th century re-view of traditional metaphysical and theological
presuppositions about women, and we cannot afford to ignore it.
Barnes did not ignore Freud. Nightwoor4 like her other works,
bears the marks of an engagement with the Freudian text. As Robert
Nadeau suggests, the "understanding of the structure of man's interior
life revealed in the narrative (of Night woodi is remarkably close to
that advanced by Sigmund Freud only a few years before Barnes began
work on the novel". In "Night wood and the Freudian Unconscious", Nadeau
demonstrates this similarity by reading the characters as
"representatives of the interior workings of the human mind at
different points along the continuum of psychic experience". (Thus,
Robin represents the id; Felix, and to a lesser extent Nora and Jenny,
represent the superego; and O'Connor, the mediator between Robin and
her lovers, is like the ego. However, as Nadeau points out, in Freud's
wake, the id, ego, and superego are "not completely disparate and
distinct from one another", and the characters should not be read as
"allegorical figures" of the three "mental provinces".)2 Although
Nadeau's article has little to do ostensibly with the immediate subject
of hysteria, his argument that Nghtwood bears important similarities
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to the Freudian text lends support to my argument that Barnes was more
familiar with that text than Barnes criticism, in general, would seem to
Indicate.
Sane Marcus's "'Laughing at Leviticus: Night wood as Woman's Circus
Epic" is another supportive exception to the general rule. (Marcus also
sees Barnes as a "writer of abjection".) However, rather than seeing
Nigh twood as collaborative with Freudian theory as Nadeau does, Marcus
states that "Nightkroods project is to expose Freudian psychoanalysis's
collaboration with fascism in its desire to 'civilize' and make 'normal'
what it considers to be the sexually aberrant misfit".24-
In this reading Nora is the archetypal
Dora or female hysteric, and Dr. Freud is
brilliantly parodied in the figure of Dr.
Matthew-Mighty-grain-of-salt-Dante-O'Connor.
The lesbian patient chooses as doctor a trans-
vestite whose most passionate desire is to be
a woman, whose womb-envy is so strong that it
parodies Freudian penis-envy mercilessly. The
psychoanalyst's office is a filthy bedroom with
a reeking chamber pot.	 The psychoana-
lytic structure is ruptured as the patient asks
the question and the doctor answers
The patient is rational, puritanical, and ana-
lytical; the doctor is mad.2s
Thus, Ariehtwood parodies (or carnivalizes, for Marcus holds that
Night wood is a carnivalesque novel) Freudianism as it "challenges not
only Freud, but the whole history of the treatment of female
hysteria".2 My argument is very close to Marcus's, although, as will
become apparent, it differs radically from hers on a number of seminal
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points. However, it is enough to note, at this point, Mat, as far as
Marcus is concerned, Barnes--although "we" "are not accustomed to
thinking of (her] as a learned woman, a scholar as well as a writer"27-
-had far more than a passing knowledge of Freudian psychoanalytic
theory.
In her 1922 interview with James Joyce for Vanity Fair, Barnes
records Joyce addressing her as one of "you Freudians". 2e As Barnes
did not take notes during interviews, preferring to reconstruct the
conversation after the fact, we might suppose that "you Freudians" was
as much a self-designation as a Joycean accusation. (According to
Joyce for Barnes's Joyce, at least], psychoanalysis is "neither more nor
less than blackmail".)2e However, such blatant instances are rare in
Barnes's published work, and we must look for other sorts of traces of
Freud. Nadeau has uncovered many thematic traces in his alignment of
characters and "mental provinces", in his recognition of how the power
of the superego is diminished in this novel as it is in sleep, and in
his diagnosis of O'Connor's "neurotic anxiety", for example. Marcus
demonstrates Barnes's thematic exposé of Freudian theories on hysteria
and lesbianism. But there are, I would argue, more explicitly textual
traces of "Freud" in Nightwood traces that would, perhaps, indicate
more than a familiarity, on Barnes's part, with Freudian themes and/or
theories.
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In Chapter Four of this thesis, I mentioned briefly, in passing, a
dream-passage in which Nora and Robin are like "a pair of opera glasses
turned to the wrong end". The sentence, in its entirety, reads as:
The louder she cried out the farther away went
the floor below, as if Robin and she, in their
extremity, were a pair of opera glasses turned
to the wrong end, diminishing in their painful
love; a speed that ran away with the two ends
of the building, stretching her apart. (pp. 62-63)
Compare this dream passage to a passage from James Strachey's 1933
translation of Freud's "Revision of Dream-Theory" in hw Introductory
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis
In general, indeed, where it is possible, the
dreamwork changes temporal relations into spa-
tial ones and represents them as such. In a
dream, for instance, one may see a scene bet-
ween two people who look very small and a long
way off, as though one were seeing them through
the wrong end of a pair of opera-glasses Here,
both the smallness and the remoteness in space
have the same significance: what is meant is
remoteness in time [Freud's italics] and we are
to understand that the scene is from the remote
past . 30;atmpruasr.	 actdopct
As well as noting the complementary references to opera glasses, we
should also consider Nightwood's frequent "references" to Robin's
prehistorical-ness and Nora's claims that Robin was "like a relative
found in another generation" (1). 157) and that "she was a long way off
and waiting to begin" (1). 155). Of course, the image of the wrong end
of a pair of opera glasses is not peculiar to Freudian discourse, and
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the phrase "a long way off" is even less so, but given the specific
contexts (the dream, the contraction and spatialization of time), it is
quite possible to see in Nora's dream(s) and reflections the recitation
of the Freudian text—or, at least, Strachey's Freudian text.
The first part of the chapter "Watchman, What of the Night" can
also be read as a recitation, with a difference, of a Freudian passage.
In the Studies on hysteria, also translated by Strachey, Freud recounts
one early success of his "pressure of the hand" therapy. The female
patient, in this case, was suffering from obsessive neurosis, but as
Freud points out, "the psychical mechanism of obsessions has a very
great deal of internal kinship with hysterical symptoms and L.J the
technique of analysis is the same for both of them". His account of
this case reads as follows:
When I asked this lady whether she had seen
anything or had any recollection under the
pressure of my hand, she replied: 'Neither
one nor the other, but a word has suddenly
occurred to me.' 'A single word?' 'yes, but
it sounds too silly.' 'Say it all the same.'
'Concierge' Nothing else?' 'No.' I pres-
sed a second time and once more an isolated
word shot through her mind: 'Might-gown'
by pressing repeatedly, I brought out what
seemed to be a meaningless series of words:
'farm-cart'. 'What does all this mean?' I
asked. She reflected for a moment and the
following thought occurred to her: 'It must
be the story that has Just came into my head.
When I was ten years old and my next elder
sister was twelve, she went raving mad one
night and had to be tied down and taken into
town on a farm-cart I remember perfectly
that it was the concierge who overpowered
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her and afterwards went with her to the asylum
as well'	 Soon L.J the meaning of
this reminiscence became clear. Her sister's
illness made such a deep impression on her
because the two of them shared a secret; they
slept in one room and on a particular night
they had both been subjected to sexual assaults
by a certain man [...J The peculiarity of this
case lay only in the emergence of isolated key-
words which we had to work into sentences; for
the appearance of disconnectedness and irrele-
vance which characterized the words emitted in
this oracular fashion applies equally to the
complete ideas and scenes which are normally
produced under my pressure.°1;aswis• a".4dd'd
Barnes, taking over from the analyst, has worked these precise
"key-words" into other "sentences" on night-time "madness" in "Watchman,
What of the Night". The chapter starts with the concierge who, in "the
anger of broken sleep", directs--like the concierge who directs the mad
girl to the asylum--Nora to the doctor's room. Once she is in the
doctor's room, it suddenly occurs to Nora that "'children know something
they can't tell; they like Red Riding Hood and the wolf in bed" ( 1). 79),
which is another recounting of the secret ("something they can't tell")
of the girl(s) assaulted by a "certain man", a "wolf". Nora's next
thought is a disquisition on the gown, "the natural raiment of
extremity": "'What nation, what religion, what ghost, what dream, has
not worn it--infants, angels, priests, the dead 	 Dr. O'Connor
completes this thought by connecting night with gown, while
establishing the fundamental distinction upon which the rest of his
(sometimes disconnected and seemingly irrelevant) discourse hinges:
"'The Bible lies the one way, but the night-gown the other. The night,
"Beware of that dark door!"" ( 1). 80). From the "night-gown", O'Connor's
- 248 -
gospel moves to the "bed" and the "town", emphasizing by capitalizing
these latter "keywords":
upair. exclaimed the doctor. "Let a man
lay himself down in the Great Bed and his
'Identity' is no longer his own, his 'trust'
Is not with him, and his 'willingness' is
turned over and is of another permission.
His distress is wild and anonymous. He sleeps
in a Town of Darkness, member of a secret broth-
erhood. He neither knows himself nor his out-
riders: he berserks a fearful dimension and
dismounts, miraculously, in bed!" ( I). 81;
emphasis added)
Thus, the "doctor" "describes" the unconscious--the "Great Bed" of sleep
and the "Town of Darkness", the night in which one goes "raving mad" or
"berserks a fearful dimension". Following, for the most part and in
precisely the same order, the chain of "isolated key-words" recounted
by Freud, working them "into sentences", O'Connor delivers an almost
Freudian "unconscious", beyond "identity", "trust", and "willingness" (the
constituents of the ego). The 'farm-cart" that ends Freud's series does
not appear as such in Barnes's text, but there is the "Cart" in
O'Connor's recitation of Donne's Sermon Number 2 (Psalms 90.14):
"But what of our own death--permit us to re-
proach the night, wherein we die manifold alone.
Donne says: 'We are all conceived in close
prison, in our mothers' wombs we are close
prisoners all When we are born, we are but
born to the liberty of the house--all our life
is but a going out to the place of execution
and death. Now was there ever any man seen
to sleep in the Cart, between Newgate and Ty-
burn? Between the prison and the place of
execution, does any man sleep?' Yet he says,
'Men sleep all the way.' How much more, there-
-249-
fore, is there upon him a close sleep when he
is mounted on darkness." (FL 97)
The phrase "mounted on darkness" recalls the "outriders" and
"dismounts" of the earlier paragraph and thus links, indirectly, the two
passages. It is quite possible to see Donne's "Cart" (the executioner's
cart being a symbolically humble vehicle) carrying us all to our deaths
as Barnes's version of Freud's "farm-cart" carrying the mad girl (still
in her "night-gown"?) through the night to the asylum. Again, the "key-
word" is capitalized (although the capital is borrowed from Donne) as
though to isolate and emphasize it, and Barnes's capitalized and
alembicated version of Freud's series is taken one step beyond the
unconscious to death--or to the "death drives".
The textual similarities between brightwood and Strachey's
translations of Freud demonstrate not only the likelihood that Barnes
had read and was reading (Strachey's) Freud, but also that ArAghtwood is,
in part, an active re-working (ra-writing, making into other sentences,
re-emphasizing, filling up) of certain parts of the Freudian text. The
assumption (in both senses of the word) of the series "concierge",
"night-gown", "bad", "town", "farm-cart" is a case in point: from Freud's
proprietorial recounting of a single woman's fragmented reminiscence of
sexual assault and a mad sister, Barnes has drawn, via the mediation of
Donne's text and by a process very like allegorization ("lifting" simple
signifiers into symbols), the "life" of the unconscious per se. This
practice of lifting fragments of discourse into significant units and
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working them into sentences, often with the mediation of literary texts,
is, of course, Freud's modus operandi However, Barnes's apparent
employment of Freudian text and method does not signal a lateral
adoption of Freudian theory any more than it signals a parody of that
theory. What happens in Night wood to the Freudian text is much more
serious (in the Bakhtinian sense of a serious, deathly laughter) than
parody (in which the object-text is still recognizable): in Night wood
the Freudian text is re-volutionized, rather than conserved. Freud,
after all, is never cited, although Loyola, Donne, Montaigne, etc, are.
The old economy collapses, and the "scientific" psychoanalytic text is
un-authorized and mingled with an authorized poetic/sermonic text
("'mingling them both with the Holy Spoon, which is that story'" fp. 213)
in a fantastic "fictional theme" focussed on a primal scene at "the
extremity of memory" (the scene of birth, death, holiness and eroticism,
of which the "gown" is the "natural raiment"). In other words,
hiettwood makes capital of fragments of the Freudian text and invests
them in an other fictional and polyvalent economy.
There is another way of looking at all of this, and that is, what
will amount to, a reading of Nightwoods characters in the light of the
text's engagement with Freudian theory. This reading will take us from
hysteria to abjection (the writing of abjection), traversing Kristeva's
distinction between the two conditions and, hopefully, bringing us to a
re-vision of the (male?) "writer of abjection".
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In NightuirxxA Robin is the hysteric par excellence and not Nora,
as Marcus has maintained. It is Robin, the bisexual somnambule whose
movements recall a "prehistory" veiled by the webs of time and whose
expressions are the "posels] of her annihilation" (1). 35), who bears all
the stigmata of hysteria. She suffers definitive hysterical attacks of
"cataleptic rigidity"--for example, "a cataleptic frozen gesture" (1).
69)--and "attaque de sommeir, "sleep worn, as if sleep were a decay
fishing her beneath the visible surface" (1). 34). 2 She is suggestible,
her life having "no volition for refusal" (x 43), and she is often
inarticulate, unable to say where she has been or where she wants to
be. She suffers from fright and from unconscious "reminiscences". And
she is bisexual.
However, these symptoms are about all we know of Robin. The text
offers no etiology of her neurosis. She has no specific background--no
mother, father, sibling, class--other than her Amsricanness, which
signifies a newness or infancy in historical terms and an illimitable
(malleable?) future possibility: "'With an American anything can be
done" (p. 39). She has no vocation, no visible means of support, no
"home". In a certain sense, this "incurable yet to be stricken with its
malady" (I). 41)--and we should pay attention to the impersonal pronoun-
-is a neurosis without a history, a pastiche of symptoms without an
etiology. Robin has no motivation: her only powers are "a stubborn
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cataleptic calm" (p. 45) and "incest". Rather than designating her the
hysteric par excellence, it might be more to the point to say that "she"
is hysteria per se, and that this hysteria exceeds (because it is
enigmatic) the economy of dis-ease.
The only other thing that we know about Robin is that she is the
"object of desire" in/for this text. In more properly Freudian terms,
she would be the "phallus"; but Nig-htwood, as we have seen, is not quite
the arena of propriety. 	 Of course, it is possible to detect in
Night wood traces of the phallic organization of Freudian desire--we
need only recall the doll substituting for the child/phallus that Robin
and Nora "cannot have" (p. 142) and Felix's desire for Robin as the
mother of his son/self34--, but hrightwood undoes the Freudian family
knot while (seemingly) mimicking it,-and the first loose thread in this
knot is the generalized hysteria placed in the position of the object of
desire.
In Night wood, hysteria--as Robin--takes on all the weight of that
(pre-oedipal) prehistory of women's psychology that so fascinated and
so continually eluded Freud. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, I
discussed in some detail the figure of Robin as matrical origin and so
will not detail these particular lineaments of Robin. But, I will
reiterate that Robin Chysteria) is a figuration of the matrical source
(hystera) that thrusts the child out of and away from itself and toward
Individuation and the symbolic. No matter how continually one "goes
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bade' to "find" “Robin", she cannot/will not be found, at least not by
the subject, for the umbilicus has been severed, once and for alL
Robin's "past" has nothing to do with the oedipal organizations of the
individual or of society: it is preoedipal, prehistorical, presymbolic,
prephallic, almost prehuman, yet anachronistically ongoing. She "yet
carried the quality of the 'way back' as animals do" (p. 40). "She was
gracious and yet fading, like an old statue in a garden, that symbolizes
the weather through which it has endured, and is not so much the work
of man as the work of wind and rain and the herd of the seasons [.-]"
(p. 41). She seemed "newly ancient" (p. 42) and "to be listening to the
echo of some foray in the blood that had known no setting" (p. 44).
She thought "unpeopded thoughts" and "she laughed, out of some hidden
capacity, some lost subterranean humour" (pp. 46-7). She had, according
to Felix, "'the quality of one sole condition, L.] a condition of being
that she had not, at that time, even chosen, but a fluid sort of
possession L.J" (p. 112), and she had made for herself '"a fearful sort
of primitive innocence" (p. 117). She had "'an undefinable disorder, a
sort of 'odour of memory', like a person who has come from a place that
we have forgotten and would give our life to recall'" (p. 118). Robin
has the "rigour" of the murderer whose "crime" is "a way to lay hands
on the shudder of a past that is still vibrating' (pp. 118-19). In a
sense, Robin is a remainder (reminder) of the natural, bloody,
"primitive", "fluid sort of possession" that once held us all and will
forever be our (unconscious) primary object of desire: she is the
enigmatic clue to the puzzle of material origin.
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However, we must be careful not to make an archetypal or mythical
figure of Robin: like any hysteric, she is a trace-bearer, a body upon
which are inscribed hieroglyphic traces of what might be described as
"archetypes" or "mythical figures"--Mother, Nature, the Lt Diana of
Ephesus CB favourite figure of an American feminist criticism that
would heroicize "Robin")--if this text sustained such categories.
However, Arightwood states the agency of that inscription as "something
being done to Robin, Robin disfigured and eternalized by the
hieroglyphics of sleep and pain" (x 63). What is made evident in
Nora's dream-identification of this agency of inscription is that the
hieroglyphs are not the mark of some pre-existing certainty or system,
some actual First Cause, but the work of the unconscious, the dream-
work (writing) of individual desire. Thus, Nora's Robin is not Felix's
or Jenny's or the narrator's: Nora comes to see Robin as her own
"self"; Felix finally realizes her as "the most formless loss" (p. 113);
Jenny comes to the conclusion that Robin was "possessed" (p. 168); and
the narrator, if we can speak of such an entity, finally portrays Robin
as a sort of dog. In Nightwocx4 the "universal" is "circumscribed to
the individual heart" (p. 12) where the ideal object is "disfigured and
eternalized" in any number of re-presentations. The ideal and the
universal are, according to the text, unknowable: we all die but, as Dr.
O'Connor points out, '"We do not know death'" for "'we die manifold
alone". "'To our friends L..) we die every day, but to ourselves we die
only at the end'" (pp. 96-7). Given the priority of the in-scriptions
and circum-scriptions of the "individual heart" or the unconscious over
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the certainties of history and epistemology in Nig1twoc4 we should
also be careful to acknowledge the "manifold" appearance of the primary
and unknowable object (s) of desire perpetually "disfigured and
eternalized by the hieroglyphics of sleep and pain".
The "Lacanian algebra" offers a useful (though only partial)
analogy for the figure of Robin: the objet petit ,A "a privileged
object, which has emerged from some primal separation, from some self-
mutilation induced by the very approach of the real".36
The objet a is something from which the
subject, in order to constitute itself, has
separated itself off as organ. This serves
as a symbol of lack, that is to say, of the
phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is
lacking. It must, therefore, be an object
that is, firstly, separable and, secondly,
that has some relation to the lack
At the oral level, it is the nothing, in so
far as that from which the subject is weaned
is no longer anything for him. In anorexia
nervosa, what the child eats is the nothing.317
Certainly, Robin (a homophone of "robbing"?), in terms of significatory
systems--history, conscious memory, developed psychology, motivated
characterization--, is a "symbol" of the lack of the place or condition
that has been lost in the stratiating developments of consciousness.
As I demonstrated in Chapter Four of this thesis, she does serve
(albeit in a complicated fashion) as "a symbol of lack" of the metrical
origin lost in the severing of the umbilicus. However, the objet a is
only a partial analogy for the figure of Robin, largely because of a
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gap in the "Lacanian algebra" itself. Luce Irigaray, in questioning the
Freudian/Lacanian postulate that "the cause of desire is lack",
describes the objet a as "that bodily remainder" and considers the
ramifications of that remaindering in Freudian/Lacanian discourse:
The being that is sexualized female in and
through discourse is also the place for the
deposit of the remainders produced by the
operations of language. For this to be the
case, woman has to remain a body without organs.
This being so, nothing that has to do with
women's erogenous zones is of the slightest
interest to the psycho-analyst.9
The objet a, which is necessarily "feminine" as the symbol of the
missing phallus (in a Lacanian reading), must, then, be empty. Rather
than remaining related to a material/matrical origin, it is symbolic of
nothing because the phallus (which has usurped the place of the womb
In the organization of the symbolic) is not "there". In this structure,
there can be no properly feminine organs--no womb, vagina, clitoris:
it's the phallus or nothing. Yet, Robin, with her "fluid possession",
does seem to have organs. She is "'a wild thing caught in a woman's
skin" (p.146); there is a "'sort of fluid blue under her skin" (p.134);
her temples are "'like those of young beasts cutting horns"' (1). 134);
the "sensuality in her hands frightened" Felix (13. 42). Inside this
hysteric's body, which should only be a sexual vacuum, are the organic
beast (sexuality) and fluid (life). In other words, this female body
holds a (frightening) libido, and not, I will argue, the always masculine
libido insisted upon by Freud. I will return to this matter of the
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libininal hysterical body when I discuss abjection: what I wished to
demonstrate here, with the introduction of the objet a (and its
limitations), is that Robin is written more as an object or (manifold
and relative) other of the individual psyche than as a character in her
own right. In some senses, she is the objet a--particularly for Felix--
but, as the text demonstrates, this particular sort of objectification
of the female body is, like the monocled Felix, one-eyed (one-horned?)
and incapable of apprehension.
Baron Felix Volkbein is the first of the characters to be
fascinated by Robin. Felix is, in many ways, rather like Freud: he is
Viennese, nominally Jewish, and cultivated; he has an enquiring mind
somewhat countermanded by a strong sense of propriety; and he has an
abiding interest in the past. Given these parallels, it is rather
intriguing to note that Felix, himself, is marked by a "humble hysteria"
(1). 11) and suffers an (apparently hysterical) attack of "uncontrollable
laughter" (i 18) in which he experiences the sort of subjective "split"
that Freud describes as characteristic of hypnosis and hysteria.3
There is also a nominal coincidence C?) in the names "Felix" (1- "happy")
and "Freud" (G. "joy"). (Marcus suggests that Felix "reminds one of
Djuna Barnes's sketch of Joyce" and that O'Connor may be read as a
parody of Freud: however, I would argue that if these characters can be
read as drawn upon historical personages, there is more of "Freud" in
Felix and "Joyce" in O'Connor than vice versa.)4-0
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Felix first meets Robin when she is suffering an hysterical
attack--an attaque de sommeil Her condition does not "put him off",
anymore than her subsequent attacks will repel him. Rather, although
he is "racially incapable of abandon", he becomes fascinated with this
girl who seems "enchanted with the gift of postponed abandon" (1). 38).
In other words, he is fascinated by her retention of, her ability to
postpone, what he lacks--in this instance, "abandon", the ability to
surrender oneself to "natural impulses", to be free "from constraint or
convention" (OED). Felix will later come to recognize this gift as
nothing, as "the most formless loss", but initially this gift signifies,
for him, an infinitude of possibility:
He had thought of making a destiny for himself,
through laborious and untiring travail. Then
with Robin it seemed to stand before him with-
out effort. (p.42)
Almost from the beginning, Felix sees Robin as the mother of a
"son who would feel as he felt about the 'great past" (1). 38). To
produce such a son (such a body of writing, such a tradition) would be
his patriarchal destiny and Robin appears to be the suggestible,
material vehicle of that destiny. "With an American anything can be
done': thus, Felix (Freud?) sets about moulding this prehistoric and
hysteric material to his end. He teaches her--about history, art and
himself--and he "shows her the world". He doesn't abandon his idea of
her, of this object of his, even when he becomes puzzled by her
resistances, even though he "wreckEs] himself and his peace of mind in
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an effort to acquaint her with the destiny for which he had chosen her"
(1). 45). Seemingly unaware of his own "humble hysteria" and of the
operations of his own desire in creating this symbol for his destiny,
Felix only seems to mis-apprehend Robin by objectifying her.
And then, of course, his object of desire--his objet a--does the
unthinkable. Like the problematic Dora before her, this object, on the
impetus of some other volition that he has not obviously recognized or
accounted for, rejects the gift/child/phallus that he knows she must
want and walks out on him. And, what had seemed to him "security" (the
security on destiny's loan to him?) turns out to be '"in reality, the
most formless loss'. This experience has 'placed [him] in the dark for
the rest of [his] life" (1). 113). As we have seen, for the Freudian
man, the objet a, if it is fashioned on the female figure, as it must be
for the proper heterosexual, must symbolize the "central lack of
desire". Thus the female must be emptied of organs, of active impulses
or a libido specific to the female but not in service of the maternal
function, that cannot be accounted for in a phallic organization. The
hystera that actively rejects the phallus is thus unthinkable--or
nothing, a blank, a hole, a total loss.
But then, the desire of the Freudian man does not stop simply
because the symbol which covers the lack gets up and walks out for
some unfathomable reason. The desire-system is far more durable than
that. Deprived of Robin, Felix, following the "normal" course of spurned
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lovers, transfers his desire on to a new object.A' However, there is a
poignant irony in Felix's choice of a new object, for his desire settles
upon the deformed, "mentally deficient and emotionally excessive",
phallus/child that should have been the object of its mother's desire.
"I have become entangled in the shadow of a
vast apprehension which is my son; he is the
central point toward which life and death are
spinning, the meeting of which my final design
will be composed."
"And Robin?" the doctor asked.
"She is with me in Guido; they are insepar-
able, and this time," the Baron said, catching
his monocle, "with her full consent." (p. 117)
Felix, by assuming what should have been the mother's desire, at last
"has Robin". In "catching his monocle", he recuperates the one-eyed
phallic organization, but in the place of the maternal. This usurpation
of a mother's desire is, in fact, a complete inversion of the Freudian
scheme that sees the girl wanting to bear the child-product-of-incest
that is inseparable from her own father. He who should want to re-
create himself in the belly of his wife-who-is-really-his-mother ends
up mothering his father-son (Felix's father and son are both named
Guido). Is it any wonder, then, that the phallus/child is deformed, as
if "born to holy decay" (1). 107)? Nightwood through the agency of
hysteria, thus begins to undo the Freudian family knot.
Jenny Petherbridge, who is "the personification of the 'thief" (pp.
97-98), according to Dr. O'Connor, and who is the target of the text's
unremitting derision, can be read as a realization of Freud's programme
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of feminine psychology as presented throughout the Freudian text,
particularly in the essays "Female Sexuality" and "Femininity". At
least, a case could be made for such a reading. Jenny is "jealous"--her
"continual rapacity for other people's facts" (1). 67) and possessions
(phalli) is insatiable—, yet her aggressivity is restrained: "her head
moved perceptibly with the broken arc of two instincts, recoil and
advance, so that the head rocked timidly and aggressively at the same
moment" (1). 65). She has no intellect and little capacity for
sublimation, but she is a good mimic:
She had the fluency of tongue and action meted
out by divine providence to those who cannot
think for themselves. (% 68)
The words that fell from her mouth seemed to
have been lent to her; had she been forced to
invent a vocabulary for herself, it would have
been a vocabulary of two words, "ah" and "oh".
(1). 66)
She spends most of her time thinking of love. O'Connor says that "for
her, the sole destiny is love" (p. 98) and that, for Jenny, love is "'the
passion that (is] all renunciation and lung trouble, with flowers at the
bosom" (p. 102). And, she is empty: "No one could intrude upon her
because there was no place for intrusion" (i 68). In her behaviour and
sentiments, Jenny fulfills the general Freudian programme for
"femininity", although we should be careful to note that Freud, in
practice, made a distinction between his hysterics (who are usually
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attractive and, notably, intelligent) and the general run of the female
population:
I cannot imagine bringing myself to delve into
the psychical mechanism of a hysteria in anyone
who struck me as low-minded and repellent, and
who, on closer acquaintance, would not be cap-
able of arousing human sympathy; whereas I can
keep the treatment of a tabetic or rheumatic
patient apart from personal approval of this
kind	 The procedure is not applicable at
all below a certain level of intelligence
But do not forget that I have only been describ-
ing women in so far as their nature is deter-
mined by their sexual function. It is true
that that influence extends very far; but we
do not overlook the fact that an Individual
woman may be a human being in other respects
as wel1.4-
Jenny is "low-minded and repellent". Her hysteria, which is acute and
commonplace and bears none of the attractiveness of Robin's enigmatic
condition, is quite literally "repellent":
Then Jenny struck Robin, scratching and tearing
in hysteria, striking, clutching and crying.
(i 76)
Because Robin's engagements were with some-
thing unseen, because in her speech and in her
gestures there was a desperate anonymity, Jenny
became hysterical. She accused Robin of a "sen-
suous communion with unclean spirits." And in
putting her wickedness into words she struck
herself down. ( 1). 168)
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This acute, aggressive, accusatory and "wicked" hysteria appears to be
another of Jenny's "secondhand dealings with life" (1). 66). Having
"struck herself down", she begins to walk "up and down her darkened
hotel room, crying and stumbling", mimicking both Nora's earlier pacing
(p. 61) and Robin's somnambulism. And, of course, Jenny's "secondhand
dealings" are the sign of her utter inadequacy, her inauthenticity: "It
takes a bold and authentic robber to get first-hand plunder" (1). 66).
Her great sin is that she "was a 'squatter' by instinct" (p. 68).
The derisive term "squatter" signifies not only an illegitimacy or
impropriety of possession, but also lowness (the position assumed in
squatting) and women in general, for women squat to urinate as well as
to defecate. And this squatter, positioned "below a certain level of
intelligence", propriety, attractiveness, authenticity, and cleanliness, is
"not	 capable of arousing human sympathy". The sympathetic Dr.
O'Connor--who is himself anonymously designated the "Squatting Beast"
(1). 163)--declares: '"I wouldn't piss on her if she were on fire! I
said, Jenny is so greedy that she wouldn't give her shit to the crows"
(1). 106). O'Connor makes several scatalogical references to Jenny--
"'snatching the oats out of love's droppings" (1). 101); '"one of those
who nip like a bird and void like an ox" (1). 138); etc.--which are
significantly contributory to Jenny's repellent condition. These
scatalogical references, if read through the Freudian text, not only
trigger a humourous disgust but mingle disgust with the concept of the
secondhand. In a renowned footnote to "Infantile Sexuality", Freud
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notes the infantile tendency to confuse the anal and genital processes,
and he states: "the genital apparatus remains the neighbour of the
cloaca, and actually [to quote Lou Andreas-Salome] 'in the case of
women is only taken from it on lease m." Thus, women's "genital
apparatus" is a borrowed, or secondhand, anus, as her libido, if she is
to have one, is a secondhand libido, for the libido is only ever
masculine.45
This squatter, this secondhand Jenny, is a figuration of the
Freudian feminine that, on the accidental grounds of its anatomy,
remains unsalvageable, beyond the analyst's aid because the analyst
finds her repellent. As we have seen, there is no amelioration of this
figure in Nlghtwood, which seems only to find this woman laughable.
Barnes undoes this figure of feminine psychology by ridiculing it--"She
defiled the very meaning of personality in her passion to be a person
(1). 67)--and by demonstrating its inadequacy in relationship to
the text's version of hysteria, or of the hystera Jenny does not
desire Robin, as such; she desires the love that cannot, because of her
incapacity to be a person, be hers:
When she fell in love it was with a per-
fect fury of accumulated dishonesty; she became
instantly a dealer in second-hand and therefore
incalculable emotions. As, from the solid arch-
ives of usage, she had stolen or appropriated
the dignity of speech, so she appropriated the
most passionate love that she knew, Nora's for
Robin. (1). 68)
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In other words, this woman's desire is for a "female desire that is no
more her own than the logocentric "solid archives of usage". Cut off
from the original and originary hystera--because she is structured by
an other, phallic organization--, Jenny can only borrow the objet a, the
"intaglio" of the object of female desire and, in borrowing, miss the
significance (or "alchemy") of this objet a. It is interesting that, in
her secondhand hysteria, Jenny accuses Robin of "sensuous communion
with unclean spirits", thus echoing a traditional diagnosis of hysteria
as a form of "possessim". A6
 (In the final chapter of Nightwood, it
might be argued, Barnes rewrites this apprehension of hysteria as
possession.) For this Freudian woman, the hystera is both
incomprehensible and beyond acquisition. But then, the Freudian woman
is always constituted by lack: her organ is nothing, unless it is
borrowed from the phallus (or anus). Here again, Barnes is undoing the
Freudian knot: in Nightwood, the Freudian woman's desire for the
phallus is a laughable, misdirected, and unsuccessful, attempt at a
misappropriation of impossible funds.
Nora Flood, it might be said, comes (obliquely) to this realization:
"I can't live without my heart'" (p. 156); "She is myself" (p. 127); "'A
man is another person--a woman is yourself, caught as you turn in
panic; on her mouth you kiss your own" (1). 143). Nora's realization
can, of course, be read as a recognition of narcissism. A narcissistic
love would certainly correspond with Nora's "homosexuality"; however,
narcissism, as Freud delineates it, is an attempt to re-install the pre-
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oedipal "primary narcissism" which is an harmonious state untroubled by
the vicissitudes of object-choice, and there is no suggestion or hint of
such an harmonious state in Night wood Nora's relationship with Robin
is always a struggle--"I struggled with her as with the coils of my
own most obvious heart" (1). 151)— and always precludes the safety
that narcissism can offer the Freudian ego. 4-7
 Also, it is difficult to
read Robin as some sort of narcissistic ego-ideal in this relationship
as Robin is not only Nora's "self" but also '"everything [Nora] can't
bear in the world" (1). 135), "'evil and degradation" (i 135), and a
"monstrosity" (1). 142). If narcissism is some sort of guarantor of the
"pleasure principle" in action, then either Nora's narcissism is
mutilated or Nora's love for Robin has little, or nothing, to do with
narcissism.
We should bear in mind that, as far as Freud is concerned, woman's
narcissism is always mutilated: her narcissism is "wounded" by her
recognition of the "fact of castration". Aa This is why Freud's
exemplary "female homosexual" finally chooses a woman who bears a
physical resemblance to her brother (a proper heterosexual choice, or a
manifestation of an assumed masculine narcissism?).
	 As far as
Nightwood is concerned, there may be something to this concept of a
"wounded narcissism" for Nora admits: '"I, who want power, chose a girl
who resembles a boy"' (1). 136). And, in this reading, the power is, of
course, the phallus. But, we are still left with the problem of Robin's
unbearableness--her attractive repulsiveness, as it were--which is a
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feature not worn by a Freudian narcissistic object-choice. Robin may
be Nora's "self", but she is also the other. O'Connor says that, for
Nora, Robin "was always the second person singular" (p. 127), the "You"
to Nora 's "I".
Nora's narcissism is, then, most problematic and appears to go
beyond the narcissistic limits prescribed by the Freudian text. It is a
sort of Freudian narcissism in crisis, or a "narcissistic crisis" that
Julia Kristeva has identified as "abjectiome. s° For Kristeva, the
"abject" is the "inseparable obverse" of "being", that which the "I" must
(violently) repudiate in its struggle toward identity.s1 At the primary
level, of course, the abject is the maternal body from which every "I"
must become disengaged and which, for the safety of the "I", must
henceforth be considered disgusting, repulsive and/or taboo. In
general, though, the abject is the "not-I" that threatens the integrity
of the "P': it can be a corpse, faeces, menstrual blood, blood per se,
or any bodily remainders or dejecta that bring the "I" face to face
with its "not-I" (that ex-"I" that is now dead, lifeless) or point
"toward the non-separation of subject/object". s2 The abject is the
target of all taboos and religious prohibitions. It is what must be
repulsed, forbidden, as evil or defilement, if a person or a people are
to maintain the propriety and integrity of identity. Abjection, the
"narcissistic crisis", is, according to Georges Bataille, as cited in
Powers of Hon-or, "merely the inability to assume with sufficient
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strength the imperative act of excluding abject things (and that act
establishes the foundations of collective existence)".6
It is essential to remember that, although the "act of excluding
abject things" is "imperative", the abject is always the "inseparable
obverse". Always excluded, it is yet always inseparable, always there.
Thus, abjection constitutes a crisis in narcissism, particularly in its
reiteration of primary narcissism. In narcissism, there is no external
object--the subject itself (the image of the subject) is the object.
This inseparability of subject and object--"the non-constitution of the
(outside) object"--both "renders unstable the ego's identity, which could
not be precisely established without having been differentiated from an
other, from its object" and recalls the indifferentiation of the primal
"mother-child dyad". 4- Although narcissism would appear to be a
preservation of the ego, it is actually threatening to the ego for it
brings the ego face to face with its own demise, its non-being as it
were. Narcissism in its crisis, in its turn back upon the self, is
abjection.
Reading Nora's love for Robin as narcissism, we should also read
Nora's condition, finally, as abjection:
"Once I was remorseless, but this is another
love--it goes everywhere; there is no place
for it to stop--it rots me away." (1). 152;
emphasis added)
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This love "goes everywhere", having "no place" where it might "stop".
It is a love without a proper external object and without the boundary
between inside and outside that would prevent the "me" being rotted
away. In trespassing the boundary between inside and outside, this
love is also an incestuous, taboo-breaking love: '"Robin is incest, too
[....]"1. This is Nora's penultimate recognition of Robin, and it has
taken her a long time to come to it. After the initial fascination with
Robin, after the dreadful betrayal, after Nora's journey through the
night of the unconscious (guided by the abject metaphors of the
perverse poet/doctor O'Connor) in search of understanding, Nora comes
face to face with the "terrible" realization of abjection:
'"And then that day I'll remember all my life,
when I said: 'It is over now'; she was asleep
and I struck her awake. I saw her come awake
and turn befouled before me, she who had mana-
ged in that sleep to keep whole. Matthew, for
God's sake, say something, you are awful enough
to say it, say something! I didn't know, I
didn't know that it was to be me who was to
do the terrible thing! No rot had touched her
until then, and there before my eyes I saw her
corrupt all at once and withering because I had
struck her sleep away, and I went mad and I've
been mad ever since	 (i 145)
In bringing Robin to consciousness, in reaching down into the
"deep-shocked realm" (p.35) of the unconscious and fishing up that
which consciousness has excluded, Nora has committed the "terrible"
deed. She has transgressed the proper separation of subject ("I",
consciousness) and object ("other", unconscious) and come face to face
with corruption. The corrupt, rotting, abject thing that Nora faces is
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not, of course, "Robin Vote in her own right", but Robin as Nora's
narcissistic object, that "inseparable obverse" of Nora's self, the
corruptible body. And, having "struck" her untouchable self, having
broken that taboo, Nora goes "mad" and refuses to "put the pen away" (p.
124):
"If I don't write to her, what am I to do?
I can't sit here for ever--thinking
I've got to write to her," Nora said. "I've
got to." (pp. 125-26)
This brings us right to the point of the relationship between
abjection and writing that is the thesis of Kristeva's Fbairs of Horror:
Before turning properly to the subject of the writing of abjection,
however, I want to emphasize the preponderance of the abjection
delineated in Night wood. The discourses of Dr. O'Connor, which are not
unlike "hysterical ravings", are laden with the poetics of abjection.
Corpses, dismemberment, decay, excrement, offal, rotten apples,
executioners, and the instruments of murder (scalpels, swords, hatchets,
knives, meataxes) form the fund of his metaphors for life, knowledge,
love. Society's freaks--the tattooed man, the narcissistic paralytic,
the legless woman, the "Tuppenny Uprights", drug addicts, male and
female prostitutes--are his exemplars. Before Nora has come to
understand the lineaments of her love, O'Connor forecasts her future
knowledge in his citation of a curse that is, in a way, an incantation
of the female abject:
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"Look for the girls also in the toilets
at night, and you will find them kneeling in
that great secret confessional crying between
tongues, the terrible excommunication:
"May you be damned to hell! May you die
standing upright! May you be damned upward!
May this be damned, terrible and damned spot!
May it wither into the grin of the dead, may
this draw back, low riding mouth in an empty
snarl of the groin! May this be your torment,
may this be your damnation! God damned me
before you, and after me you shall be damned,
kneeling and standing away till we vanish!
For what do you know of me, man's meat? I'm
an angel on all fours, with a child's feet
behind me, seeking my people that have never
been made, going down face foremost, drinking
the waters of night at the water hole of the
damned, and I go into the waters, up to my
heart, the terrible waters! What do you know
of me? May you pass from me, damned girl!
Damned and betraying!'
"There's a curse for you," he said, "and
I have heard it."
"Oh!" Nora said, "Don't--don't!" ( 1). 95)
It is worth pausing, for a moment, before this passage. It is a
difficult passage to follow, and not only because of the ambiguities
that certain parts of the syntax give rise to, but also because of the
borders that are trespassed in its twisting progression. The trespass
is, first of all, a carnivalesque inversion--the confessional, here, is a
public toilet; the kneeling position is that assumed in a one-sided
cunnilingus; and the "confession" is an "excommunication", a curse,
uttered by prostitutes. However, this is not a simple inversion of the
relationship of priest and profligate, for this curse is a doubled,
self-reflective, address. Not only is the penis damned--"May you die
standing upright"--, but the vagina--"low riding mouth"--is damned as
well. '"May you pass from me, damned girl" can be read both as a
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repudiation of the female self (or body) and as a demand that the male
"pass from me, [the] damned girl". "Man's meat" can be read, variously,
as the penis, the female body (the sustenance of masculine desire), or
the human body per se. The "you" is at one moment the second person
singular and, in the next, the "self". Damnation, then, is all-
encompassing, but priority is claimed for the "girls" (who, in Dr.
O'Connor's gay discourse could be either female or male): "God damned
me before you, and after me you shall be damned".
In a certain sense, the precepts of this curse are very
conventional. Eve was damned before Adam; Adam was damned through
Eve; the prostituted body is, conventionally, defiled, damned; and those
who have consorted with prostitutes have, conventionally, been
contaminated by the prostitutes "damnation". The phrase "terrible and
damned spot" draws upon the image of Lady Macbeth and her bloodstained
hands, which is another portrait of the abject as feminine--the
murderous mother, madness, and taboo blood. On the one hand, then, we
have a conventional delineation of the female body as abject—damned,
tormenting, contaminating. This is the absolute (revolting) other of
the "clean and proper"; it is what has always been excluded and
prohibited--at least, repressed--by the Law that maintains the
integrity of the individual, society and of language. On the other
hand, however, what we also have here is the unthinkable in
conventional terms, for in this passage, it is the abject thing itself
that speaks, that presumes the laws of signification and the voice of
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denunciation. Moreover, it speaks from the margin of a place that
cannot be measured or circumscribed, the "terrible" "waters of night",
and what it seeks is an identity outside of any structure of
signification, "my people who have never been made". This voice doesn't
respect proper boundaries: it refers to itself as "an angel on all
fours, with a Child's feet behind", collapsing the distinctions between
the divine being and the beast and between innocence and bestiality as
It has collapsed the distinction between inside (identity) and outside
(rlon-identity). Although this curse has borrowed from phallic
discourse, its ambivalence and ambivalent use of abject metaphor undoes
a properly phallic organisation. We should also recall that this curse
of the abject has been re-cited by the 'Old Woman who lives in the
closet" (p. 138) whose own little phallus, 'Tiny O'Toole", is "lying in a
swoon!' (p. 132) and is "like a ruined bird" (I,. 133).
On her first visit with Dr. O'Connor, Nora--the upright Seventh Day
Adventist--cannot bear this voice of the kneeling abject: "Oh!' Nora
said. 'Don't—don't!" By her second visit, however, after she has
passed through an identification with Robin--"l will do what she has
done, I will love what she has loved" (p. 156)—and with the night,
Nora comes to an apprehension of abjection:
"Suffering is the decay of the heart; all that
we have loved becomes the 'forbidden' when we
have not understood it all, as the pauper is
the rudiment of a city, knowing something of
the city, which the city, for its own destiny,
wants to forget." (1). 156)
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It is this aprehension of abjection and the abject that underlies all of
Nightwood: the abject is simply that which we once loved but which now
is "forbidden", taboo, because we have not "understood it all", because
it exceeds the enclosure of epistemology; abjection is the unavoidable
"suffering" of those who persist in loving, or find themselves loving,
the "forbidden". As Kristeva points out, abjection is a "borderline"
state, and not only because so-called borderline patients suffer it:
abjection, while unable to exclude the abject, yet retains that border
between the proper and the abject. It commits incest at the same time
as it acknowledges the incest taboo. The person suffering abjection
stands at a very uncertain threshold between identity and non-identity,
literally between life and death, and this is why abjection is full of
"fear":
Nell, I, Dr. Matthew-Mighty-grain-of-salt-
Dante-O'Connor, will tell you how the day and
the night are related by their division. The
very constitution of twilight is a fabulous
reconstruction of fear, fear bottom-out and
wrong side up. Every day is thought upon and
calculated, but the night is not premeditated.
The Bible lies the one way, but the night-gown
the other. The night, 'Beware of that dark
door!" (pm)
Thus, the doctor pre-scribes, at the outset of his symptomology of
the night, the threshold that constitutes the space of abjection:
between day and night, between calculation and unpremeditatim, and
between a moral/religious code and unconscious/sexuality. This between
is constituted by a "fabulous reconstruction of fear". Given O'Connor's
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frequent references to fables and myths, we can read this "fabulous" as
not only "astonishing" but "mythical, legendary, unhistorical" (OED) as
well. The "fabulous reconstruction of fear", then, would be a matter of
turning an elemental prehistoric or primary fear into a story, myth or
fable--dressing "the unknowable in the garments of the known" ( 1). 136),
as it were. 'Twilight" could also be fear's own reconstruction, a
rehabilitation of abjection under the impetus of fear. Whatever the
motivation, on the threshold between day and night, fear must be re-
constructed, turned inside out and inverted, as a fable. It is only
through this process of symbolic organization that the fear that is
abjection can be put away, that one can recover from abjection.
Kristeva suggests that the writer "is a phobic who succeeds in
metaphorizing in order to keep from being frightened to death; instead
he comes to life again in signs". s;	 a'cici "At that level of
downfall in subject and object, the abject is the equivalent of death.
And writing, which allows one to recover, is equal to a resurrection."s7
But, this resurrection may not be the end of the story. Nora says
that the resurrection is a "second duel" (I). 58), another bi-partite
conflict that may also be fetal. Night wood gives clear indication that
writing is compulsive and not a one-off catharsis or ameliorization of
abjection—Nora keeps on writing to Robin and, by writing, keeps
bringing Robin up to consciousness:
"Terra damnata et maledicta!" exclaimed the
doctor, banging his fist down. "My uncle
Octavius, the trout-tickler of Itchen, was
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better; he ate his fish when he caught it!
But you, you must unspin fate, go back to
find Robin! L...] you are always writing to
Robin. Nothing will curb it. You've made
her a legend and set before her head the Eter-
nal Light, and you'll keep to it	 How
do you know what sleep you raise her from?"
(1). 125)
"The trouble with you is you are not just a
myth-maker, you are also a destroyer, you made
a beautiful fable, then put Voltaire to bed
with it [...J" (1). 140)
Thus, this writing is both compulsive and compulsively marked by
the (absent) object. It simultaneously creates and destroys. The
writer of abjection, although continuously resurrected, is still always
on that threshold, fascinated by the abject. Like Dr. O'Connor, the
writer of abjection has "got heart failure for the rest of [his or her]
life" (p.24). Kristeva explicates the relationship of the writer and the
abject as follows:
[Contemporary literature] seems to be written
out of the untenable aspects of perverse or
superego positions. It acknowledges the impos-
sibility of Religion, Morality, and Law--their
power play, their necessary and absurd seeming.
Like perversion, it takes advantage of them,
gets around them, and makes sport of them.
Nevertheless, it maintains a distance where
the abject is concerned. The writer, fascin-
ated by the abject, imagines its logic, pro-
jects himself into it, introjects it, and as
a consequence perverts language--style and
content. But on the other hand, as the sense
of abjection is both the abject's judge and
accomplice, this is also true of the litera-
ture that confronts it. One might thus say
that with such a literature there takes place
a crossing over of the dichotomous categories
of Pure and Impure, Prohibition and Sin, Moral-
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ity and Immortality.
For the subject firmly settled in its super-
ego, a writing of this sort is necessarily impli-
cated in the interspace that characterizes per-
version; and for that reason, it gives rise in
turn to abjection. And yet, such texts call
for a softening of the superego. Writing them
implies an ability to imagine the abject, that
is, to see oneself in its place and to thrust
it aside only by means of the displacements of
verbal play. It is only after his death, even-
tually, that the writer of abjection will escape
his condition of waste, reject, abject. se; a"Pt1'..1"'n
Certainly, Nora, as the prototypical writer of Night wood, has this sort
of relationship with her abject, Robin. Nora is (perversely)
"fascinated" by Robin: she "imagines" Robin's logic, puts herself in
Robin's place, projects herself onto Robin ("she is my heart"), and
introjects Robin (or, at least, the "intaglio" of Robin's "identity").
And, she realizes that only death will end this entanglement: "'it is
always with her in my arms--for ever it will be that way until we die"
(1). 150). Nora also, according to Dr. O'Connor, "perverts [...] style and
content": "you made a beautiful fable, then put Voltaire to bed with
(Arid, Voltaire may qualify as another writer of abjection, if we
take into account works like Candide.) But, we might well ask, are
Nora's myth-making and letter-writing the significant paradigms of the
production of the text? Is her abjection the "intaglio" of the
abjection of the writer of Night wood?
Before attempting to answer these questions and addressing
Nig-htwoods writing of the abject, I want to bring up a problem with
the use of Kristevais theory of the abject in an analysis like this.
Kristeva always maintains the essential structures of the Oedipal
family. For her, writing is always primarily a phallic activity, the
"speaking being" is always "masculine" (the symbolic being the phallic),
and the non-speaking "other" (the semiotic) is always marked by the
maternal.
If "something maternal" happens to bear upon
the uncertainty that I call abjection, it
illuminates the literary scription of the
essential struggle that a writer (man or woman)
has to engage in with what he calls demonic
only to call attention to it as the inseparable
obverse of his very being, of the other (sex)
that torments and possesses him E...J Leaving
aside adherents of a feminism that is jealous
of conserving its power--the last of the power-
seeking ideologies--none will accuse of being
a usurper the artist who, even if he does not
know it, is an undoer of narcissism and of all
imaginary identity as well, sexual included.
ss; sempi,asimadd
The "writer (man or woman)" is always "he", and the "inseparable
obverse of his very being", the abject, will always have "something
maternal" about it. This concept of the writer as masculine (the
symbolic system being the father's arena) is something that Kristeva
has inherited from Lacan and, in the specific structure of the
Freudian/Lacanian symbolic system, is a perfectly valid concept. But, if
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we take into account the strict biologism underlying the oedipal
structure, we must realize that the woman writer can only ever mimic
"his very being" and that her attempts to write are always motivated by
an envy that he doesn't share. Writing is proper to him This is made
very clear at certain points in Powers of Horror; for example, in
writing about the eroticization of abjection—an event which follows
the "collapse of the Oedipal triangulation that supports" the sign and
thus allows the writer of abjection to "pervertEl language"--Kristeva
adds:
When a woman ventures out in those regions [in
which abjection takes the place of the other,
object of desire] it is usually to gratify, in
very maternal fashion, the desire for the ab-
ject that insures the life (that is, the sexual
life) of the man whose symbolic authority she
accepts. Very logically, this is an abjection
from which she is frequently absent; she does
not think about it, preoccupied as she is with
settling accounts (obviously anal) with her
own mother. Rarely does a woman tie her desire
and her sexual life to that abjection, which
coming to her from the other, anchors her in-
teriorly in the Other. When that happens, one
notes that it is through the expedient of wri-
ting that she gets there, and on that account
she still has quite a way to go within the
Oedipal mosaic before identifying with the
owner of the penis.
Even on those rare occasions when a woman does eroticize abjection--
which necessarily makes her a "writer", as "writing" seems to be the
only "expedient" available to her in her "maternal fashion"--"she still
has quite a way to go" before she can catch up with him It is little
wonder, then, that Kristeva's "writers of abjection" are all men--
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Dostoevsky, Proust, Joyce, Borges, Artaud, Bataille, Lautreamont, Kafka,
Baudelaire, Sartre, Celine—for whom the abject is, finally, the
"something maternal" which is properly "the other (sex) that torments
and possesses" them.
I would not presume to challenge Kristeva's thesis on abjection,
but I would suggest that something, perhaps, has been left over. This
suggestion has arisen entirely from my reading of Afightwvod as a text
of abjection written by a Fromm (Given Kristeva's apparent adherence
to Freudian biological determinism, I feel justified in emphasizing
Barnes's gender.) If Barnes is going through the "Oedipal mosaic", it is
not, I would argue, in order to identify with "the owner of the penis".
Rather, it seems that Barnes is continually chipping away at the
"Oedipal mosaic" in order to clear a-space for her "people who have
never been made", for that which has resisted phallic organization,
particularly the relationship of woman to her material origin (the
organed female body).
Nora's recitation of her third dream demonstrates this chipping
away. Two principal images of this dream are Nora's dead grandmother
and her living father "struggling with that death [of the father's
mother] as if they were struggling with the sea and my life .", and
these images mark out the father's abjection: he is "low going and
into the grave beside her, his head thrown back L.J, struggling with
her death terribly'" 	 149X Yet, Nora says that this "'I have done to
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my father's mother, dreaming through my father, and have tormented them
with my tears". Dreaming through her father, Nora has identified
(effortlessly?) with the owner of the penis in order to create or re-
create the mother's death, the father's abjection. And, this
identification is only one possible movement in the re-creation of the
unbearable: "this, I have done to Robin: it is only through me that
she will die over and over, and it is only through me, of all my family,
that my grandfather dies, over and over'. In the dreaming that brings
her face to face with the abject (as the death of the object and the
collapse of the subject/object distinction), the identification with or
detour through the father and the father's abjection is but one
possibility. The dead paternal grandmother is but one possible figure
of the abject object. The dream throws up other images of the abject--
Robin, the (maternal?, paternal?) grandfather--that elude the strictures
of the "oedipal mosaic", for whatever relationship Nora may have with
these figures, it need not be a relationship taken over from "the owner
of the penis". Obviously, the oedipal account--as the account of
distinction, demarcation, and the sign--is merely one account of
abjection, and it is not the account that Nora settles. Nora, who is, at
first, almost the paradigmatic subscriber to the Name of the Father,
may have wanted "power", but Barnes has her pay an exorbitant price for
that desire--the knowledge that the abject/object of her desire is also
her self before or outside of the "oedipal mosaic", at "the centre of
eroticism and death"--a dissolving and destabilized centre--in which
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the phallogocentric dialectics of power are irrevelant. There can be,
it seems, no recuperation from this knowledge of abjection.
Kristeva writes of Joyce and his writing of Molly Bloom that:
L.J from afar, the writer approaches the
hysterical body so that it might speak, so
that he might speak, using it as a springboard,
of what eludes speech and turns out to be the
hand to hand struggle of one woman with another,
her mother of course, the absolute because prim-
eval seat of the impossible--of the excluded,
the outside-of-meaning, the abject. Atopia.G1
If we replace "from afar" with "from within" and "he" with "she"--
from within, the writer approaches the hysterical body so that it might
speak, so that she might speak--, we will come closer, I tilt* to a
formulation of Barnes's textual abjection than a strict adherence to
Kristeva's theory of abjection will permit. Nores "mistake" was in
thinking that she was approaching Robin from the outside, when all the
time she was already within the hysteric's dream: "'Robin is not in
your life, you are in her dream, you'll never get out of it'" (1). 146);
was like a shadow in her dream that could never reach her in time,
as the cry of a sleeper has no echo, myself echo struggling to answer"
(x 145); "What part of monstrosity am I that I am always crying at its
sideVu (p. 142). Only the woman writer can make this sort of approach
(and, finally, it is the only approach she can make.)
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Take the case of Dr. O'Connor, who is as Joyce-like as a character
could be. This Irish, catholic, expatriate, pseudo-
obstetrician/gynecologist (we should recall, here, Joyce's study of
obstetrics and gynecology during his writing of Ulysses and his early
medical studies)6 with the "gift of the gab" comes as close to
articulating the hysterical body in his "poetic" (in the Kristevan sense
of language afflicted by eruptions of the semiotic) digressions. Like
Kristeva's Joyce, O'Connor "causes [the abject] to break out in
prototype of literary utterance" which is a female utterance--Molly's
monologue or the curse of the prostitutes. His "voice" is "as irritable
and possessive as a maddened woman's" (4).15). But then, unlike Joyce,
we may assume, O'Connor is a character in a novel written by a women,
and in this novel he is confused and silenced by a woman's, Nora's,
abjection (I). 158). Having been silenced, he "falls", assuming the
position of the crucified, "his arms spread, his head between them" (I).
166), and he utters the prophecy: '"Now L.J the end--mark my words--
now nothing-, but wrath and weepingi" (1). 166). According to Night wood,
then, the "end" of the man (however womanly) who would attempt to
enable the hysterical body to speak, or, crossing over to the inside,
attempt to speak from the place of the hysterical body, is annihilation
of the self, of meaning. In other words, the approach to the abject
hysterical body is, for a man, for phallic signification (no matter how
abbreviated or perverse), fatal. "He" becomes, as Barnes wrote of Joyce,
"crucified on his sensibilities".
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For "her", however, the approach to the hysterical body produces
not the end, but another chapter. O'Connor collapses: Nora and Robin
carry on to another sort of climax. There has been little critical
consensus on the last chapter of Nig-htwood, and with good reason, for
it is "enigmatic", seemingly inconclusive, and, for some critics, almost
pointless.'"- However, if we read this chapter as some sort of
supplement to this text of abjection, recuperating and extending
simultaneously the woman's approach to the hysterical body, it is not
quite, perhaps, so problematic. 	 In such a reading, what happens in
"Nora's part of the country" and in her "decaying Chapel" (1 ). 168) is
the reconstruction of a "primal scene" in which the triangulated oedipal
structure has been displaced by another erotic triangulated structure:
woman, woman, and beast.
There are only three Characters in "The Possessed", the three
women Robin, Jenny and Nora. The Chapter opens with Robin and Jenny
arriving in New York--"The doctor said: 'In America, that's where Nora
lives. I brought her into the world and I should know" ( 1). 49). Robin
is incommunicative: she seems "distracted" and will "not listen to
Jenny's suggestions"; Jenny can "do nothing with her"; it is "as if the
motive power which had directed Robin's life [...] had been crippled".
Robin begins "to haunt the terminals, taking trains into different parts
of the country, wandering without design" ( I). 167) as though she is
looking for something but she doesn't know what. Silent, wandering,
distracted, her motive power seemingly crippled, Robin seems at her
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most hysterical. She wanders "into church as one renouncing something".
Just what she is renouncing is not apparent, but she is moving "like a
housewife, come to set straight disorder in an unknown house". This
last descriptive phrase stands out because it would seem to contradict
everything we know about Robin--there is something incongruous about
the image of Robin as a "housewife" setting "straight disorder".
CEspecially if we recall that when Felix and O'Connor first set eyes on
Robin, her "unseen birds" have been "left without the usual silencing
cover, which, like cloaks on funeral urns, are cast over their cages at
night by good housewives" Cp. 347.) There are at least two readings of
this image which imply a motivation that the text would appear,
ostensibly, to deny. The first is that the woman, with her housewifely
sense of where things should be, enters the unknown and unfamiliar
bachelor residence of Father and Son in order to "set straight" the
"disorder" of a masculine/patriarchal religion. The second reading,
through the text of Freud's case histories, would engage the notion of
the obsessive housewife, whose motivation or drive is unconsciously
deflected into compulsive behaviour. There is little to choose between
these two readings and, in the light of Robin's hysteria, they can
overlap: the important thing to note is the implication of a motivation
or drive toward rectifying something. Robin may be "wandering without
design" or "fixed in an unthinking stop", but she is driven by something
beyond, or beneath, thought or conscious design.
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Leaving the strictures of the church, Robin "wallds) the open
country in the same manner"--"like a housewife come to set straight
disorder"?--where she identifies with the unspecified animals (feral or
domestic?) that come near enough to be "grasped": "Those that came
near, she grasped, straining their fur back until their eyes were
narrowed and their teeth bare, her own teeth showing as if her hand
were upon her own neck" (p. 168). Could this be another form of
projection, the equivalent of Nora's projection of the intaglio of
Robin's identity? A narcissistic identification with the animal would
explain, at least in part, the enigma of the silent hysteric, with her
"unpeopled thoughts" (i 46). To be hysterical, then, would be to be in
some sort of "sensuous"--rather than articulated--"communion" with the
animal/body (or the "unclean", as Jenny puts it).
Through all of this, Robin does not speak. Only Jenny speaks in
this chapter, and her utterance is a venial sin: "in putting her
wickedness into words she struck herself down". At this point, at the
point of wicked utterance, Jenny ceases to be, and she drops out of the
narrative. Robin now "head(s7 up into Nora's part of the country"--from
Jenny, she "head[s]" Ono longer "wandering"?) "up" to Nora's place. The
"up" of this phrase signals the beginning of an upward movement that
will bring both Robin and Nora to their meeting in the "decaying
chapel" at "the top of the hill" (1). 169). Robin begins to "circlet]
closer and closer", like a stalking animal, as if to circumscribe "Nora's
part of the country". "Sometimes she slept in the woods [..-] Sometimes
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she slept [...] in the decaying chapel	 but she never went further."
It is worth noting that, at this point, Robin is again described as
sleeping, unconscious. Then Nora's dog barks.
The barking dog, of course, fulfills O'Connor's prophecy that
"though those two [Nora and Robin) are buried at opposite ends of the
earth, one dog will find them both" (p. 106). When the dog barks,
Robin is awoken and "brought [...] up, rigid and still" and Nora, [Mall
an acre away [...] raised her head". The dog begins to run "about the
house" and then outwards, "barking and whining [Nora] heard him farther
and farther away" (1). 168-69). "After a moment she got up, unlocking
the doors and windows" as though to invite, to open up her house to,
danger. Unable to wait (for what?), Nora goes out of the house. "The
night was well advanced. She could see nothing." She moves upward
toward the "decaying chapel" on the hill where "a light ran the length
of the door". In all the darkness, that which is lighted, that which
can be seen, is the Chapel door, the threshold between Nora and Robin,
between the subject and its abject. Nora doesn't go through the door,
she collides with it: "cursing and crying, and blindly, without warning,
[Nora] plunged into the jamb of the chapel door". Inside Nora's ruinous
chapel, which Nora does not/cannot enter, Robin is standing before "a
contrived altar" with a Madonna, two candles, flowers and toys on it.
She is dressed in "boy's trousers", which signals, at once, her
hysterical bisexuality and her childish lack of sexual definition. This
signaling suggests that Robin represents the hystera not in its
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singular maternal sense, in the terms of the maternal-sexual function
insisted on by Freudian discourse, but in the sense of the female organ
as the site of a libido which is only in part, if that, masculine, or is
disguised as masculine, and which is prior to its maternal structuring
in the phallic economy.
The Madonna, as we have seen before, is peculiarly,
unconventionally, significant in this text. Earlier, Nora has told
O'Connor of another Madonna that she has seen through an open door:
"In the narrow streets of Naples, ivies and
flowers were growing over the broken-down
walls. Under enormous staircases, rising
open to the streets, beggars lay sleeping
beside images of St. Gennaro; girls going
into the churches to pray were calling out
to boys in the squares. In open door-ways
night-lights were burning all day before gaudy
prints of the Virgin. In one room that lay
open to the alley E.-3 in the semi-darkness,
a young girl sat on a chair E...1 as if half
of her slept, and half of her suffered. When
she saw me she laughed, as children do, in
embarassment. Looking from her to the Madonna
behind the candles, I knew that the image, to
her, was what I had been to Robin, not a saint
at all, but a fixed dismay, the space between
the human and the holy head, the arena of the
'indecent' eternal. At that moment I stood in
the centre of eroticism and death (-3
(pp. 157-58)
The "open" doors, Knight-lights", "broken-down walls", "flowers", the
childlike before the "gaudy" Madonna, the "candles", generate the same
sort of scene of the complication of innocence and experience, of life
and death (like "ivies and flowers [...] growing over broken-down
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walls"), as the scene in the chapel. The difference is that, in "The
Possessed", the scene has come home to "Nora's part of the country".
The open door of the "decaying chapel" is the threshold of Nora's
abjection, of her specific "centre of eroticism and death" within which
Nora and her Robin "would have broken down to [their] love" (p. 158).
The Madonna marks out the space of the "indecent' eternal", of the
incestuous mother/child dyad, but without the patriarchal third party
(father or god or holy spirit) or the symbol of the patriarch (the
peaceful dove, messenger to Noah and Mary) that completes and gives
reason and language to the Oedipal family. The third party in
Night woods triangulation is the "barking and whining dog", Nora's
inarticulate and carnivorous beast.
With Jenny's demise, speech has already been done away with. When
Nora's body collides with the wood of the door, the subject, as such,
disappears: "at the moment Nora's body struck wood, Robin began going
down" (i 169). To this point, everything has been going upward, now it
begins to go down with the disappearance of the subject, Nora, who
seems to vanish once her body strikes the wood (prime matter, the
cross, the "rich and bloody wood" [pp. 5-61) of the threshold. Nora's
body trips: Robin's falls down. Has Nora's body become Robin in the
disappearance of the subject? (We should recall, here, the subject
O'Connor's demise, arms spread upon the (wooden?) table.) I would
suggest that this is the critical moment, the most abject moment, of
the text, when the "I" disintegrates and vacates the scene. From here
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on, the scene appears to be solely that of the "not-l". Now, within
Nores chapel, "as if (..J in the belly of a great mother where there
was yet room to play" (p. 54), Robin drops onto all fours (like the
cursing prostitutes, like a dog) and begins to enact an erotic, at once
touching and terrifying, dance with Nor-es dog. The libidinal nature of
this "obscene and touching" dance is unmistakeable: what is also
unmistakeable is that the masculine libido of "him", the dog, is
countered by and engaged with "her" feminine libido. The drive that
initiates and sustains the dance is her, Robin's, drive. At the end of
Nightwoo4 beyond its speeches and subjects, at the limit of its
abjection, is a carnivalesque revolution of the Freudian libidinal
economy, that primeval force that, sublimated, becomes "writhe.
The dog, quivering in every muscle, sprang
back, his tongue a stiff curving terror in his
mouth; moved backward, back, as she came on,
whimpering too, coming forward, her head turned
completely sideways, grinning and whimpering.
Backed into the farthest corner, the dog reared
as if to avoid something that troubled him to
such agony that he seemed to be rising from
the floor; then he stopped, clawing sideways
at the wall, his forepaws lifted and sliding.
The head down, dragging her forelocks in the
dust, she struck against his side. He let
loose one howl of misery and bit at her, dash-
ing about her, barking, and as he sprang on
either side of her he always kept his head
toward her, dashing his rump now this side,
now that, of the wall.
Then she began to bark also, crawling after
him--barking in a fit of laughter, obscene and
touching. The dog began to cry then, running
with her, head-on with her head, as if to cir-
cumvent her: soft and slow his feet went pad-
ding. He ran this way and that, low down in
his throat crying, and she grinning and crying
with him; crying in shorter and shorter spaces,
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moving head to head, until she gave up, lying
out, her hands beside her, her face turned and
weeping; and the dog too gave up then, and lay
down, his eyes bloodshot, his head flat along
her knees. (1). 170)
It is interesting to note how the writing of the last pages of
"The Possessed" seems to contract into a smaller space the rhetorical
circlings and terminological repetitions that characterize the text as a
whole. The sentences are shorter and simpler; the vocabulary becomes
limited and simple words--"down", "head", "turned", "crying", "side", etc.-
-are repeated over and over. And, repetition is the means by which we
re-call (whether for pleasure or for catharsis) the "primal scene".E.G.
It is as if the writing, itself, is being "destroyed back to [its]
structure as an old master disappears beneath the knife of the
scientist who would know how it was painted" (pp. 129-30). Going back
to its structure, what the text seems to offer is an illustration of a
feminine libido and a feminine organ rather than or as well as the
penis-pen of the Freudian text. As I have noted before at similar
junctures, this is not a matter of simple inversion. Of course, there
is some simple and necessary inversion--the father GOD becomes a male
DOG. But, Barnes is not simply replacing Freud's masculine libido with
a feminine libido or replacing the phallic system of signification with
a non-phallic one. This text is not about replacing one sameness with
another. It is more about "inbreedire, about the incestuous difference
within sameness that is repressed, or obliterated, by the Freudian
project, and is only faced at the extremity of abjection. It is that
"inbreeding" which produces the supplement of abjection, that which both
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sustains and overcomes abjection, the text which inscribes differance
within itself.
As Dr. O'Connor says to Nora, who cannot stop "writing":
"You are," he said, testing the wine bet-
ween his lower lip and teeth, "experiencing
the inbreeding of pain. Most of us do not dare
it. We wed a stranger, and so 'solve' our
problem. But when you inbreed with suffering
(which is merely to say that you have caught
every disease and so pardoned your flesh) you
are destroyed back to your structure as an old
master disappears beneath the knife of the
scientist who would know how it was painted.
Death I imagine will be pardoned by the same
identification	 Ah, to be able to hold
on to suffering, but to let the spirit looser'
(pp. 129-30)
The "mating" dance of Hors's lover and Nora's dog, with its
combination of agony and attraction, its crying and barking, is a
ritualistic (carnivalesque) enactment of the inbreeding of pain. It is
also a certain anxious excavation of the valuable creation or image by
the artist-scientist who would know how "love" was constructed. Such
inbreeding Oa term which inscribes difference [of gender] within
sameness [of family]) is a de-struction, an agonizing ruination of
fiction (as something made). But, it is also a pardon--a remission of
sins, a restitution of the criminal (without purgation), a "document
conveying a pardon" (O0). What are identified and pardoned by the
document-text are the flesh and death, the abject. Only incest or the
destructive inbreeding of pain/fear/desire can produce such an
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offspring, or supplement, as a text pardoning (restituting, forgiving)
the abject. And, perhaps, only the woman writer can inbreed in this
way, for only she is both subject (as writer) and abject/object (as the
hystera). Perhaps only she can destroy these distinctions of subject
and object back to their structure and, so, identify and "pardon" the
centre of eroticism and death which is only masked by the orthodox
figure of the maternal, the Madonna, or the maternal phallus.
Julia Kristeva describes the anxious or anguished excavation that
is the writing of abjection as follows:
On the trail of my fear I meet again with my
desire, and I bind myself to it, thus leaving
stranded the concatenation of discourse with
which I have built my hallucination, my weak-
ness and my strength, my investment and my
ruin.
It is precisely at such a point that writ-
ing takes over, within the phobic child that
we are, to the extent that we speak only of
anguish (...J The mature writer, whether a
failure or not (though perhaps never losing
sight of those two alternatives), never stops
harking back to symbolization mechanisms,
within language itself, in order to find a
process of eternal return, and not in the ob-
ject that it names or produces, the hollowing
out of anguish in the face of nothing.'57
Upon the meeting of the fearful "I" and its desire, at the con-
junction of investment and ruin which is abjection, in the last two
paragraphs of hrightwood, writing does take over: the subject
disappears and terms and phrases circle about the centre of eroticism
and death, as though marking out a circuitous "process of eternal
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return". But, is this a "hollowing out [...] in the face of nothing"? Is
there not something there, "her face turned and weeping", at the end of
the tunnel, beyond the hole left by the impossible maternal phallus in
the oedipal symbolization mechanism? In Nightwoo4 the excavation of
the made (fiction, anguish, the object) is also, at the same time,
inbreeding and the production of a difference within sameness. It is
not an excavation in the face of nothing, but of a something that has
not yet been made in the symbolic system--the hystera, the female
organ, and a female libido. Nora, who always would go back to find
Robin, writes in anguish, but in the end, she does re-turn to Robin,
though at great cost to her "self". And Barnes, who seems always faced
with "my people who have never been made", becomes the writer of a
female abjection which forges, excavates, out of anguish a place, a
text, for those "people".
I would suggest that Nora is, perhaps, the "intaglio" of Barnes's
subjectivity, although I remain suspicious of bio-critical readings that
simply assume that Nora = Djuna. I do not find it useful to align the
characters of Nig-htwooch which are not mimetic or realistic in an
orthodox sense, with historical personages. (HowTviu-, I do suspect that
those critics who suggest that Robin Vote is Thelma Wood are on to
something, even if they don't always recognise Just what it is that
they are on to.) After all, history and (Aristotelian) mimesis are
"deflowered" in this text. Yet, some sort of subjectivity persists in
this writing of the disintegration of the "I". Nora vanishes, but
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something, from within the symbolic, persists in articulating that
abandonment, insists on speculating, evaluating, troping. Even in the
arena of the "not-I", speculation and troping persist: the dog rears
"as if to avoid something"; his tongue is a "stiff curving terror"; and
Robin's barking laughter is "obscene and touching". Is this not
evidence of the "mature writer L.J harking back to symbolization
mechanisms" (the speculative and tropaic) "in order to find a process of
return" to the primal, and abject, scene? But, the primal scene of
Mightwood, Nora's "centre of eroticism and death," is scarcely a
Freudian/Kristevan primal scene: rather, it is a specifically female
primal scene, composed of the (non)maternal, female desire, and the
female's (pet/male) beast, the dog as a possession of Nora.
In a reading of Night wood as a writing of abjection, Nora is not
Djuna and Robin is not Thelma; rather, Nora and Robin can be read as
figures—or projections, for we are still in the sphere of narcissism--
of the writer and the writer's abject. As if in anticipation of Lacan
and Kristeva, Barnes has delineated the condition of abjection and,
specifically, of a female abjection that Kristeva will later hold a
virtual impossibility. But, then, Barnes has read the Freudian text
differently to Kristeva, making up other sentences with the key
signifiers of that text and suturing the gap that is the "enigma of
women" with the thread of the female libido. In other words--again, as
if in anticipation of Kristeva--, Barnes has carnivalized the Freudian
project[ion] and delivered its repressed into an active participation
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with the symbolic. Chipping away at the oedipal mosaic, Barnes makes
room for the other, for the (not only maternal) female, in what would
be a discourse of sameness. And, because she does so, her work
solicits the privileged status of the phallus in the general economy of
writing and signification. Whatever anxiety it is that spurs writing
on, whatever it is that, sublimated, becomes writing, it need not be
predicated on a specifically phallic organization of desire. It may,
also, be the specifically female anguish of a woman brought face to
face with her other/self.
CONCLUSION
"She who stands looking down upon her who lies
sleeping knows the horizontal fear, the fear
unbearable. For man only goes perpendicularly
against his fate. He was neither formed to
know that other nor compiled of its conspiracy."
(1). 87)
Occasionally, in Night wood, masculine designators (=Ins, pronouns)
are used as generic forms--"he" refers to "Man" as humankind--, and a
case might be made for reading the "he" of the above passage as a
generic term. However, this passage is preceded and succeeded by
exemplars of apparently heterosexual relationships: '"He lies down with
his Nelly and drops off into the arms of his Gretchen"; and "'For the
lover, it is the night into which his beloved goes L.J that destroys his
heart: he wakes her suddenly, only to look the hyena in the face that
is her smile". It is quite possible, then, to read the personal pronouns
and nouns of the cited passage as gender-specific and the passage itself
as a contrast between "she" and 'We", between she who "knows" and he who
is not "formed to know". The ambiguity of the passage permits this
much.
The contrast between "she" and "he" hinges upon "that other", the
demonstrated ("that") and feminine ("her") object speculated (looked) upon
by the standing and perpendicular subjects. And, only the subject "she"
can know ("recognize L.J identify L..] distinguish"; "acknowledge the
claims or authority of"; "have carnal acquaintance with" EOM) the
abjection-al "fear unbearable" because only she, it would seem, is
"formed to know that other" and "compiled of its conspiracy". As Nora
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says elsewhere, "'A man is another person--a woman is yourself, caught
as you turn in panic 	 (1). 143).
What would be "that other", then? According to Nightwcxxl it is
Robin, the hysteric with the leonine, beastly qualities, the rejecting and
irretrievable mother, the prehistoric, the preoedipal libido that is also
female, the feminine organ(s), evil, the irretrievable unconscious, the
Great Enigma, the abject. In short, it is everything that has not been
known by the phallic organizations of historical, theological and
psychoanalytic discourses. Within those organizations, "that other" is
designated as "death" or "evil" or "nothing": it is what must be negated
so that it may be got round, so that its incestuous power may be
annulled, so that one does not die.
Of course, it is precisely this "other" or death/evil/no-thing that
the carnivalesque work and that epitome of carnivalesque works, the
writing of abjection, bring into play. They make possible a relationship
between phallic, authoritative organization and the non-phallic,
heterological other at the same time as they subvert the possibility of
a synthesis of these so-called opposites. They permit the return and
reinstatement of the "repressed" while, at the same time, deferring the
effect of that return and reinstatement which would be the death of the
subject and/or of society. Certainly, this is what, in Night wood, Barnes
has done--like Bakhtinss carnivalesque writers and like Kristeva's
writers of abjection. However, Barnes has also done so with an
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additional difference--a difference not in evidence even in the fictional
work of the only other nominated woman writer of the carnivalesque,
George Sand--and this difference is the (inconceivable) difference within
the other (the female) itself.
If there is always "something maternal" about the other of the male
writer, there is also something maternal about "that other" of Nightwooll
Yet, that other also exceeds the maternal which is rendered as something
simultaneously irretrievable and imaginary. The other is both "something
maternal", which is its phallic designation, and the organed female body
that is prior to the maternal and so escapes phallic demarcation. And
"that other", that split and differentiated other, Barnes seems to
suggest, can only be written (to) by a woman, for only "she" can know
the unbearable fear that is the death of the subject (the limit of
abjection) as only she is formed to know that other and compiled of its
conspiracy. It is, at once, her other and her self.
The carnivalesque and abjection's engagement with or to the other
proceeds from the symbolic and the sollicitation of the symbolic toward
the (impossible) recuperation (and, perhaps, colonization) of the other.
It must be stressed that that other is always marked by a systemic
femininity. The other is always that which does not have the antecedent
of the "it", that which is a negativity, a hole, an abyss, an enigma, that
which eludes phallic definition and articulation, that which stands over
against identification. For the penis-owning writer Ono matter how
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"feminine" he might be) of the carnivalesque or abject text, the other
can be always that which the "I" is not properly anymore.
For the female writer (as owner of the hystera), the relationship
between the "I" and that other is more complex because the "other" is
always her "self" as well. Seemingly sacrosanct and always dominant
symbolic codes (sociocultural, theological, historical, literary,
psychoanalytic) inform her that she (even as subject) is and always has
been "that other" contaminated by other-ness. Of course, she can, as
Woolf has done, attempt to articulate the other as the sphere of the
emotive, non-rationalist, sensory consciousness. She can articulate the
"I" of an "other". But if that woman writer (like Barnes, like Kristeva)
has laid a claim on the "intellect"--on the sphere of the production of
the metaphysical, theological, etc, discourses--and has an interest in
the revolutionizing of the orthodox, she is faced with a peculiar
dilemma. On the one hand, she may choose to accede to the conventional
designations of the "symbolic" as masculine and the "semiotic" as
feminine--if she also agrees that gender is a significatory acquisition
transcending sexual difference--and read the carnivalesque and the
"poetic" as productive eruptions of the (semiotic) other. On the other
hand, she may, in recognizing sexual difference as that difference which
can be neither transcended nor reduced, choose to rewrite the
distinctions between, and the "inbreeding" of, subject and other. If she
is both the subject and "that other", then both the subject and the other
must differ from their orthodox delineations. Barnes, I think, has
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chosen the latter route, plunging into the dark and abject other-world
of the night-wood in order to bring the female subject and that other
face to face, so that "'the face of the one tells the face of the other
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Scott argues that reading Night wood as "surrealist fantasy",
instead of "inverted naturalism", "tends to make it a 'safe' book, one
which does not threaten in any way the security of the reader" (p. 119).
I am merely using his own argument against him.
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all possibility, and this gesture effectively puts an end to
undecideability, variability, and possible difference. It is an
authoritative imposition of closure on truth and a means of securing
authority's dominance for the future.
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25 Ibid, p. 266.
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AS Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago:
U. of Chicago Press, 1981). See esp. "Plato' s Pharmacy", pp. 61-172.
Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, pp. 3-4.
Balchtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Rotsel trans., pp. 103
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Ae Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Birth of Tragedy" in The Birth of
Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golf fins (New York:
Doubleday, 1956), pp. 19-36.
69 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James
Strachey, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), Vol. XVIII, pp. 36-42.
SO 
"difference": Fr. differer < L. differre = to differ and to
defer.
'Now, the word difference (with an e) can never
refer either to diffe:rer as temporization or
to differ-ends as polemas Thus the word dif-
ference (with an a) is to compensate--economi-
cally--this loss of meaning, for difference can
refer simultaneously to the entire figuration
of its meanings. It is immediately and irreduc-
ibly polysemic C....1 In its polysemia this
word, of course, like any meaning must defer
to the discourse in which it occurs, its inter-
pretive context; but in a way it defers itself,
or at least does so more readily than any other
word, the a immediately deriving from the pre-
sent participle (different), thereby bringing
us close to the very action of the verb differer,
before it has even produced an effect consti-
tuted as something different or as difference
(with an e). In a conceptuality adhering to
classical strictures 'difference' would be said
to designate a constitutive, productive, and
originary causality, the process of scission
and division which would produce or constitute
different things or differences. But, because
it brings us close to the infinitive and active
kernel of differer, difference (with an a)
neutralizes what the infinitive denotes as
simply active, just as mouvance in our lang-
uage does not simply mean the fact of moving,
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of moving oneself or of being moved. No more
is resonance the act of resonating. We must
consider that in the usage of our language the
ending -once remains undecided between the ac-
tive and the passive. And we will see why that
which lets itself be designated diffdrance is
neither simply active nor simply passive, an-
nouncing or rather recalling something like
the middle voice, saying an operation that is
not an operation, an operation that cannot be
conceived either as passion or as the action
of a subject on an object, or on the basis of
the categories of agent or patient, neither
on the basis of nor moving toward any of these
terms For the middle voice, a certain non-
transitivity, may be what philosophy, at its
outset, distributed into an active and a passive
voice, thereby constituting itself by means of
this repression (Margins of Philosophy, pp. 8-9)."
Thus, Jacques Derrida "explains" the spelling of this "movement" that is
"neither a word nor a concept", that has "neither existence nor essence"
(p. 3), a movement that "announces" an "order that resists the
opposition, one of the founding oppositions of philosophy, between the
sensible and the intelligible" (12, 5) (because the difference between the
a and e of differ Once can be neither seen nor heard, and because
intelligibility is "not fortuitously affiliated with the objectivity of
theorein [= to look at, to see]- or understanding [Derrida uses
entendement] (1). 5)".
-51 Thid, p. 11.
S2 Ibid, pp. 6 and 11.
G Thid., p. 17.
SA lbid, p. 18.
55 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 198.
5G Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 272.
S7 lbid, pp. 272 and 273.
SS Ibid, pp. 272 and 270.
G Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Rotsel trans, p. 88.
G° Ibid, p. 131.
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Gl Ibid, p.134.
62 Ibid., p. 101.
G3 Julia Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue, and Novel" in Desire in
Language, pp. 64-91. Both Bakhtin and Kristeva see the Menippean satire
as a progenitor of more recent carnivalesque writings such as the works
of Dostoevsky and Joyce.
Kristeva, Desire in Language, pp. 82-83.
GS Umberto Eco, "The frames of comic 'freedom" in Carnival!, ed.
Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin, New York, Amsterdam: Mouton, 1984), p. 3.
ss Juliet Mitchell, "'Femininity, Narrative, and Psychoanalysis',
Women: The Longest Revolution" in Feminist Literary Them,: A Reader,
ed. Mary Eagleton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), P. 101. For Kristeva's
work on the "carnivalesque" see Le Texte du roman (The Hague, Paris:
Mouton, 1970) and Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller
(New York: Columbia U.P., 1984).
67 I am circumventing Mitchell's argument that "politically
speaking, it is only the symbolic, a new symbolism, a new law, that can
challenge the dominant law" because I find it logically unsound. Any
"law", any "symbolic", implies dominance and the imposition of meaning
(ie. Lacan's "Name of the Father"). A "new law" is simply a substitute or
supplement to the "old law": its relationship to the "unlawful", or
"lawlessness", is unchanged.
66 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Fbetics, Rotsel trans, p. 111.
69 Ibid
70 Kristeva, p. 71.
71 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p. 12, trans. fn. 14.
72 Ibid., and Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 143.
CHAPTER 77-NEE: HISTORY  DEFLOWERED
' David Lodge, "The Language of Modernist Fiction: Metaphor and
Metonymy", in Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane eds., Modernism
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 481.
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Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature, Part I", p. 225.
3 Baxter, p. 1176.
Albert Cook, The Meaning of Fiction (Detroit: Wayne State U.P.,
1960), p. 126; Pochoda, pp. 187 & 188.
s Benstock, pp. 266 & 262.
s The question of "modernism", of the definition of "modernism",
has yet to be resolved, if it ever can be. Malcolm Bradbury and James
McFarlane, in "The Name and Nature of Modernism", demonstrate the
difficulties in describing this particular term:
Perhaps the oblique nature of Modernism ex-
plains why critics have found it so hard a
movement to find a clear place or date for.
For the potential of Modernism was long pre-
sent in the development of literature; it is
possible to discern its origins long before
we see its fruition. If Modernism is movements,
then movements had been coming in increasing
waves right through the nineteenth century.
If the movements have to be bohemian or avant -
g-arde, then bohemia was active in Paris from
the 1830s; and the theory of the artist as a
futurist, an agent free and loose in the realm
of dangerous knowledge, was active throughout
romantic thought. If an explicit aesthetic of
experimentalism is required, then Emile Zola
published Le Roman experimental in 1880 (though
he used the word in a scientific or laboratory
sense). The crucial idea of the modern as a
special imperative and a special state of expo-
sure exists in Nietzsche. If Modernism means
the ruffling of the hard naturalistic surface
by a state of multiplicity of consciousness,
then Walter Pater in the 1870s in England and
other thinkers in Europe were talking of 'quick-
ened, multiplied consciousness'. If Modernism
means a response of the imagination to an
urbanized, Gesellschaft world, then Baudelaire
spoke of the unreal city and the need for the
imagination to produce 'the sensation of new-
ness' C....3 Indeed Modernism can look surpris-
ingly different depending on where one finds
the centre, in which capital (or province) one
happens to stand. (Modernism, p. 30.)
7 Pochoda, p. 188.
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Peter Ackroyd, Notes for a New Culture (London: Vision Press,
1976), pp. 119 & 147.
Pochoda, p. 187.
lo Burke, "Version, Con-, Per-, In-: Thoughts on Djuna Barnes's
Novel Nightwoocr, p. 245.
11 T.S. Eliot, "Introduction" to Djuna Barnes's Nightwood New York:
New Directions, 1961), p. xiv.
12 William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell" in The
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 37. Some of Blake's
"Proverbs of Hell" are:
The road of excess leads to the palace of
wisdom.
Prudence is a rich ugly old maid courted by
Incapacity.
Prisons are built with stones of Law, brothels
with bricks of Religion.
The tigers of wrath are wiser than the horses
of instruction.
The head Sublime, the heart Pathos, the genitals
Beauty, the hands and feet Proportion.
Enough, or too much!
Blake and Barnes: both writers and painters/engravers; both largely
self-educated and inordinately, if eclectically, well-read in obscure or
unusual texts CBoehme, Swedenborg, the theosophists, for example) as well
as the classical canons; both self-proclaimed creators, and defenders, of
"works of imagination". The fundamental similarity between the two
might be best illustrated by a comparison of Blake's "Preface" to Milton,
which denounces the "ignorant Hirelings" "in the Camp, the Court, & the
University", those "fash[i]onable Fools" "who would if they could, for
ever depress Mental & prolong Corporeal War", and against whom those
who "are but just & true to our own Imaginations, those Worlds of
Eternity", must "Rouze up!" (The Complete Poetry and Prose of William
Blake, p. 95) with Barnes's 'Torward" to the 1928 edition of Ryder
This book, owing to censorship, which has
a vogue in America as indiscriminate as all
such enforcements of law must be, has been
expurgated. Where such measures have been
thought necessary, asterisks have been employed,
thus making it matter for no speculation where
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sense, continuity, and beauty have been damaged.
That the public may, in our time, see at
least a part of the face of creation (which it
is not allowed to view as a whole) it has been
thought the better part of valour, by both
author and publisher, to make this departure,
showing plainly where the war, so blindly
waged on the written word, has left its mark.
Hithertofore the public has been offered
literature only after it was no longer litera-
ture. Or so murdered and so discreetly bound
in linens that those regarding it have seldom,
if ever, been aware, or discovered, that that
which they took for an original was indeed a
reconstruction.
In the case of Ryder they are permitted to
see the havoc of this nicety, and what its
effects are on the work of imagination.
NINA BARNES
Paris, August 8, 1927.
Taken from Ryder (New York: Horace Liveright, 1928), p. xi. There is not
space in this thesis to further delineate the relationships between the
texts of Barnes and Blake, but I offer the above as a justification of
the occasional reference to Blake in the course of this analysis.
IS Alan Singer, in his A Metaphorics of Fiction, has also noticed a
coincidence: "L.J what links the author's and character's voices here is
a predilection for epigrammatic statement. Miming the duplicitous
teleology of the lie, the pronouncements of the narrator and the doctor
almost always arrange themselves paratactically as pairs of literal-
discursive and figural-extrapolative complements" (3. 59) and "O'Connor)
becomes a vehicle for transcending the opposition narrator/character" (p.
60).
I am relying principally on the terms and definitions offered
by "Literary Forms of the Bible", an article appended to the New English
Bible: (afford Study Edition New York: Oxford U.P., 1976). My reference
to biblical aphorisms, or proverbs--without mention of the rich history
of aphoristic writings from Aristotle, through Augustine, Chaucer,
Montaigne, La Bruyere, Blake, Coleridge, Proust, Wilde, etc, etc,--serves
a specific purpose here. While I recognize that Barnes may well be
writing within a tradition of aphoristic literature, I am, at this point,
more interested in the carnivalizing of the paradigmatic Proverbs
offered in the eponymous biblical Book.
IS Singer, p. 61.
15. Ibid, p. 63.
17 Ibid, p. 65.
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Ibid, p. 61. Singer refers to Rhetoric, Sec. 171.
' 	 Binary opposition depends upon a concept of one thing and its
opposite, so that, although the member parts of the binary opposition
are mutually exclusive, both depend for their definition on the dominant
one thing. Thus, binary opposition rests upon the assurance of
sameness.
Jane Marcus, in "Laughing at Leviticus", spends a great deal of
time on this figure of Nikka and develops the thesis that "his skin (is)
a text on which the dominant culture writes him as other" qi 156X
'This figure is a projection of a 'phallic negro' and is the white man's
archetypal erotic animalization of the black (...J The black man's body is
a text of Western culture's historical projections and myths about race.
The angel from Chartres represents the myth of the black as angelic,
innocent, and childlike during the early days of slavery; the book of
magic refers to Europeans' fears of African religions" ( 1). 152). While
there is much of interest in Marcus's reading of ummae% she does not
seem to have noticed the specifically rhetorical nature of this "figure"
in Dr. O'Connor's poetics. Instead, she appears to have lifted this
figure out of its specific context, treating it as almost universally
emblematic: "Modernism, then, if we take Night wood as its most
representative text, is a tattoo on the backside of a black homosexual
circus performer" (1). 156). Aside from the fact that the text gives no
specific indication that this figure is to be read as a homosexual
figure, I also have some difficulty accepting Marcus's thesis that Nikka's
tattoos are the invasive writings of a dominant culture. After all,
according to the poet O'Connor, his figure chooses "barbarity" because he
loves "beauty and would have it about him".
21 Samuel Beckett and Georges Duthuit, 'Three Dialogues" in Samuel
Beckett: A Collection of Critical Esosays, ed. Martin Esslin (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1965), p. 17.
22 Hanrahan, pp. 92-94.
23 Pochoda, pp. 179 & 190.
24 Ryder, p. 1.
23 New English Bible: Oxford Study Edition. John 1: 1-5.
26 See esp. Jacques Derrida, 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the
Text of Philosophy" in Margins of Philosophy where Derrida discusses in
detail the metaphors of "light" and the "sun" as the "founding" metaphors
of philosophy, of a theorin that is "seeing", perceiving, and clarity.
27 These are all facets of the "dream-work" as Freud describes it
in The Interpretation of Dreams in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud
trans. and ed. Dr. A.A. Brill (New York: The Modern Library (Random House],
1983), pp. 181-552.
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.29 The Interpretation of n..-Elms, p. 362.
.29 Mid., p. 223.
30	 p. 250-51.
Freud worked out his "natural science" model of memory in the
early essay "A Project for a Scientific Psychology" in The Origins of
Psychoanalysis in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud Vol. I, pp. 175 ff.
Derrida, 'Freud and the Scene of Writing" in Writing and
Difference, pp. 202 and 200. In this essay, Derrida examines how, from
the "Project" to "Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad", Freud's models for
psychic structure depended on the metaphor of writing.
CHAPTER FOUR: NIGHTWOOD: GOD'S LITTLE BAG OF TRICKS
' See Julia Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue, and Novel" in Desire in
Language, p. 80: "The laughter of the carnival is not simply parodic; it
is no more comic than tragic; it is both at once, one might say that it
is serious This is the only way that it can avoid becoming either that
scene of the law or the scene of its parody, in order to become the
scene of its other."
We might, in considering the carnival as the scene of the other in
the specific context of Pauline Christianity, also consider the etymology
of "carnival" which is derived from the Latin carnem ievane, "the putting
away of flesh (as food)" (OED). There is a delightful ambiguity in this
translation which can signify, at once, eating flesh
(feasting/fornicating) and turning the flesh away (fasting/abstinence).
The carnival may be, traditionally, a time of riotous feasting before
Lent, but it is always marked by the inevitability of fasting which is
variously its reason, result and excuse. With its obvious roots in
carnem, the carnival is predicated on the seminal Platonic/Christian
distinction between spirit and flesh, a distinction to which this
analysis pays a great deal of attention.
Marcus, 'Laughing at Leviticus: Nigh twood as Woman's Circus
Epic".
Burke, 'Version, Con-, Per-, and In-: Thoughts on Nuns Barnes's
Novel Nightwood", p. 244.
Gerstenbe_rger, pp. 132-33.
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9 Ulrich Weinstein, "Beast, Doll, and Woman: Djuna Barnes' Human
Bestiary", Renascence., XV (Fall 1962), pp. 3-11.
Pochoda, pp. 179-91.
7 F.R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit (London: Chatto and Windus,
1952), P. 284.
a 1 Corinthians 13:12: "For now we see through a glass, darkly;
but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even
as also I am known."
9 Gerstenberger is principally interested in how this "mock-
creation narrative" disrupts "Itlrust in historical progression and in
narrative as a means to a serviceable end" (p. 133), however her reading
of the text is also most valuable to a discussion of Nightwooa's
disruption of Judeo-Christian concepts of "origin".
10 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973):
"Poetic history, in this book's argument, is
held to be indistinguishable from poetic in-
fluence, since strong poets make that history
by misreading one another, so as to clear ima-
ginative space for themselves" (1). 5).
I have no intention of employing Bloom's entire schemata for the
reading of "poetic influence" in MightwoccF -one would have to find a
"Laius" for Barnes's "Oedipus" if one were to follow Bloom's centerings
"upon intra -poetic relationships as parallels of family romance" (p. 8),
and I am not at all certain that such a father-figure exists for Barnes.
However, Bloom's notion of the "clinamerP as the initial stage of the
successor poet's development in relation to the precursor can be very
useful to an analysis of Barnes's relation to certain precedent
traditions. Bloom offers this "synopsis" of the "cLinaimar2":
1. Clinamen, which is poetic misreading or
misprision proper; I take the word from Lucre-
tius, where it means a "swerve" of atoms so as
to make change possible in the universe. A
poet swerves away from his precursor by so
reading his precursor's poem as to execute a
clinamen in relation to it. This appears as
a corrective movement in his own poem, which
implies that the precursor poem went accurately
up to a certain point, but then should have
swerved, precisely in the direction that the
new poem moves. (1). 14)
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" Plato, "Phaedrus", trans. R. Hackforth, in Plato: The Collected
Dialogues, 266b.
It is this sort of inexactitude that renders a precise
employment of Bloom's "method" of reading difficult. Barnes may well
have read both Augustine and Loyola; she was, after all, a friend of
Joyce and he may have passed on, or suggested, these texts to her. It
may just be possible, too, that these texts were in her grandmother's
"library". These are, of course, speculative ventures, and I only make
them in order to establish that it is not impossible that Barnes had had
access to either text. Barnes could have become familiar with the
structures of Pauline doctrine that are discussed in this chapter
through her reading of Dante, if not from the Seventh Day Adventist
influence in her own family. I should also note, here, that the first
suggestion of a relationship between The Confessions and Nightwvod was
Kenneth Burke's, and Burke was a long-standing acquaintance of Barnes.
Romans 6: 3-7 (CD/). Paul's conversion is described in Acts 9:
1-19.
See fn. 10. In suggesting that we would only be led back to
Augustine, I am following John Freccero who, in Dante: The Poetics of
Conversion, argues for an Augustinian, and thus Platonic, influence on
Dante's writing of The Divine Comedy rather that a predominantly
Aristotelean influence.
Is In citing the reasons for my Choice of "intertexts", I have
made a series of generalisations that may well be questioned by anyone
familiar with these texts and that, thus, need to be qualified. The
generalizations will become more particular as the chapter proceeds, but
to thread the loom, I introduce another series of con-texts that will
attend the weaving of this discussion. My reading of the structures of
"conversion" owes its patterns in part to John Freccero's Dante: The
Poetics of Conversion (Cambridge, Massachusettes, and London: Harvard
University Press, 1986) and, in part, to Philippe Sollers's "Dante and the
Traversal of Writing" in Writing and the Experience of Limits, trans.
Philip Barnard and David Hayman (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983). The informing argument for a Platonic, rather than Aristotelian,
influence in the works of Dante and Augustine is Freccero's, and this
argument can be embossed by Derrida's reading of Plato in Dissemination.
To the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Lacan, and to Roland Barthes
Sade/Loyola/Pourier, as well as Freccero and Sollers, I owe the reading
of discursive structures of "desire". My reading of Nightwood's "desire"
is also informed, in part, by Julia 1Cristeva's Desire in Language and
Tales of Love, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1987) and, more emphatically, by Luce Irigaray's Speculum of the
Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1985) and This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985). To Kenneth Burke, of
course, goes all the credit for recognizing Barnes's adoption of
Augustine's "turn".
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' 	 The Confessions of 51. Augustine, ed. and trans. unrecorded
London: Griffith, Farran, Browne and Co, Ltd, 1886), Book X, Chapter XX.
17 Ibid, Book VIII, Chapter ILL
1B Henry Chadwick, Augustine (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), p. 22.
19 Burke, "Version, Con-, Per-, and In-", p. 243. As will become
apparent, I do not entirely agree with Burke's assessment of Nightwood
as a "secular variant" of the "religious" text. Nor do I agree with
Burke that this specific variation, which intimates a connection between,
or paralleling of, religious and romantic passions, is (rhetorically)
motivated by Barnes's need to persuade the reader that Nora's and Robin's
love is properly lamentable in the religious sense. Of course, Burke's
essay is somewhat more suggestive (and rather epigrammatic) than
conclusively analytic, and it does little more than point out most
usefully this one essential similarity/difference between The Confessions
and Night wood I am using Burke's essay as a starting point only: my
"alembications" follow quite an other line to that intimated by Burke's
suggestions, particularly as regards "motivation" with its
presuppositions of the originary intention, etc. A considerable part of
the difference between my reading and Burke's is that a
poststructuralist analysis remains suspicious of certain concepts (for
example, intention) that neo-Aristotelean rhetoric takes for-granted. As
a consequence of this difference, my examination both goes back much
further--to the Platonic roots of Augustine's "turn" - -than Burke's and
projects a more radical con-, per-, in- version of Augustine's "pattern"
by Barnes's text than that projected by Burke.
20 This "question of priority" is the question that Jacques
Derrida posits in "'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy"
in Margins of Philosophy.
2 ' Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).
22 Burke, "Verson, Con-, Per-, and In-", p. 242.
23 Augustine, Book IV, Chapter XI.
24- 
_Mid, Book IV, Chapter XVI.
2s The route that this detour takes is, of course, the text of The
Confessions, which insists that it is a guide (a trail, a track) through
the process of conversion:
For the confessions of my past sins, which Thou
hast "forgiven and covered" (P15. xxxii,
that Thou mdghtest bless me in Thee L.J when
read and heard, stir up the heart, that it may
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not slumber in despair, and say, "I can't" f....]
(Book X, Chapter III)
26 Dante, The Divine Comedy, Vol II Purgatory, trans. Mark Musa
(New York: Penguin Books, 1987), Canto XVI, 88-90 and Canto XVII, 100-
102.
27 Cardinal Newman, Idea of a University, Dis. iii (London: Oxford
University Press, 1976), p. 64.
zet Augustine, Book VII, Chapter XIL
29 Plato, "Republic", Book VII, 518 c and d.
30 Augustine, Book VII, Chapter XVII.
31 See Augustine, Book IX, in which he describes the exemplary
life and death of his mother, "Monica, Thy handmaid".
a	 Burke, "Version, Con-, Per-, and 111-", p. 242. Burke
concentrates on the novae of turns: he does not, however, remark on the
proliferation of turns throughout the entire text, from beginning to end.
33 This scene of the "pelvic round" has its analogue in
Nightwoods description of the circus in which clowns "in red, white and
yellow, with the traditional smears on their faces, were rolling over the
sawdust as if they were in the belly of a great mother where there was
yet room to play" ( 1). 54). In other words, it might be said that the
"pelvic round" is a carnivalesque "space", the space of the circenses.
34 Roland Barthes, Sade/Loyola/Fourler, trans. Richard Miller
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1977) pp. 52-53.
35	 p. 46.
36 Ibid., p. 75.
The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola, trans. with
comm. W.H. Longridge (London: A.R. Mowbray and Co, Ltd, 1955), Annotation
II, p. 7.
ae Ibid., First Week, First Exercise, p. 53.
33 This excision of anything "external" to the subject makes
posible a purely projective and closed system of contemplation. There is
no margin for chance or distraction. This movement inward is not unlike
that followed by Augustine and bears a similar relationship to Plato's
"Reminiscence"--that is, by moving inward the subject gains access to a
prior (to the subject) truth.
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A° Of course, Robin, as "the woman who presents herself f-.1 as a
picture" (1). 37), is the principal figure/image-maker of the text, but
each of the others are marked, at one point or another, with the
connotations of Altamonte's "living statues" (1). 13). (Weisstein suggests
that "Altamonte should be regarded as a Christ figure; and here [p. 241
he has 'come upon his last erection', [-.] erection, surely, is a Freudian
lapsus, a subconscious distortion of resurrection" [Weisstein, p. 5]. If
Altamonte ("high mountain") is a Christ figure, he is certainly a
carnivalesque one, casting out his "guests" that he might enjoy "his last
erection" with a young girl. The perverse "Christ figure" designation
does seem appropriate as Altamonte "puts on" the "living statues", which
suggests mastership/proprietorship.) Certainly, Robin and Jenny are
presented as like "living statues": "they presented the two halves of a
movement that had, as in sculpture, the beauty and absurdity of a desire
that is in flower but that can have no burgeoning [..-] they were like
Greek runners, with lifted feet but without the relief of the final
command that would bring the foot down [.-] in a cataleptic frozen
gesture of abandon" (1). 69). Nora is presented as like a wood carving:
"though her skin was the skin of a child, there could be seen coming,
early in her life, the design that was to be the weatherbeaten grain of
her face, that wood in the work 1.-1" (1). 50). Frau Mann also has this
"carved", manufactured quality: "She seemed to have a skin that was the
pattern of her costume: a bodice of lozenges, red and yellow L..] one
somehow felt that they ran through her as the design runs through hard
holiday candies, and the bulge in the groin where she took the bar 1.-]
was a solid, specialized and as polished as oak" (1). 13). Neither Felix
nor O'Connor are presented as "statues" Ca condition which seems
fundamentally "female" and wood-en), but both are described as "having
been seen" by "many people" or by an anonymous observer/observers (pp.
7, 8, 29, for example). In other words, both men (who have feminine
traits) have been "viewed" as "objects" to be seen, by anyone, by the
"public at large".
4. 1 Loyola, Annotation I, p. 4.
4.2	 p. 67.
4.3 Ibid., First Week, First Exercise, pp. 53-54.
4.4. Ibid, First Week, Additions IV and X, pp. 71 and 73.
118 Ibid., pp. 86, 89, and 91.
.4.16 Barthes, p. 62.
A7 See fn. 38. Could we, reading through Weisstein, see this
orchestrating "half lord, half promoter" as another Altamonte figure, a
carnivalesque Christ (half divine, half mortal)?
Barthes, p. 62.
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" Barthes, p. 63-65: "that evasive presence of the subject
within the image which marks both fantasm and Ignatian contemplation"
(1). 65).
E.° Jacques Lacan emphasizes the importance of "sexual relations"
(as marriage, as the exchange of women) to Freud's understanding of the
"foundations" of "societies":
in establishing, in 'The Interpretation of
Dreams', the Oedipus Complex as the central
motivation of the unconscious, he recognized
this unconscious as the agency of the laws
on which marriage alliance and kinship are
based. This is why I can say to you now that
the motives of the unconscious are limited--a
point on which Freud was quite clear from the
outset and never altered his view--to sexual
desire. Indeed, it is essentially on sexual
relations--by ordering them according to the
law of preferential marriage alliances and
forbidden relations—that the first combina-
tory for the exchanges of women between nominal
lineages is based, in order to develop in an
exchange of gifts and in an exchange of master-
words the fundamental commerce and concrete
discourse on which human societies are based.
(tcrit, pp. 141-42.
51 Augustine, Book VII, Chapter X; and 1 Corinthians 3:2.
52 Barthes, p. 73.
Loyola, p. 26.
5A Mid:, pp. 157-58.
55 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman.
55 Ibid., pp. 243 and 245.
157 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics; Rotsel trans,
P. 111.
CHAPTER FIVE: T'HE CENTRE OF EROTICISM AND DEATII
1 Monique Wittig, "The Point of View: Univeral or Particular" in
Feminist Issues 3 (1983), pp. 63-69.
Night wood has been criticized by critics like Lillian Faderman
(Surpassing the Love of Men, pp. 364-365) for promoting a 19th century
notion of lesbian angst that owes much to male portraits (from Louys to
Krafft -Ebing) of lesbianism. I find this criticism a rather simple-, and
single-, minded approach to a text that, it seems to me, is actually
disemboweling such notions. Shari Benstock, in Women of the Left Bank,
states:
If Nightwood has been read as an analysis of
lesbianism that damns its practices and Ladies
Almanack as a satire of lesbian communities,
it is perhaps because Barnes is so successful
in inverting expected values [...J (p. 248)
This notion that lesbian writers used euphemism, euphemistic
style, or a lesbian "code" in order to write about the love between
women without being censored has been a popular notion since Edmund
Wilson suggested, in The Shores of Light: A Literary Chronicle of the
Twenties and Thirties (New York: Farrar, 1952), that this was Gertrude
Stein's "intent". However, as Benstock has demonstrated (1). 246), this
notion depends on a conventional distinction between "style" and
"content" which is, in itself, "phallic": the critic must "penetrate" the
"style" to get at the "content", as it were.
' It should also be noted that Barnes, in using these "scientific"
terms, is not subscribing to the theories of Ellis and Krafft-Ebing.
O'Connor explodes these terms by refering to the "invert" or "third sex"
as "the sweetest lie of all" which "our miscalculated longing has
created": "they the living lie of our centuries" (FL 139).
6 Wittig, p. 66.
6 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans.
Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia U.P., 1982), p. 138.
7 All of Freud's "discoveries" were made in the course of his
treatments of patients, particularly hysterics, neurotics, and
homosexuals. See Charles Bernheimer, "Introduction", In Dores Case:
Freud- -Hysteria - -Feminism (London: Virago Press, 1985):
Freud invented psychoanalysis between 1895
and 1900 on the basis of his clinical exper-
ience with hysterical patients, nearly all of
them women, and of the self-analysis he per-
formed to cure his own hysterical symptoms.
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Hysteria thus is implicated in psycho-analysis
in the sense that the science enfolds the
disease within it and is constituted simul-
taneously with this pathological interiority.
(p. 1)
That the structure of the human psyche is only revealed in the ruptures
in normalcy caused by "disease"--whether the disease of mental illness
or perversion or the dis-ease motivating dreams--is a "given" of
Freudian psychoanalytic theory. The idea of a "primal scene" or primary
scene of psychic trauma that is then "repeated" in neurotic symptoms
appears to have first come to Freud during his early work with
hysterics. This discovery led to his investigations of the psychical
constructs of childhood, abetted by the disease of "Little Hans", which
culminated in the "discovery" of the oedipal complex. Thus, it could be
said that through the agency of dis-ease, Freud was able to "go back" to
the obscure beginnings of human development. Night wood, with its
emphasis on dis-ease and "going back", seems to be following a similar
project.
Freud's descriptions of his hysterical patients, who are always
"attractive" and frequently "intelligent", and his insistence that he
could not treat an hysteric whom he disliked indicate more than a purely
clinical interest in the hysteric. That his concept of "transference",
which involves an engagement of patient and analyst, should have
developed during his work with hysterics is particularly interesting.
Kristeva, p. 45.
la Kristeva, following Lacan, insists that sexual identity is an
"imaginary identity" and that the "writer of abjection" undoes such
constructs (13. 208). However, Kristeva, even more than Lacan, still seems
to give credence to the actual, biological determinants of sexual
development (having/not having a penis) insisted on by Freud.
Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer, Studies on Hysteria in The
Pelican Freud Library Vol. 3 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,
1986; rpt. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud Vol.	 p. 58.
1	 Sigmund Freud, "Some General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks" in
The Pelican Freud Library Vol. 10 CHarmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1986; rpt. The Standard Edition, Vol. IX), p. 102.
73 Sigmund Freud, "Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to
Bisexuality" in The Pelican Freud Library VoL 10 Crpt. The Standard
Edition, VoL	 p. 94.
1 " Sigmund Freud, "Feminity" in The Standard Edition Vol.	 p.
131.
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' s It was during the period 1885-1886, when Freud was studying
under Charcot, that he become interested in hysteria. He married Martha
Bernays in 1886, following several years of courtship.
16. Freud, Studies on Hysteria, p. 63.
17 See the late essay "Female Sexuality" (1931) in The Pelican
Freud Library, Vol. 7 (rpt. The Standard Edition, Vol. XXI):
L.J this [pre-oedipal] phase of attachment
to the mother is especially intimately related
to the aetiology of hysteria, which is not
surprising when we reflect that both the phase
and the neurosis are characteristically
feminine [....]cp. 373).
"Femininity" is largely based on "Female Sexuality".
' s For Freud, women were always the "other", on the other side of
a (specifically biological) border that could never be crossed
successfully:
Throughout history people have knocked their
heads against the riddle of the nature of femin-
inity	 Nor will you have escaped worrying
over this problem--those of you who are men; to
those of you who are women this will not apply--
you are yourselves the problem. ("Femininity",
p. 113).
1	 Freud, "Female Sexuality", p. 373.
0 See Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, especially, for example,
the chapter "The Signification of the Phallus".
1 I am thinking specifically of Luce Irigaray's Speculum of the
Other Woman and This Sex Which Is Not One. However, Helene Cixous and
Catherine Clement in The Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing
(Manchester; Manchester U.P., 1987; trans. of La Jeune nee Paris: Union
Generale dtditions, 19757), and the various writers who have contributed
to In Dora is Case have all demonstrated the difficulties in Freudian
"readings" of female sexuality.
22' James Joyce, Finneg-ans Wake, p. 115.23.
23 Nadeau, p. 159.
" Marcus, ID. 164.
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lbid, p. 168.
27 Ibid, p. 163.
28 Djuna Barnes, "James Joyce" in DjUna Barnes: Interviews, ed.
Alyce Barry (Washington, D.C.: Sun and Moon Press, 1985), P. 293.
29 Ibid.
3° Sigmund Freud, "Revision of Dream-Theory" in The Standard
Edition Vol. XXII, p. 26.
3 1 Freud, Studies on Hysteria, pp. 360-361.
33 See Freud and Breuer's "On the Psychical Mechanism of
Hysterical Phenomena" in Studies on Hysteria, pp. 53-69.
93 See, for example, "Femininity", p. 128, and "A Special Type of
Choice of Object Made by Men" in The Pelican Freud Library, Vol. 7 (rpt.
The Standard Edition Vol. II), pp. 231-42.
34 See Hanrahan:
L..] Robin is the object of desire of men and
women alike: in her apparent asexuality (she
is like a prince and a monk, a boy, that is an
unformed man), she represents a lost paradise
of completude, a paradise which nobody alive
has ever enjoyed ('where what we never had
stands waiting'); she represents death. (1). 88)
Robin is the object of desire for the characters of the text, with the
possible exception of Dr. O'Connor who points out that in her invert or
"uninhabited angel" guise, she is a "lie". However, Robin also seems to
act as object of desire for the text itself. It is as if Robin's
attraction as an image, as an object--which, according to Hanrahan, "has
no desire of its own and on to which we can project [...1 our desire for
an unchangeable, unchanging world [...](p. 87)--haunts and perplexes
language itself.
5 There is a tendency among some American feminist critics to
read Robin as the virgin goddess of the hunt, and there is indeed a
reference to "'Diane of Ephesus in the Greek Gardens, singing and shaken
in every boson" (pp. 137-38). However, there seems no specific
connection between Robin and Diane, and I find the designation of Robin
as Diana reductive and, in some ways, misleading. Robin may be many
things, but she is certainly not a virgin, nor does she, as Marcus
suggests, "have control over her sexuality" (1). 177).
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2E. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-
Analysis; trans. Alan Sheridan, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Landon & New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981), p. 83.
"Ibid, p. 103. Hanrahan makes the interesting suggestion that
"Robin's identity is predicated on having no identity" (Emu-famln, p. 88),
which emphasizes her "lack" in terms of significatory systems.
Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 90.
2.3 See Studies on Hysteria, "Preliminary Communication".
A° Marcus, p. 159.
Al See Freud's "Mourning and Melancholia" in The Pelican Freud
Library Vol. 11 (rpt. The Standard Edition Vol. XIV:
An object-choice, an attachment of the libido
to a particular person, had at one time existed;
then, owing to a real slight or disappointment
coming from this loved person, the object-
relationship was shattered. The result was not
the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido
from this object and a displacement of it on
to a new one, but something different
(p. 257)
42 Freud, Studies on Hysteria, pp. 348-49.
"	 Freud, "Femininity", p. 135.
AA Freud, "Infantile Sexuality" in The Pelican Freud Library Vol. 7
(rpt. The Standard Edition VoL	 p. 104.
AS See "Femininity", (p. 131):
It would not be surprising if it were to turn
out that each sexuality had its own special
libido appropriated to it, so that one sort
of libido would pursue the aims of a masculine
sexual life and another sort those of a
feminine one. But nothing of the kind is true.
There is only one libido, which serves both the
masculine and the feminine sexual functions.
To it itself we cannot assign any sex: if,
following the conventional equation of activity
and masculinity, we are inclined to describe
it as masculine, we must not forget that it
also covers trends with a passive aim. Never-
theless the Juxtaposition 'feminine libido' is
without any justification.
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Thus, we may, following convention, and with one reservation, call the
libido "masculine", but there is no justification for calling a libido
"feminine".
4-6 See Catherine Clement, "The Guilty One", in The Newly Born
Woman.
41.7* Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction" in The Pelican Freud
Library Vol. 11 (rpt. The Standard Edition Vol. XIV), for example.
Narcissism in this sense would not be a perver-
sion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism
of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure
of which may justifiably be attributed to every
living creature. (p. 66)
AS Freud, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical
Distinction Between the Sexes" in The Pelican Freud Library Vol. 7 (ret.
The Standard Edition Vol. X/X), p. 337.
A9 Freud, "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a
Woman" in The Pelican Freud Library Vol. 9 (rpt. The Standard Edition
Vol. XVIII), p. 382.





SS Ibid, p. 56.
SA Ibid, p. 62.
SS See Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", (pp. 257-58):
The result was not the normal one of a with-
drawal of the libido from this object and a
displacement of it on to a new one, but some-
thing different, for whose coming-about various
conditions seem to be necessary. The object-
cathexis proved to have little power of resis-
tance and was brought to an end. But the free
libido was not displace on to another object;
it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however,
it was not employed in any unspecified way, but
served to establish an identification of the
ego with the abandoned object.
56 Kristeva, p. 38.
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57 Ibid., p. 26.
613 Ibid., p. 16.
59 lbid, p. 208.
50 Ibid., p. 54.
61	 Ibid., p. 22.
6:2 See Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1982).
sa Djuna Barnes, "James Joyce", p. 292.
64 Critical appreciations of the last chapter range from Joseph
Frank's reading of it as a musical "coda" to Elizabeth Pochoda's reading
of it as the demise of language. I have discussed some of these views
in the first chapter of this thesis.
6S I want to reiterate, briefly, the connection between my use of
the term "carnivalesque" and the Derridean terms "differance,
"supplement", etc., as that connection was delineated in the last pages
of Chapter Two. I want to stress that the threshold at which the
"writer of abjection" is positioned (or positions itself) is a sort of
bridge-breach (making "possible the very thing that it makes impossible")
like Rousseau's "supplement", Plato's "pharmakon", Maname's "hymen", and
Balchtin's "carnivalesque". In other words, the writing of abjection, like
these other terms, inscribes "differanc-e" within itself. Between the "I"
and the abject, abjection "writes", a movement that at once both makes
possible the relationship between the "I" and the abject (or between
"being" and "nothing") and subverts the possibility of a synthesis of
opposites, a synthesis that could only produce death (of the "I" and of
signification). I have drawn these threads together--these "non-
synonymous terms"--again simply to emphasize that the term "writing", as
I use it, is always informed by Derridean "writing" and the
"carnivalesque".
GE. See, for example, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" in The Pelican
Freud Library Vol. 11 (rpt. The Standard Edition Vol. XVIII), where the
"compulsion to repeat" is treated in detail.




Barnes, Djuna. Night wood New York: New Directions, 1961; rpt. London:
Faber & Faber, 1936. All references in this thesis are to
the 1961 edition.
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